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Task and Environmental Uncertainty and the Adoption of Technological
Innovations by Home Builders
by T. Michael Toole
An empirical investigation into two research questions pertaining to the adoption of
technological innovations by small- and medium-sized home building firms was
conducted by multiple regression analysis of data collected from interviewing over 100
home builders across the country.
How are home building firms that are more apt to adopt technological innovations before
they are widely diffused differentfrom those that are less apt to do so? The research
showed that home builders who are more apt to adopt non-diffused innovations have
superior information processing abilities related to building innovations. These builders
were found to tap into more sources of information about new products from portions of
their organizational environments than did non-adopters. Information processing
significantly differentiates these builders from those who are less willing to adopt
innovations that are not widely diffused because the uncertainty level of most building
innovations is quite high due to the complexity of the home building task and the
complexity of the organizational environment facing home builders. No significant
relationships were found to exist between adoption behavior and either company size,
number of years the company has been in business, or market segment served (i.e.,
average house price).
How are home buildingfirms that are more apt to adopt high uncertainty technological
innovations before they are widely diffused different from those that are more apt to adopt
low uncertainty innovations before they are widely diffused? The data provided evidence
that the two groups differ in the characteristics of the individuals involved in innovation-
related activities. Propensity to adopt high uncertainty, non-diffused innovations is
associated with having higher numbers of functions (e.g., top management, office
administration, sales, design, site supervision) involved in making adoption decisions.
Each function possesses intimate knowledge of one or more sectors of the environment
and can therefore help to reduce the uncertainty of how well an innovation would fit with
the firm's task process and environment. Propensity to adopt high uncertainty
innovations is also associated with having at least one individual with a building trades
background involved in innovation-related activities. These individuals likely apply their
tacit knowledge about the construction process to reduce the uncertainty relating to how
well an innovation will be assimilated into the existing task process.
Propensity to adopt low uncertainty, non-diffused innovations is associated with having
at least one individual with an architectural or engineering background involved in
innovation-related activities. These individuals apparently apply engineering principles to
reduce the uncertainty of innovations related to physical performance, but cannot reduce
the uncertainty of high uncertainty innovations related to market acceptance. Propensity
to adopt low uncertainty innovations is also associated with having a more positive
attitude about adoption of innovations and/or higher tolerance of uncertainty. This factor
does not play a critical role in relatively early adoption of high uncertainty innovations
apparently because it is overwhelmed by the need for effective gathering and processing
of information about innovations.
The results of this research suggest that, contrary to the prevailing opinion within the
home building industry, builders' adoption of technological innovations substantially
reflects factors within their control. However, contrary to widespread public perception,
the majority of home builders are neither apathetic nor excessively conservative about
new building technologies. The results also suggest that the construct of uncertainty
deserves a more prominent position within organizational diffusion theory.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The rate of technological change in the home building industry continues to be wrongly
perceived by managers in other industries, academics, and the American public as a
whole. In 1980, Ventre railed against the home building industry's reputation as a
"backward industry," "a non-industry," "a headless monster," and "an army of pygmies"
(Ventre, 1980). While these terms have not been used to describe the industry in recent
years, I am confident that if the public was polled as to the perceived rates of
technological progress in various industries, home building would be one of the lowest
(Nelson & Winter, 1977; Oster & Quigley, 1977; U.S. Congress Office of Technology
Assessment, 1986).
To examine the gap between the expected and the perceived rates of technical change in
home building, first consider the expectations. It is generally assumed that in all
industries: some firms should generate technological innovations through formal research
and development (R&D); firms not attempting to generate innovations should quickly
adopt innovations to maintain competitiveness; the set of innovations in an industry over
time will include both incremental and radical innovations; and the result of innovations
over time will be a visible pattern of technical progress, manifested in reductions in the
costs and/or improvements in the performance of the industry's products or services.
Next, consider the perceived rate of technological change. U.S. home builders appear to
violate all four of the above assumptions. Little formal R&D is performed even by the
largest firms. Few firms appear to aggressively import technologies developed in other
industries. Not only have there been no radical innovations adopted throughout the home
building industry over the past few decades, but the flow of incremental improvements is
typically so subtle and so constant that a net change is not obvious to individuals not
familiar with the technical details of home buildings (U.S. Congress, Office of
Technology Assessment, 1986; NAHB, 1990).
Critics could probably understand an industry not meeting normative expectations about
technical change if technology did not play a critical role in the industry (as is the case
with taxi-cabs, truck driving, and other industries), but this is not perceived to be true in
home building. From the normative technologists' view, successful home building
1 Moavenzadeh (1991) reports that nearly 90% of the materials and construction processes of houses
built today are different from those of houses built in the 1950s.
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results from effective application of engineering principles and processes during the
design stage, followed by the managed application of a broad and deep base of tacit
technologies-known as construction trade skills-during the construction stage. Since
tacit and explicit technologies are critical in the design and construction stages,
technological innovation should play a critical role in shaping competition within the
home building industry.
If substantial technological change is not evident, so the view goes, there must be
institutional or individual factors that are to blame. Until the past decade or so, the
fragmented local building code system justifiably was blamed for hindering the diffusion
of innovative building products. Recent evidence, however, has shown that the influence
of building codes on innovation adoption has decreased (Duke, 1988). One explanation
that remains popular for what is perceived as slow diffusion of building innovations is
that home builders are excessively conservative and do not appreciate the benefits of
technological innovation.
The goals of this thesis is to increase our understanding of technological innovation in
home building and refute the perceptions that home builders are ignorant or irrationally
resistant to new technology. I accomplish these goals by investigating the question:
How are home building firms2 that are more apt to adopt technological
innovations before they are widely diffused different from firms that are
less apt to do so?
The theme underlying my research is that uncertainty plays a key role in decisions on
adopting innovative home building products. I furnish evidence that adoption of
innovations that are not widely diffused reflects uncertainty reduction as a result of
internal information processing. In other words, home building firms that adopt
innovations before they are widely diffused process information about innovations better
than firms that are less apt to adopt non-diffused innovations.
Because uncertainty plays such a pivotal role in the adoption behavior of home builders, I
differentiate between high and low uncertainty innovations and focus on a second
research question: How do adopters of high uncertainty, non-diffused
building innovations differ from adopters of low uncertainty, non-
2 The theory and empirical findings presented in this thesis apply to small- and medium-sized home
building firms, that is, firms building less than 200 homes per year. Large home building companies
were also interviewed and observed as part of my research but were not included in my empirical analysis.
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diffused building innovations?
Because so little effective research has been done on the home building industry, I feel it
is important to take a descriptive, rather than a prescriptive, approach. My research
questions do not ask what should builders do; they ask what do builders do. This thesis
does not investigate whether the rate of technological innovation in home building is
sufficient, nor does it assume that it is not. I neither analyze whether most new building
products represent proven technological progress, nor assume that they do. Most
importantly, this thesis does not discuss whether builders should adopt non-diffused
innovations because this may lead to better financial performance. Instead, this thesis
demonstrates that builders who are more apt to adopt innovative building products that are
not widely diffused are indeed different from their competitors who are less apt to do so.3
WHY THIS TOPIC IS IMPORTANT
My research topic is important for several groups. When a home building firm typically
starts using new building products relative to other builders is a key element of its
technology strategy. Technology strategy may in turn play an important role in
determining the overall success of a company. Builders who believe that adopting
innovations may improve their sales and profit margins and help them better deal with
shortages in traditional materials, will be interested in what firm characteristics facilitate
relatively early adoption.
The research reported in this thesis may help building material manufacturers to better
market innovative building products and to reduce the time required for effective
innovations to diffuse throughout the industry.
My research topic is also important for academics. The broader question underlying my
research is how organizational environments influence technological change. This
question is being asked by academicians for other industries, as suggested by the
following quote from a leading organizational theory journal (Tushman & Nelson, 1990:
3)
3 This thesis does aQt provide data or background information about the industry or the home building
process other than what is necessary to communicate my hypotheses. Readers interested in general
information on the industry should consult the President's Committee on Urban Housing (1968), Willis
(1979), or Slaughter (1991).
9
"Several broad research questions motivated this special issue: ... To what
extent do organizational and social factors affect technological change? and What
characteristics of organizations and environments shape the development of
technological change and innovation?"
Government policy makers are aware of the critical need for reductions in the cost of
housing. Housing accounts for a major portion of consumer budgets and therefore
influences the overall quality of life. Although the significant drop in interest rates over
the past two years has reversed the trend, the housing affordability index has substantially
deteriorated over the past two decades (Harvard University Joint Center For Housing
Studies, 1990). While the causes of decreasing affordability are due mostly to higher
land prices, lower real incomes, and other factors unrelated to the actual construction
process, many researchers continue to assert that technology has the potential for
significantly reducing the cost of housing. If this potential is to be achieved, it is essential
that we understand what factors hinder the successful application of improved building
technology.
Home builder adoption behavior is also important in light of two goals that have been
voiced in the federal government. One goal is to stimulate the diffusion of energy-
efficient and environmentally-friendly innovations. A second goal is to transfer advanced
materials and manufacturing systems developed in defense-related industries into civilian
industries, including construction. Such a program would not be entirely new. Formal
government programs to encourage the transfer of technology, capital, and management
expertise from Fortune 500 firms into the housing industry were established immediately
after World War II and in 1969. Neither of these programs, however, were more than
marginally successful. And, as the following quote implies, it is not clear that our
understanding of technological innovation in home building has advanced sufficiently
since those periods to ensure a similar program would be more successful now.
"Little is known, for example, about the characteristics of early adopters, the
specific attributes of housing innovations that influence adoption, and how
various actors in the housing industry make adoption decisions." (National
Association of Home Builders Research Center, 1991: 38)
I show in Chapter Two that the existing home building innovation literature emphasizes
institutional barriers to innovation and that few studies have investigated individual- and
organizational-level factors. Yet it is on the latter levels that decisions concerning
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innovation are made. If we hope to promote the adoption of advanced technologies by
home builders, we need to know more about what they think about innovations in
general, how they decide whether to adopt specific innovations, and what aspects of their
environment most influence when and how innovations are adopted. This thesis may
therefore help government agencies make better decisions about funding innovative
building technology research, development, and transfer programs in not-for-profit
laboratories and universities.
BACKGROUND DEFINITIONS
Due to the lack of consistent and precise definitions in the literature, it is appropriate to
provide up front definitions of key terms in this thesis.
Technological innovation in home building is the application of technology that is
new to an organization and that significantly improves the design and construction of a
living space by:
· decreasing installed cost (due to a greater volume of output resulting from a given
level of input);
* increasing installed performance (i.e., qualitatively superior output from a given level
of input); and/or
· increasing construction business performance (i.e., quantitatively or qualitatively
superior process, such as reduced lead time and increased flexibility.)
Let me focus on a few elements of this definition because it is central to the thesis. The
phrase "that is new to an organization" borrows from the extant diffusion research the
notion that innovation is something new to an organization. It need not be new to the
entire industry. Thus, when a company uses any significant product or process for the
first time and continues to use it, we say that innovation has occurred, regardless if this
first use represents no technical progress for the company's industry as a whole.
"That significantly improves" is intended to eliminate minor changes that are so
inconsequential that most builders or home owners have little incentive to consider
changing. For example, changes that result in cost savings of less than $10 per house or
less than a few percentages of a performance parameter would not be considered
significant.
"The design and construction of a living space" eliminates administrative changes that
have no effect on the home building process or final product. Using a computer for job
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costing (that is, financial record keeping of past expenditures) is an administrative
innovation, while using a computer for estimating or scheduling would be considered a
technological innovation because it can significantly influence the sequencing of the
individual work tasks and whether the proper quantities of materials were ordered.
"Design" does not refer to purely aesthetic design. Changes in living spaces or
architectural features to accommodate lifestyle changes and aesthetic preferences are
generally not considered technological innovations. If, however, such changes require
changes in the technical design, the technical process, or new materials, then they are
considered technological innovations. Breakfast nooks and pass-throughs would
generally be considered only architectural changes because they require only minor
modifications to the existing framing process. Bigger living rooms, on the other hand,
often may be associated with a technological innovation because they require the second
story floor joists span longer distances, which often requires the use of innovative
framing materials or designs.
While the previous examples illustrate that changed appearance does not necessarily imply
technological innovation, it is also true that an unchanged appearance does not necessarily
imply that technological innovation has not occurred. There is an oriented strand board
(OSB) siding product available that is nearly identical in appearance to traditional wood
siding. Yet this product is a technological innovation because the underlying material-
engineered reconstituted wood-is significantly different in cost, performance, and factor
inputs from traditional sawn lumber.
Home builder adoption of a technological innovation occurs when a home
building firm first uses a technological innovation that it subsequently uses in at least 25%
of the cases in which it has an opportunity to use the innovation. The italicized portion of
the previous sentence is an important part of the definition but rather difficult to ascertain.
Aside from high volume speculative builders who rarely deviate from a standard portfolio
of regional house designs, most builders construct a wide variety of homes. They may
try a new product on a house, have success with it, yet not attempt to use it again on their
next few houses because they consider it inappropriate (namely, not cost-effective) for the
customer, design, or market. While it is clear that a builder who tries an innovation then
never uses it again is not considered to have adopted it, it is not clear whether a builder
who has not used an innovation recently should be considered a non-adopter.4
4 While this definition may seem awkward or excessively vague, I mention in Chapter Three that very
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The terms "early adoption" and "early adopter" are used in this thesis as they are used
in the existing diffusion literature. That is, early adoption refers to adoption that occurs
within the early stages of an innovation's diffusion. Early adoption does not necessarily
imply that adoption occurs shortly after the innovation is first introduced. For example,
steel studs (for framing light structures such as commercial and residential buildings)
have been available for many decades, but their market share is currently less than 5%.
Therefore, a builder who uses steel studs in his houses is considered an early adopter
even though he might not have started using them until 20 or more years after they
became available.
Organizational environments are the conditions in which organizations operate.
They are the external factors that influence how an organization must behave if it is to be
considered successful. The totality of these conditions are often divided into specific
sectors, such as suppliers, customers, technology, socio-political, regulatory, and
competitors. For example, important aspects of the customer sector of a home builder's
environment might include the demand for rapid-construction, energy efficiency, or a
specific architectural feature. Chapter Two summarizes the portions of home builders'
environments that may influence their adoption behavior.
The term risk refers to decisions in which the individual knows both the subjective utility
of possible outcomes and the probabilities associated with these outcomes (Luce &
Raiffa, 1957). Thus, risky situations can be rationally evaluated by calculating expected
value. 5 This academic definition is more narrow than the definition used by practitioners,
the latter referring to a situation in which there are two or more possible outcomes to an
event, of which at least one is not desirable.
Uncertainty is defined as the state when an individual perceives that she is missing
information necessary for a decision or action. Specifically, information is missing that
would allow the decision maker to know what outcomes are possible from her decision
and the odds associated with each outcome. Uncertain situations are almost always
few builders requested clarification when I asked them if they used an innovation "on a regular basis."
5 Consider the simple example in which you are playing one-on-one basketball with your friend and he
challenges you to bet $1 on the next game. Should you accept the bet? According to normative decision
theory, it would be irrational for you to accept the bet unless you believe that the expected outcome of the
bet is greater than your current situation. Let's say you believe that the chances of you winning are 55%.
The expected value of the bet would be the probability of winning (.55) multiplied by the outcome of
winning ($1 + $1 you already have = $2) plus the probability of losing (.45) multiplied by the outcome
from losing (0), which equals $1.10. $1.10 is greater than the outcome of not taking the bet (1.00
multiplied by $1= $1.00), so you should take the bet. The bet is risky in that there is a possibility of
you losing your dollar, but if you wish to maximize the amount in your wallet, you should take the bet.
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perceived as being "risky" (using the common notion of risk) in that there is a possibility
(albeit unknown) that the outcome of the situation will be undesirable.
Task uncertainty is uncertainty resulting from characteristics of the decision maker's
work process or an organization's set of value activities.
Environmental uncertainty is uncertainty resulting from characteristics of the
decision maker's external environment. In this thesis, environmental uncertainty does not
refer to uncertainty resulting from a decision maker's internal environment, that is,
conditions within the decision maker's organization (Duncan, 1972).
High uncertainty innovations differ from low uncertainty innovations in the
amount of information that potential adopters are typically missing when they first hear
about the innovation. High uncertainty building innovations are those in which potential
adopters are missing substantial amounts information relating to, for example, long-term
performance, total installed cost, or acceptance by home buyers, subcontractors, or local
building officials. Low uncertainty innovations are those in which potential adopters are
not missing substantial amounts of information pertaining to these criteria.
OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS
The structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter Two reviews several sets of literature
on my research topic and theoretically explains how the home building task and home
builders' organizational environments contribute to high levels of uncertainty about many
home building innovations. Chapter Two also suggests that home builders who are more
apt to adopt non-diffused innovations are those who have superior abilities to gather and
process information about innovations and higher tolerances of uncertainty.
Chapter Three presents nine hypotheses that follow directly from the perspectives on my
research questions presented in Chapter Two. Chapter Three also includes a detailed
discussion of the methodology used to gather empirical evidence for my hypotheses.
Namely, I conducted telephone or in-person semi-structured interviews with 108 builders
around the country.
Chapter Four discusses the multiple regression and probit analysis process that were used
to analyze my data and that indicate at least partial statistical support for five of the nine
hypotheses. Chapter Five summarizes my research and suggests implications for various
groups associated with home building.
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The appendices include the classification of high or low uncertainty of the twelve
innovations used to measure the dependent variables, the questionnaire form that was
used to record every interview, my raw data, and descriptive statistics.
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CHAPTER 2: EXISTING AND NEW PERSPECTIVES ON
THE ADOPTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS BY
HOME BUILDERS
This chapter has two objectives. One objective is to draw from four sets of literature that
are relevant to my research questions. 6 The four sets of literature are home building
innovation, diffusion theory, organizational environments, and descriptive decision
theory. The second objective is to show that uncertainty is a major factor influencing
home builder adoption behavior and that builders more apt to adopt non-diffused
innovations are better able to reduce uncertainty through effective information processing
than are builders less apt to adopt non-diffused innovations.
HOME BUILDING INNOVATION
While no literature on home building innovation specifically addresses either of my
research questions, many reports address a related question: What factors affect the
diffusion of innovations in the home building industry?7 Table 1 summarizes the
answers to these questions most often found in the literature. All of the factors included
in Table 1 are assumed to be negatively related to the generation or adoption of
innovations. With few exceptions, all of the relationships suggested in Table 1 are based
on intuitive analysis, usually by applying general theory to the home building industry. 8
The existing literature focuses almost exclusively on industry-level factors. Not only
does the literature emphasize institutional barriers to innovation (such as governmental
regulations), the firm-level and individual-level characteristics that are seen as directly
influencing diffusion of innovations are themselves seen as being determined by industry-
level factors. For example, firm size, management intensity, and profit margins (shown
6 How are home builders who are more apt to adopt technological innovations that are not widely
diffused different from home builders who are less apt to do so? And, how do adopters of high uncertainty
non-diffused building innovations differ from adopters of low uncertainty non-diffused building
innovations?
7 Although there are exceptions--e.g., Ventre (1973, 1980), Moavenzadeh (1991), and Slaughter (1991,
1993)-it is interesting to note that the majority of literature on construction innovation seems to accept
the assumption that the rate of technological innovation in home building is lower than it should or could
be.
8 The relationships suggested by NAHB Foundation (1972) and Ehrenkrantz Group/Gershon Meckler
Assoc. (1979) are based on empirical investigation. Ventre (1973), Oster & Quigley (1977), and
Slaughter (1991) are also empirical pieces, but the factors that they suggest influence the rate of technical
progress in home building are based on intuitive analysis.
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in Table 1) are firm-level factors that result from variation among local building codes,
cyclical sales, and horizontal and vertical fragmentation.
Table 1: Factors Discouraging Innovation in Home Building
Factor Source Typical Explanation
variations NAHB Research Foundation, Inconsistent local building codes limit
among 1972; Ventre, 1973; the potential market of innovations.
building Ehrenkrantz Group/Gershon
codes Meckler Assoc., 1979; Oster &
Quigley, 1977; Tatum, 1986;
U.S. Congress OTA, 1986;
Slaughter, 1991; NAHBRC,
1989b, 1991; Toole & Tonyan,
._ i1992
cyclical sales President's Committee on Volatile demand makes it harder to
Urban Housing, 1968; Oster & carry the relatively large fixed costs
Quigley, 1977; Tatum, 1986; typically associated with generating or
U.S. Congress OTA, 1986; adopting innovations.
Moavenzadeh, 1991; Slaughter,
1991; NAHBRC, 1989b, 1991;
Toole & Tonyan, 1992
conservative President's Committee on Home buyers reject innovations and
home buyers Urban Housing, 1968; Ventre, insist builders offer traditional
1973, 1980; Ehrenkrantz materials and designs.
Group/Gershon Meckler
Assoc., 1979; U.S. Congress
OTA, 1986; NAHBRC, 1989b,
1991; Toole & Tonyan, 1992
vertical President's Committee on The vertical disjointedness of the
fragmentation Urban Housing, 1968; Ventre, home building value system (i. e.,
1973; U.S. Congress OTA, designers, general contractors,
1986; Moavenzadeh, 1991; subcontractors, and others are all
NAHBRC, 1989b, 1991; Toole involved in each project but no one
& Tonyan, 1992 group dominates the process, and the
typical lack of cooperation among
these groups) prevents the joint prob-
lem solving and acceptance necessary
for innovation.
horizontal Ventre, 1973; U.S. Congress The disjointedness between the
fragmentation OTA, 1986; Moavenzadeh, different building trades involved on
1991; NAHBRC, 1989b, 1991 each project prevents the systems
integration that is necessary for
innovation.
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Table 1, continued
Although the literature mentioned in Table 1 does not directly address my specific
research questions, it does provide information and theory that allow us to infer answers.
If the overall rate of technological progress in home building and the diffusion rates of
individual innovations reflect institutional characteristics of the industry, home builders
who are willing to adopt non-diffused innovations must somehow manage to overcome
such barriers. Thus, referring back to Table 1, we might infer that such adopters have
sufficient staffing to reduce management intensity, broad vertical and horizontal scopes of
operations, etc. Unfortunately, most of these are associated with large firm size. They
do not help us to predict what characteristics of small home building companies might
determine whether they typically adopt innovations earlier than other builders.
Only one report has taken the issue one step further and addresses what firm-level and
individual-level factors influence when a company typically adopts technological
innovations. An unpublished report by the National Association of Home Builders
Research Center (NAHBRC) (1989b) includes an exploratory multiple regression
18
small size of Oster & Quigley, 1977; Small firms rarely have the human
firms Ehrenkrantz Group/Gershon and financial resources to pursue
Meckler Assoc., 1979; U.S. innovation.
Congress OTA, 1986;
Moavenzadeh, 1991; Slaughter,
1991; NAHBRC, 1989b, 1991
variation in President's Committee on Local variation limits potential sales of
housing not Urban Housing, 1968; innovations, which makes it more
related to Slaughter, 1991; NAHBRC, difficult to amortize investment.
codes 1989b, 1991
labor NAHB Research Foundation, Labor resists innovations that might
resistance 1972; Ventre, 1973; NAHBRC, reduce labor requirements or cross
1989b, 1991 (trade) jurisdictional boundaries.
low profit Tatum, 1986; NAHBRC, Builders interpret the uncertainty
margins on 1989b, 1991 inherent in innovations as higher risk.
total contract Risk (unless compensated by
value significant benefits) must be
minimized because low margins are
so low that failure of any sort could
result in a net loss on a proect
management NAHBRC, 1989b, 1991 The day to day operations of home
intensity building require intense management,
leaving little time to consider or initi-
ate innovation.
analysis of data from the "1987 NAHB Builders Survey." The variables included in the
initial full (i.e., not stepwise) model are total employees, amount of work subcontracted,
percentage of company that is direct labor, age of the owner/CEO, education of the
owner/CEO, years in business, whether the firm engages in any multi-family
construction, and whether the firm uses any "industrialized construction technologies."
The exploratory analysis indicates that variables associated with total employees,
subcontracting, multi-family construction, and industrialized technologies were
significant at the p<.05 level. However, the contribution of this study to my own
research is limited by the fact that the regression model did not include many potentially
important independent variables. (This is not surprising given that the data were collected
for purposes other than exploring potential determinants of firm adoption behavior, and
may explain why the multiple R squared of the stepwise equation was only 0.08.) The
NAHB study is also limited by the fact that pre-regression and post-regression analyses
was not included in the report to confirm that multiple regression was an appropriate
analysis tool. (Chapter Four of this thesis discusses the issue of appropriate pre-
regression analysis further.)
DIFFUSION THEORY
Diffusion theory is a topic within the field of the management of technology and
innovation that the diffusion of innovations within communities and the adoption of
innovations by individual units. The seminal work on diffusion theory is The Diffusion
ofInnovations by Everett Rogers (1983). He identifies five elements found in many
diffusion or adoption studies:
· Diffusion has four basic elements: innovations, social systems, communication
channels, and time.
* There are two primary types of communication channels: mass media and
interpersonal.
* The innovation-decision process can be conceptualized as having five stages:
knowledge, persuasion, decision, implementation, and confirmation.
* There are three important aspects of the social system: social structure, norms,
opinion leaders and change agents.
* The rate of diffusion of an innovation is influenced by five characteristics of the
innovation: Relative Advantage, Compatibility, Complexity, Trialability,
Observability.
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The Diffusion of Innovations (Rogers, 1983) includes a chapter expressly on
organizational innovation. He suggests three sets of factors that influence when an
organization adopts innovations: individual personality characteristics of management,
characteristics of organizational structure, and characteristics related to the organization's
interconnectedness with its environment. Figure 1 contains a compilation of
generalizations about what factors influence the typical adoption timing of organizations.
The ten individual (leader) characteristics were compiled from Rogers' (1983) Chapter 7,
which discusses the individual attributes of early adopters. Structural characteristics are
explicitly listed and discussed in some detail in Rogers' Chapter 10. Unfortunately,
external characteristics of the organization are neither listed nor discussed anywhere in the
book. In Figure 1, the plus and minus signs in parentheses indicate whether the factor
typically positively or negatively influences organizational innovativeness.
Figure 1: Independent variables related to organizational innovativeness
(compiled from Rogers, 1983)
Individual (Leader) Characteristics
1. Years of education (+)
2. Exent of dogmatism (-)
3. Ability to deal with abstractions (+)
4. Attitude toward change (+)
5. Ability to cope with uncertainty and risk (+)
6. Attitude toward science (+)
7. Fatalistic attitude (-)
8. Exposure to mass communication (+)
9. Exposure to interpersonal communication (+)
10. Intensity of information seeking (+)
Internal Characteristics of Organizational
Organizational Structure Innovativeness
1. Centralization (-)
2. Complexity (+)
3. Formalization (-)
4. Interconnectedness (+)
5. Organizational Slack (+)
6. Size (+)
External Characteristics of
the Organization
1. System openness (+)
2. Etc.
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DIFFUSION THEORY DOES NOT ADEQUATELY CAPTURE THE
UNCERTAINTY IN ORGANIZATIONAL ADOPTION DECISIONS
Although the literature on the diffusion of innovations is one of the most voluminous in
social science, the vast majority of it focuses on adoption by individuals in a community-
based social system, rather than adoption of technological innovations by industrial
organizations (Baldridge & Burnham, 1975; Gatignon & Robertson, 1986; Van de Ven &
Rogers, 1988). Much of the theory developed for individual adoption does not
adequately apply to the organizational adoption context because the latter is inherently
more complex.
Three characteristics of organizational adoption contribute to its complexity. First, there
are many organizational variables that act over and above the aggregate of individual
variables (Ven de Ven & Rogers, 1988). For example, the outcome of an organizational
adoption decision may reflect organizational inertia or political struggles more than the
characteristics of the individuals making the decision or the characteristics of the
innovation.
Second, the task process in which technological innovations are introduced is typically
more complex, reflecting multiple sets of distinct technical skills applied in many
interdependent activities. Furthermore, the products of the completed tasks are often
composed of numerous interrelated subsystems, which may exhibit dynamic, counter-
intuitive behavior (Forrester, 1969). This characteristic suggests that the implicit
assumption in existing diffusion theory, that potential adopters have the ability to obtain
nearly complete knowledge of the characteristics of an innovation (e.g., how it would
match with the adopter's task), is inappropriate.
The third characteristic of organizational adoption decisions that make them significantly
more complex than individual adoption decisions is that the number, diversity, and
volatility of individuals and organizations with which organizations typically interact is
much greater than is the case with individuals. This point is discussed further in the
section of this chapter entitled, "Environmental uncertainty of home building
innovations."
The latter two characteristics suggest the need for theoretical links between an
organization's task and environment and its adoption behavior. Specifically, they suggest
that the relative advantage of an innovation is not strictly a function of how an innovation
matches with the internal characteristics of an organization, such as norms or structure.
The relative advantage of an innovation is also a function of how the innovation can be
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expected to fit with an potential adopter's task, and a function of how the innovation
allows the organization to match with its environment. Figure 2 illustrates that adoption
behavior, which is an important component of technology strategy, thus fits naturally
with the emerging concept of strategy as guiding an organization's match to its
environment (Bourgeois, 1980; Venkatraman & Prescott, 1990).
Figure 2: The concept of strategy as matching an organization with its
environment
ENVIRONMENT
the interface between
and its environment
tributors
petitors
)ns
an organization
To evaluate an innovation's relative advantage, individuals making organizational
adoption decisions need tremendous amounts of information related to the innovation and
to their environments. Yet, task complexity and environmental complexity and volatility
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can result in potential adopters missing information necessary to effectively analyze how
adopting the innovation within their organization will effect their organization's match
with its environment. Consequently, uncertainty-which was defined in Chapter One
as the state when an individual is missing information relevant to a decision-plays a
critical role in the adoption of technological innovations by organizations.
Existing diffusion theory does not sufficiently address uncertainty. Rogers (1983)
includes only a few passing references to the uncertainty inherent in innovations.
Existing diffusion theory also has not sufficiently addressed how organizational
environments and task characteristics influence adoption behavior or how organizations
gather and process information to reduce uncertainty. Gatignon and Roberts (1989)
included hypotheses that pertained to each of these constructs, but their conceptualizations
and measurements are not helpful for understanding the home building industry, and
many of their hypotheses were not supported. Ettlie and Bridges (1982) report that the
few studies of how environmental uncertainty influences adoption have yielded
contradictory results. 9
In short, while the existing diffusion theory is satisfactory for predicting diffusion of
innovations in an individual consumer context, significant gaps develop when it is applied
to many organizational adoption contexts. Furthermore, even the organizational
characteristics that have been shown to predict innovativeness in other industries (see
Figure 1) seem to be of little use for understanding the adoption behavior of small home
building companies. Generic constructs such as formalization and centralization are
difficult to define and even more difficult to measure in firms with few employees.
Before considering the uncertainty of most building innovation adoption decisions, it
might be helpful to elaborate on the concept of uncertainty in adoption decisions in
general. It was stated in Chapter One that normative decision theory holds that decision
makers should endeavor to make choices that offer the highest expected value. In other
words, decision makers should make choices that provide the best chances of an outcome
meeting their goals. In the case of adoption decisions, decision makers must judge
whether the technological innovation they are considering using offers a better set of
potential outcomes than that offered by the product or method they currently use.
9 Their own results appear to support the hypothesis that uncertainty and early adoption are positively
related; however, I question the contribution of this study given that the sample consisted of graduate and
undergraduate students.
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In order to identify the choice offering highest expected value, it is necessary to know all
possible outcomes associated with each choice and the probabilities associated with each
outcome. Five distinct elements are required. A decision maker must: 1) know the goals
that are relevant to the decision; 2) know the variables that influence potential outcomes
and the states of these variables; 3) know the cause and effect relationships between the
variables (Schrader, Riggs & Smith, 1993); 4) have the ability to calculate the potential
outcomes that result from elements 1) through 3); and 5) know the reversibility the
decision. If a decision maker can reverse a choice that led to an undesirable outcome with
little effort or tangible cost, the set of potential outcomes associated with that choice will
clearly be viewed more positively than if the consequences of a decision were costly or
impossible to reverse.
Except in the case of pure gambles, decision makers are always missing one or more of
the five elements listed above and thus cannot identify the possible outcomes associated
with each choice and the probabilities associated with each outcome. Herbert Simon
made a major contribution to organizational theory with his picture of managers as
satisficers who constantly make decisions under at least some degree of uncertainty
(March & Simon, 1958). Psychologists have since theorized and furnished empirical
evidence for heuristicsl 0 and other cognitive mechanisms that humans routinely use to
make decisions without having all of the desired information (Tversky & Kahneman,
1974).
The previous paragraph does not imply that individuals are always comfortable with and
effective at making decisions under uncertainty. Psychological research over the past two
decades has shown that individuals facing highly uncertain decisions frequently avoid the
decisions altogether or demonstrate extreme decision biases. This point will be discussed
further at the end of the chapter, after discussing how the task and environmental
characteristics of home building causes most adoption decisions to be highly uncertain.
TASK UNCERTAINTY OF HOME BUILDING INNOVATIONS
It was suggested in the previous section that potential organizational adopters of
innovations frequently have difficulty evaluating how an innovation will match with their
task. This section elaborates on this point in the context of the home building industry.
10 Heuristics are cognitive shortcuts that people use to make decisions without undue mental effort or
the need to have all information available at the time of the decision (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974;
Hogarth, 1980).
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Five distinct characteristics of the home building process make it difficult for potential
adopters to analyze how innovations may effect their operations. Three of the five
characteristics relate to Perrow's (1967) two dimensions for categorizing organizational
tasks: variety and analyzability. The former refers to "the degree to which stimuli is
familiar or non familiar" while the latter refers to whether the search necessary to solve
unfamiliar stimuli can be logical, analytical, and systematic. The first characteristic
discussed below-the variety of the end product-pertains to task variety. The second
and third characteristics pertain to task analyzability. Due to the complex interaction of
multiple subsystems installed by groups possessing distinct, tacit skills, the task of
designing and installing all but the simplest homes is fairly unanalyzable.
The end products vary considerably. It is obvious that houses are not like consumer
goods in which a limited number of product variations are mass produced and marketed
around the country. The variations in size, layout, materials, living spaces, and style of
houses around the country due to local tastes, climate, and regulations are tremendous
(Slaughter, 1991). The variation even within geographic regions is considerable. A
substantial portion of the single family detached (SFD) homes in the U.S. are considered
custom homes, that is, they have designs that are at least partially custom tailored to the
desires of the future buyer. Since the concrete benefits of an innovation depend on the
characteristics of the house in which it is used, weighing the expected benefits versus the
switching or fixed costs associated with adopting the innovation can be difficult.
The end products of the task consist of many interacting parts and/or dynamic
subsystems. Houses are assembled from thousands of parts which comprise at least six
distinct but interrelated subsystems (Oster & Quigley, 1977; Tatum, 1986): structural,
building envelope, interior and exterior finishes, plumbing, HVAC (heating, ventilating,
and air conditioning), and electrical. This fact influences innovation adoption decisions in
two ways. First, it makes it harder to analyze how an innovation itself will perform and
how interrelated systems will perform. An innovation that ostensibly is part of only one
subsystem may change the performance of another subsystem in an unpredictable way.
For example, through a series of incremental improvements over the past five decades, air
leakage through the building envelope has been significantly reduced, thereby reducing
uncomfortable drafts and energy usage. Unfortunately, this technological "progress" has
caused excessive moisture, poor indoor air quality, and other problems to develop
(Slaughter, 1991). Oriented strand board, which is a sheathing product used in lieu of
plywood, is another example. Some builders believe that it swells more than plywood
and does not hold nails as well, which requires changes in how finish materials are
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typically installed.
The second way in which the interrelated systems characteristic of houses influence
adoption decisions is to make the consequences of poor adoption decisions potentially
severe. A new building product that does not perform as expected could have short- or
long-term health and safety implications for the occupants. Replacing many building
products requires removing and replacing adjacent materials in order to gain access. For
example, replacing defective structural, building envelope, or utility systems requires that
finish materials be removed and replaced. The cost of such work can easily exceed the
profit generated on the entire house.
Long time frame and wide range of conditions associated with output. As mentioned
above, few houses are exactly alike in design and materials. When installation,
regulation, site conditions, and end users are also considered, every house is to some
extent unique. Even two houses with identical designs located next to one another may
differ in non-trivial ways due, for example, to variation in the following areas during the
construction process: the weather; the skills, attitudes, and energy levels of the
tradesmen; when the local building inspector happened to be on site; whether the specified
materials were actually ordered, delivered, and installed correctly; and whether there was
a vein of clay underlying one of the footings. Once the house is built and occupied, the
range of extreme weather, unusual living habits, and other conditions under which the
house must perform over a lifetime of twenty or more years is also largely unknown.11
Although governmental regulations and the market demand that building material
manufacturers test new products before marketing them, the testing that is performed
often falls short of approximating the range of field conditions. Also, expected service
lives of most innovations are considerably longer than pre- or post-introduction testing
periods and accelerated testing methods are often dubious. In short, it is difficult for a
home builder to be completely confident that every portion-particularly those that
include one or more innovations-of every new house he or she builds will stand up to a
wide range of design, installation, and occupancy conditions over many years.
The task requires high levels of tacit knowledge and skills. By definition, tacit
knowledge and skills are those that are not easily articulated or transferred to others. The
11 A local building official told me in an interview that this is the reason why local code officials have
the authority to reject innovative building materials and systems that have been approved by the state
building code or have a National Evaluation Report issued them by the three model code agencies.
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building trades includes high levels of tacit knowledge and skills that are gained through
many years of on-the-job training and socialization (Stinchcombe, 1959). The tacit nature
of construction trade skills make it difficult for an individual without a trades background
to understand the nuances of the construction task process. The tacit nature also makes it
difficult for an individual to articulate to someone without his specific trades background
the consequences of changes resulting from the introduction of an innovation. The many
sets of tacit knowledge necessary to build houses thereby contribute to the uncertainty of
building innovations.
The task requires interaction with a large number of diverse entities. For a complex set of
reasons, the entire process of building a home is performed by many organizations other
than home building companies. The uncertainty their involvement contributes to the
adoption decision is discussed in the next section.
As a result of the five characteristics of the home building task summarized above,
potential adopters of building innovations that have not been widely diffused are typically
missing a tremendous amount of information relevant to their decision. Unless the
organization is able to gather and process a substantial portion of the missing information,
the assessment of "relative advantage" becomes difficult and unstable. The information
missing as a result of task complexity might not be viewed as so critical if builders
perceived that nearly all building innovations have been eventually shown to provide a net
economic advantage. Unfortunately, the history of the home building industry is full of
examples of innovations that were adopted by some builders but eventually shown not to
be able to accommodate the range of conditions to which they were subjected. Fire-
retardant plywood and early in-slab plastic pipe systems are two examples of products
that eventually failed in the field, causing irreparable damage to many home builders.
ENVIRONMENTAL UNCERTAINTY OF HOME BUILDING
INNOVATIONS
It was stated earlier in this chapter that the relative advantage of an innovation is in part a
function of how the innovation allows the organization to match with its environment.
This section discusses the uncertainty prevalent in the adoption decisions of home
builders that is related to their organizational environments. It is first useful to review the
organizational environments literature because it provides a useful framework for
analyzing an organization's environment, the organization's ability to predict future states
of the environment, and how an inability to predict future characteristics of the
environment may influence the organization's behavior.
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Organizational environments may be conceived as "those external actors or conditions
relevant or potentially relevant to goal setting and goal attainment" or "the primary set of
forces to which the organization must respond" (Miles & Snow, 1978: 252).
Organizational environments have traditionally been seen as consisting of five sectors:
technology, supplier, regulatory, competitor, and customer. It is the "match" between
these sectors and an organization that determines an organization's performance. Thus,
the five sectors-individually and as a group-influence what a company must do to
achieve profitability, growth, and other organizational goals.
Much of the organizational environments literature focuses on the characteristics of the
environment that induce uncertainty within organizations about how to best match the
environment. The higher the amount of perceived environmental uncertainty, the
more difficult it is for managers to make decisions concerning what actions are most
appropriate for achieving organizational goals.
Miles and Snow (1978: 252-253) summarize well the prominence of environmental
uncertainty in organization theory:
"Although theory and research on organizational environments have employed
numerous dimensions, the uncertainty dimension has received by far the most
attention. March and Simon (1958) suggested that uncertainty absorption is one
of the most fundamental functions of an organization. Weick (1969) and
Galbraith (1973) argued that organization structure largely arises from attempts
to remove equivocality from external information and to process this information
during performance of internal tasks. Finally, Thompson (1967, p. 159)
claimed: 'Uncertainty appears as the fundamental problem for complex
organizations and coping with uncertainty, as the essence of the administrative
process."'
Concepts and causal theory related to environmental uncertainty help to supplement our
understanding of the uncertainty of home building innovations gained from the
construction innovation and diffusion theory literatures. Empirical research has shown
that environmental uncertainty influences organizational structure, strategy, and
performance (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Miles & Snow, 1978; Tung, 1979; Bourgeois,
1985). Since each of these constructs have been shown to correlate with organizational
innovation and because uncertain environments imply it is more difficult to predict how
an innovation would allow an organization to match its environment, it seems likely that
environmental uncertainty may directly influence organizational adoption behavior. To
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date, the relationship between environmental uncertainty and adoption behavior has not
been sufficiently researched. As mentioned in the previous section, Ettlie & Bridges
(1982) state that the research results to date have been contradictory. 12
The dimensions of the environment that contribute to environmental uncertainty have been
debated for two decades (Duncan, 1972; Sharfman & Dean, 1991). Dess and Beard
(1984) build on the work of Child (1972), Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), Aldrich (1979)
and others in theorizing that three dimensions of the environment contribute most to
environmental uncertainty.
Munificence refers to "the extent to which the environment can support sustained
growth" (Dess & Beard, 1984: 55). Munificence can be thought of as the degree of
hostility. Organizations in industries that are fragmented, have low profit margins, or
pursue stable or shrinking markets face environments with low munificence. Low
munificence contributes to uncertainty because it implies that organizations face stiff
competition in achieving organizational goals relating to revenue and profit growth. In
addition, low munificence also implies that the consequences of improper decisions may
threaten organizational survival.
Dynamism refers to unpredictable volatility in demand, prices, product characteristics,
technologies, and other important industry characteristics. Unpredictable change
contributes to uncertainty because managers do not know on what assumptions they
should base their decisions. The contribution of dynamism to perceived uncertainty is
heightened when organizational response requires a significant amount of time and
resources.
Complexity refers to "the heterogeneity of and range of an organization's activities"
(Child, 1972: 3; cited in Dess & Beard, 1984: 56). The more inputs required for an
organization's operations, the more outputs it produces, the more organizations and
industries that it interacts with, or the more regulated it is, the higher the complexity of an
organization's environment. Complexity contributes to perceived uncertainty by
increasing the number of variables that managers must take into account when making
decisions about organizational actions.
Home builders face extremely high perceived environmental uncertainty (PEU), which
12 To the best of my knowledge, Ettlie & Bridges (1982) is the most recent article to research this
relationship.
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influences adoption behavior. The dynamism of the industry is high in that it faces
extreme swings in demand (Rosen, 1979; NAHBRC, 1991), perhaps more than any
other American industry. Volatile demand influences innovation because it is difficult for
managers to determine their company's ability to amortize capitalization and fixed costs
necessary for generating and adopting innovations. The industry also faces extreme
swings in material prices. For example, the cost of lumber needed to frame a typical
house has increased over 50% over the past two years.
The munificence of the home builder industry is very low as a result of low profit
margins, fragmentation (NAHBRC, 1991), and not having sustained market growth in
decades. (Housing starts have fluctuated between 1.0 and 1.9 million since the 1950s.)
Low munificence results in very few home building firms having sufficient resources to
invest in generating or adopting innovations while also ensuring sufficient organizational
slack to survive drastic drops in demand.
The complexity of builder's organizational environment is due to the number and
diversity of external groups and industries which may influence the effectiveness of the
adoption decision. Figure 3 indicates the groups and organizations associated with the
entire home building process.
The home building innovation literature listed at the beginning of this chapter suggest that
the following groups and industries often influence or are influenced by builders'
adoption decisions:
· architects and other house designers
· banks
· building material or component manufacturers
· building material retailers
· developers
· home buyers
· local building departments and planning boards
· realtors
· subcontractors
· local and national trade associations
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Figure 3: Groups and organizations associated with the entire home
building task. (source: President's Committee on Urban Housing, 1968)
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There is considerable diversity among these groups, which makes communication and
anticipation of their actions difficult, thereby increasing the uncertainty of the adoption
decision. Most of the groups are in the private sector (e.g., developers, banks,
contractors), while several are in the public sector (e.g., code agencies, building
departments). Some have national or international operations (e.g., raw material
suppliers); others typically operate only in a small local area (e.g., architects,
contractors). Some of the organizations are product-oriented (e.g., suppliers,
manufacturers); others are service-oriented (e.g., architects, banks). Several of the
groups have distinct professions or occupational trades associated with them.
Three of the groups listed above are particularly significant sources of uncertainty in
innovation adoption decisions.
Home buyers.
'"The function of the home is to conserve, to protect privacy, family life, cultural
and social values, traditions. It is a reflection of very deep needs, for security,
continuity, conformity, in an area of emotional intensity, dealing as it does with
one's personal immediate environment, rich in symbolic meaning." (Herbert,
1984:19)
For reasons implied in the quote above, most buyers approach the buying decision for a
new home very differently from other purchases, often with a very strong bond to
tradition. At the same time, buyers today seek higher levels of physical performance
(e.g., thermal efficiency, low maintenance) and more architectural features (e.g., large
open spaces, cathedral ceilings) than in the past, which often demands materials and
components superior to traditional construction. Walking the fine line between tradition
and progress is exceedingly difficult for builders, particularly for small builders who
often must obtain information on buyer needs through outside real estate agents.
Home building is a localized business in which home buyers respond to word-of-mouth
effects more than to mass media or other types of advertising. A builder's reputation is
therefore critically important to his success. It was mentioned in the previous section that
the cost of a poor adoption decision can be severe in home building because the direct
costs of replacing a failed portion of the house can be high. The importance home buyers
place on a builder's reputation suggests that the indirect costs of a poor adoption decision
can be even more severe than the direct costs.
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The regulatory system. There is intense but non-uniform regulation of the home
building process. Home builders not only must comply with a hierarchy of building
codes (federal, regional, state, local) but often face wide variation among zoning
ordinances, the enforcement of local building codes, and the permitting and inspection
process. It is often difficult to determine whether an innovation might delay a project or
require additional management effort to satisfy regulatory officials (NAHBRC, 1991).
Builders are also faced with changing federal and local regulations pertaining to
environmental protection, access for the disabled, and other areas that influence their daily
operations.
Subcontractors. Construction of a house typically involves 15 to 20 subcontractors
(NAHB, 1990). Home builders and subcontractors have established a system of
socialized skills, norms, and implicit contracts that help coordinate the efforts of so many
firms working sequentially or simultaneously in relatively small spaces. Some
innovations disrupt this system, resulting in construction delays, reduced quality,
disputes between trades, and require additional coordination costs.
THE RESULT: UNCERTAINTY DOMINATES HOME BUILDER
ADOPTION DECISIONS
The task and environmental characteristics of the home building industry result in two
salient phenomena relating to adoption of technological innovations. First, home builders
are typically missing key information related to how an innovation will allow them to
match their task and environment. Typical questions implicitly and explicitly voiced by
builders include:
* Will it perform as promised in all of my homes over a long period of time?
* How much will money will it actually save or cost me?
* How much will potential home buyers value or resist it?
* To what extent will it affect and/or be resisted by subcontractors?
* To what extent will it be resisted by the local regulatory system?
The second salient phenomenon is that the consequences of poor adoption decisions can
be severe. The industry characteristics of volatile demand and low profit margins leave
most builders with very low cash reserves. Yet, as stated earlier, the direct costs alone of
replacing a portion of a home that failed can exceed the total profit that a builder made on
a house, and the resulting damage to his reputation can limit his sales for years afterward.
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In light of the severe consequences of poor adoption decisions and the fact that so many
innovations in the past have physically failed or been resisted by home owners or other
groups, the vast majority of builders seek convincing proof that a new building product
will provide significant advantages over an existing product. If a builder has not adopted
an innovation, it is rarely because he is confident the innovation will not provide a net
economic advantage; rather, its net economic advantage has not been convincingly
demonstrated. Innovations are considered guilty until proven innocent. "Uncertainty is
avoided like the plague, while the certainty of historical information is accorded such a
premium that it dominates the managers' mental processes completely" (Woods,
1966:95).
Table 2: Constraints to the use of cost saving innovations reported by
builders
Constraint
Not considered using
Poor performance risk
May damage reputation
Building code prohibits
Not enough technical information
Building officials frown
Not applicable to design
Not marketable
Expect too many callbacks
Appraisal penalty
Cost more
Lenders frown
Unsatisfactory experience
Material not available
Requires sub to change
Not worth extra training
Union rules prohibit
Licensing system prevents
Lack of management/supervision
Not heard of item
Aggregate
Weighted
Value
.45
.44
.39
.34
.32
.30
.30
.26
.26
.21
.21
.20
.19
.17
.16
.13
.11
.09
.09
.08
(source: NAHB Research Foundation, 1972)
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Rank
Order
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
I
Preliminary evidence that uncertainty plays a key role in the adoption behavior of home
builders and that the three groups mentioned above contribute to home builder uncertainty
can be found in the results of an empirical study conducted over twenty years ago. Table
2 summarizes the results of a survey of hundreds of builders by the NAHB Research
Foundation in 1971. Note how many of the high ranking responses indicate a suspicious
lack of information pertaining to how the innovation would perform or how it would
allow potential adopters to match with portions of their environment.
DECISION MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY
The previous sections have shown that many home building innovations are at least
initially highly uncertain for most builders. Up until this point, we have not theorized an
answer to my research question, how do builders who are more apt to adopt non-diffused
innovations differ from builders who are less apt to do so? To do so, let us consider
descriptive decision theory on both the individual and organizational levels.
When decision makers are missing information that they feel is necessary to make the best
decision, they may take one of two paths. They can postpone the decision until they have
gathered at least some of the information that they are missing, or they can make the
decision based on the information they already have, using heuristics. In general, the
more information a decision maker is missing, the more the decision is likely to be
biased, that is, the more likely it is that the alternative chosen will not have the highest
expected value (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Hogarth, 1980).
Several of the theories that have been formulated to explain typical decision making
behavior can be applied to decisions about adopting technological innovations. Prospect
theory explains why most individuals are risk-adverse with respect to gains (that is, they
prefer choices with higher probabilities, even if they offer lower expected values than
alternative choices), but are risk-seeking with respect to losses (Kahneman & Tversky,
1979). The possible outcomes associated with adopting a non-diffused innovation are
more difficult to identify than the possible outcomes associated with not adopting an
innovation because the potential adopter can draw on experience to envision the latter, but
not the former. Since the possible outcomes of adopting and their corresponding
probabilities are rather fuzzy, prospect theory can be used to explain the observation that
most potential adopters of non-diffused building innovations choose not to adopt.
Decision theorists suggest that anticipated regret in conjunction with norms and the status
quo may play a strong role in decision making under uncertainty (Bell, 1982; Kahneman
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& Miller, 1986; Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988; Ritov & Baron, 1992). Rather than
carefully comparing the benefits of alternatives to a decision maker's current situation,
individuals compare the levels of future regret that each alternative could cause.
Alternatives linked with possible high levels of regret are avoided, especially if they
require action. Alternatives that are more uncertain are typically associated with higher
levels of potential regret. If a more uncertain alternative was chosen and an undesirable
outcome occurred, the decision maker would have a high level of regret (e.g., "I knew
that was too risky!"). On the other hand, if the less uncertain alternative is chosen and an
undesirable outcome occurred, the regret level would be low (e.g., "I really didn't have
any choice since I didn't know what the other alternative was about.").
Whether an alternative that offers higher utility but is more uncertain is chosen over an
alternative that offers lower utility but is more certain (such as the status quo), depends on
the level of uncertainty of the more uncertain alternative and the decision maker's
tolerance of uncertainty. If the uncertainty level is low or if the decision maker has a
relatively high tolerance of uncertainty, it is likely that status quo or regret bias will not
cause the decision maker to reject the superior but more uncertain alternative. If, on the
other hand, the uncertainty level is high, then status quo or regret bias will likely cause
the decision maker to reject the more uncertain alternative.
The previous paragraphs discuss individual decision making under uncertainty.
Uncertainty has also been theorized to play a key role in organizational behavior. Indeed,
a key premise of organizational theory for the past 35 years is that missing information is
more the norm in organizations than the exception, and that collecting information from
their environments to reduce uncertainty is one of the most salient characteristics of
organizations (March & Simon, 1958; Thompson, 1967; Galbraith, 1973; Miles &
Snow, 1978).
Three more recent articles add to our understanding of uncertainty reduction in
organizations. Daft and Macintosh (1981) and Daft and Weick (1984) suggest that what
happens to information once it is brought into an organization is just as important as the
quantity and quality of information that is brought in. Information relevant to decisions
that is collected from an organization's environment is worthless data until it is interpreted
and given meaning within the organization. Furthermore, the set of information
apparently relevant to a decision is often equivocal, that is, it can be interpreted in multiple
ways to yield differing conclusions. Part of the task of management and other employees
involved in information processing is to reduce the equivocality of the information in
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order to reduce the uncertainty of the decision.
Schrader, Riggs and Smith (1993) clarify the construct of uncertainty by differentiating it
from ambiguity. An uncertain decision is one in which the decision maker does not know
the probabilities associated with the outcomes but does know the cause and effect
relationships that determine the possible outcomes. An ambiguous decision is one in
which the decision maker does not even know the underlying cause and effect
relationships, that is, the decision maker lacks an adequate mental model of the situation
at hand. These authors theorize that whether or not an attempt is made to gain additional
information (versus basing the decision on the information that the organization already
possesses) depends on: whether the decision is framed as uncertain or ambiguous;
whether the organization has successfully reduced uncertainty in similar situations; and
whether information can be gained from existing communication networks using specific
problem-solving skills available within the organization.
The decision theory summarized above can be directly applied to help understand the
adoption of technological innovations by home builders. When a builder hears about a
new building product that is not highly uncertain, he may either attempt to obtain at least
some of the missing information before making the decision, or he may make the decision
without gaining more information using heuristics. If the uncertainty of the innovation is
low or if he has a relatively high tolerance of uncertainty, he is more apt to try the new
product.
On the other hand, if the adoption decision is perceived to be highly uncertain, it is very
unlikely that the decision maker will decide to adopt the innovation without gathering
more information because the decision would probably reflect status quo or regret bias.
Specifically, a builder may reject a new building product that provides superior
performance and has the same chance of failure as the product he currently uses because
he would have an extreme level of regret if he used the new product and it failed. ("I
knew I shouldn't have tried using that thing!") On the other hand, if he took no action,
used the conventional product and it failed, he would have low regret since he did what
he and other builders have always done. ('"hese things happen.")
If the information gathering process is ineffective-that is, not enough information is
collected or it is not effectively interpreted-he will be forced to make his decision based
on missing or misinterpreted information and will probably not adopt due to status quo
bias. If the information gathering process is effective, then adoption is more likely to
occur.
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In short, we should expect to find that adopters of non-diffused innovations-particularly
of high uncertainty innovations-have superior abilities to effectively gather missing
information for their adoption decisions. In addition, these relatively early adopters are
also expected to have higher tolerances of uncertainty. Four hypotheses presented in
Chapter Three suggest what factors influence the effectiveness of the information
gathering process.
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CHAPTER 3: HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY
This chapter presents nine hypotheses pertaining to my research questions that follow
directly from the perspectives provided in Chapter Two. This chapter also summarizes
the methodology used to test the hypotheses.
Recall it was asserted in Chapter Two that most home building product innovations are
highly uncertain. That is, as a result of the complexity of the home building task and
home builders' organizational environment, potential adopters of building innovations are
initially missing tremendous amounts of information necessary for the adoption decision.
The information that is missing can be divided into two sets. One set pertains to how
well the innovation really works. The other set pertains to whether the innovation
matches well with portions of the home builders' environment. If an attempt is not made
to gather at least a portion of the missing information, a potential adopter is likely to reject
an innovation due to ambiguity avoidance or status quo bias.
If this picture of the adoption process is valid, what would we expect to find about
builders who are more apt to adopt home building innovations that are not widely
diffused? Also, what differences would we expect to find between adopters of high
uncertainty, non-diffused innovations and adopters of low uncertainty, non-diffused
innovations? The rest of this chapter presents specific expectations about the uncertainty
reducing characteristics of companies that lead to relatively early adoption. Four of the
hypotheses pertain to structural, procedural, and staffing characteristics that result in
effective information gathering. One hypothesis relates to attitude or tolerance of
uncertainty. The remaining hypotheses pertain to the relationships between adoption and
firm size, market segment, company age, and geographic location. These variables are
included in hypotheses primarily to prevent them from being viewed as plausible
alternative explanations for findings associated with the first five hypotheses. Assume,
for example, that it was found that the number of functions active in innovation-related
activities is significantly related to adoption behavior. If an indicator of firm size was not
included in the multiple regression model, it would be difficult to dismiss the possibility
that the relationship really reflected the fact that larger firms (which may have more
functions involved in various decision making processes than smaller firms) are more
innovative.
With the exception of H7, all of the hypotheses address adoption of non-diffused
innovations in general. That is, all but H7 suggest the same direction in the relationship
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between the independent variable and adoption of high uncertainty, non-diffused
innovations as in the relationship between the independent variable and adoption of low
uncertainty, non-diffused innovations. As is discussed under the Methodology section of
this chapter, the sets of data pertaining to the two sets of innovations are analyzed
separately in order to answer the thesis' second research question.
A general theme underlying the first four hypotheses is that adopters of non-diffused
building innovations adopt earlier than other builders because they have established
superior abilities to gather information that is missing. This conflicts with the
presumption of overwhelming environmental determinism found in the home building
innovation literature. For example, NAHBRC (1991) cites the conclusions of NAHB
Research Foundation (1972) that only 15% of home builder adoption behavior can be
attributed to factors under builders' control. This suggests the Research Foundation
authors assume if a builder is missing information necessary to adopt an innovation, it
certainly is not the fault of the builder. While not denying the strong determinism of the
home building environment, the hypotheses that follow suggest that a significant portion
of home builder adoption behavior is a result of internal characteristics of firms.
HYPOTHESES
HI: Adoption of non-diffused innovations is facilitated by
tapping into many sources of information about innovations.
Reaching out into the environment for information about innovations that are being
considered for adoption helps potential adopters reduce both task-related and
environment-related sources of uncertainty associated with innovations. Potential sources
of information include: architects and other house designers, home buyers, local material
suppliers, trade magazines, manufacturers' literature and service representatives, other
builders, seminars and trade shows, and subcontractors.
Each external source of information can provide information about the innovation itself or
about how the innovation will allow the organization to match with its environment. The
more sources of information that an organization taps into, the more it reduces the
uncertainty of an innovation, and, thus, the more likely it is to adopt innovations earlier
than other builders. For example, builders who talk with manufacturers' sales
representatives, or view and touch an innovation at a lumberyard or home show, are more
apt to understand how the product works than are builders who just see pictures of the
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product in trade magazines. Builders who ask one or two home owner customers for
their opinion of an innovation are less likely to be uncertain about whether future
customers will reject the use of the product in their homes. Reducing uncertainty through
gathering of external information is hypothesized to be important for both high and low
uncertainty innovations, but more so for the former.
H2: Adoption of non-diffused innovations is facilitated by higher
numbers of employees who participate in innovation-related
activities and/or higher percentages of employees who participate
in innovation-related activities.
The more employees considered to be involved in suggesting innovations or gathering or
processing information on innovations, the greater the chances that the company will hear
about a new product and gather sufficient information about it to allow relatively early
adoption. An employee is more likely to suggest that management look into a new
building product if the employee is explicitly assigned this responsibility or if he knows
that management considers him to be an important source of information about new
building products.
The hypothesized relationship between an organization and its environment can be likened
to that between a tree and its environment. Each portion of a tree draws in a necessary
resource from its environment. The roots draw in water and nutrients. The leaves
capture sunlight and carbon dioxide. The more roots and the more leaves, the higher the
total flow into the tree. The roots and leaves of organizations are the individuals and
groups who interact with different portions of their environment, gathering information to
increase the likelihood that it will be able to adapt to changes in its environment, such as
new technology. The more people involved in innovation-related activities, the higher the
total amount of information flowing into the organization.
Note that the construct of the numbers of individuals active in innovation-related activities
is different from the construct of company size (H6), although you would expect the two
to be positively correlated. Going back to the tree analogy, if you conceptualize the total
size of a tree to be composed of the total volume of roots, leaves, and trunk, you would
expect that trees with high volumes of roots and leaves would have high total size;
however, this need not be the case because some trees have unusually thin trunks. Thus,
this hypothesis refers to the number of employees active in gathering and processing
information, not to the total number of employees (which is hypothesized in H6).
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The second construct included in this hypothesis-the percentage of employees active in
innovation related activities-is very different from firm size. In fact, there is probably a
negative correlation between the two constructs.
It should also be noted that the hypothesized directions of the relationships between
numbers and percentages of employees active in innovation-related activities and
relatively early adoption behavior are opposite what would be hypothesized for larger
companies. As IBM, GM, and other large organizations have experienced, too many
information gatherers and decision makers can lead to ineffective bureaucracy. In large
companies, hypothesizing a positive relationship between early adoption and high
numbers and percentages of employees involved in making the decisions could mean that
tens or even hundreds of people are involved. This would almost certainly lead to
excessive lengths of time and perhaps poor decisions as well (Wheeler & Janis, 1980).
In a sample of home building companies with employees typically less than 10, however,
organizational inertia and other phenomena that would have a negative influence on early
adoption behavior are not expected to be present.
H3: Adoption of non-diffused innovations is facilitated by a
greater number of functions involved in innovation-related
activities.
The tree analogy may help explain this hypothesis. It was stated above that the more
leaves a tree has, the more it can capture sunlight and carbon dioxide. Leaves alone,
however, are not sufficient for a tree's survival. Roots are also essential because they
draw in water and nutrients from a different portion of a tree's environment.
The same type of relationship is hypothesized for home builders needing information
from their environment. It is not enough merely to have multiple people in the company
active in innovation-related activities; such individuals must be associated with multiple
functions within the company for effective information processing. Small home builders
typically have four functions within the company: top management, office
administration, sales, and field supervision. Additionally, some builders have in-house
trades crews or professional design capability, while others subcontract out the sales
function to realtors. Each function interacts with a different portion of the company's
environment. Superintendents interact with subcontractors, sales employees interact with
customers, office staff often interact with suppliers, etc.
Since employees in each function are the company experts on one or more areas of the
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company's environment, the more functions represented by those active in suggesting,
gathering information on, or deciding whether to use innovations, the better we expect the
information gathering, equivocality reduction, and processing to be. Thus, the more
functions involved in innovation-related activities, the more the organization is able to
reduce the uncertainty of how the innovation might change the company's match with
each portion of its environment, making relatively early adoption more likely.
The comment made for H3 about the direction of the relationship being opposite that
hypothesized if the sample included larger companies may not apply to this hypothesis.
As stated above, having higher numbers of employees involved in innovation-related
activities could mean that tens or even hundreds of people are involved in making a single
decision, which would be dysfunctional. The number of functions within companies,
however, is typically conceptualized as no more than eight, which is probably not
excessive for effective decision making.
H4: Adoption of non-diffused innovations is facilitated by having
multiple professional backgrounds active in innovation-related
activities.
Individuals in home building companies who participate in decision making typically have
one of three professional backgrounds: building trades, architecture or engineering, or a
college degree in an area other than architecture or engineering. Each of these
backgrounds is associated with a unique and valuable set of analytical skills. Companies
with individuals who are active in making adoption decisions and have one or more of
these backgrounds will be more apt to adopt non-diffused innovations because such
individuals help the company process different sets of information and reduce uncertainty
and equivocality more than in companies who lack these backgrounds. For example, an
individual with an architectural or engineering background is more apt to understand the
engineering principles underlying engineered wood products or be more confident of the
properties of synthetic materials. An individual with a building trades background would
be more able to predict how an innovation will be installed and whether it will disrupt the
subcontracting sequence. Since the third category represents a wide range of
backgrounds, it is not clear what analytical skills individuals in this category share.
Nevertheless, it is hypothesized that degrees in business, science, and even liberal arts
provide valuable perspectives that non-college graduates and engineers lack, and that such
perspectives can help reduce uncertainty about the home building environment.
43
HS: Adoption of non-diffused innovations is facilitated by a
positive attitude about early adoption of technological
innovations. 13
Having a positive attitude about adoption of non-diffused technological innovations can
be thought of as perceptions (or culture) within a company that technological innovations
are important to their company's success and that early adoption does not always present
excessive risk. Having a positive attitude facilitates relatively early adoption by
influencing all stages of the adoption decision. An organizational culture which embraces
innovations as important to the company's success may encourage employees to be on the
lookout for innovations during the knowledge stage and to seek information about
innovations that are being considered during the evaluation stage. A positive attitude
implies a certain tolerance of the uncertainty associated with innovations, which makes it
more likely that low uncertainty innovations will be accepted in the decision stage without
the need to gather further information. Higher tolerance of uncertainty will also make it
more likely that high uncertainty innovations will not be rejected due to status quo bias or
regret bias.
H6: Adoption of non-diffused innovations is related to company
size.
Unlike the previous five hypotheses, this hypothesis is included not because it is
suggested by the perspectives related to uncertainty that underlie this thesis, but because
its inclusion strengthens the findings of the other hypotheses. Diffusion theory holds that
larger firms are more apt to be early adopters (Rogers, 1983). If an indicator of company
size was not included in the multiple regression analysis, critics could argue that some or
all of the relationships found to be statistically significant were spurious or indirectly
related to company size.
Plausible hypotheses concerning the relationship between early adoption behavior and
company size could be made in either direction. As just mentioned, numerous empirical
studies have documented a positive relationship between company size and
innovativeness. It could be hypothesized that large home builders are more apt to adopt
13 It may be tempting to downplay the significance of this hypothesis with the thought, "Of course you
should expect a relationship between an attitude about a behavior and actual behavior." There are,
however, many examples in organizational literature in which embraced attitudes are not reflected in
behavior, as well as examples in which actual behavior would not be predicted by espoused attitudes.
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non-diffused innovations for many reasons. They are more apt to hear about innovations
because there are more employees to interact with the environment and because
employees are more apt to be formally assigned to scan for innovations. Large firms
typically have the resources to investigate innovations, including individuals with an
architectural or engineering background, and to have the financial resources to survive an
occasional failure of an adopted innovation. Also, larger firms may be more motivated to
pursue incremental innovations because the net result of even a small cost savings per unit
is substantial with high volumes of houses.
On the other hand, it could be hypothesized that the relationship may be in the opposite
direction. A negative relationship between size and adoption behavior might be expected
because larger firms are more apt to be bureaucratic and conservative. Also, many
consumers seek homes built by larger firms because they anticipate receiving more
consistent quality (but not necessarily higher quality). The uncertainty inherent in many
innovations could cause large builders to avoid high uncertainty innovations. Another
reason why large builders might be less apt to adopt non-diffused innovations is that
small builders might be more aggressive about trying cost saving or differentiating
innovations as a means of competing against larger builders who enjoy economies of
scale.
In light of the conflicting plausible directions of the relationship between company size
and adoption behavior, it is hypothesized only that a relationship exists. The direction is
not specified.
H7: Adoption of high uncertainty, non-diffused innovations is
negatively related to average house price while adoption of low
uncertainty, non-diffused innovations is positively related to
average house price.
Existing diffusion theory (Rogers, 1983) might suggest that builders serving the high end
of the market-that is, those typically building luxury homes rather than starter or average
homes-would be more apt to adopt all building innovations early because their
customers would tend to be more cosmopolitan, educated, and connected with social and
information networks. The uncertainty inherent in many building innovations, however,
suggests a different relationship. I hypothesize that the relationship between a builder's
market segment and adoption behavior depend on the uncertainty level of the innovation.
Builders serving primarily the high end of the market will avoid innovations with high
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levels of uncertainty because quality absolutely cannot be compromised with their
customers. That is, builders of high cost homes will avoid innovations that they are not
confident will perform as promised because their business critically depends on positive
word-of-mouth effects. However, high end builders may be more apt to adopt low
uncertainty, non-diffused innovations that they perceive offer high performance with little
risk of failure.
Early adoption behavior of builders serving the lower end of the market is hypothesized
to be in the opposite direction. Because in this segment profit margins are typically
lower, buyers are less choosy about the details of their homes, and word of mouth is not
as critical to builders' success, builders building starter and average homes will be more
apt to adopt cost saving non-diffused innovations, even if the innovations at least initially
have high uncertainty associated with them.
H8: Adoption of non-diffused innovations is positively related to
the age of the company.
Several builders I spoke with during the formative stages of my research suggested that
builders who are more apt to adopt non-diffused innovations are inexperienced builders
who have not learned the hard way that early adoption does not provide sufficient payoff
to outweigh the many risks. To preclude the possibility of this view serving as a
plausible rival explanation for any significant findings related to H1-H5, company age
was included in the multiple regression model. Although existing diffusion theory holds
that early adopters are no different in age than later adopters (Rogers, 1983), it is
hypothesized that propensity to adopt non-diffused innovations is positively related to age
of the company. Adoption decisions in older companies are apt to be made by individuals
possessing more years of building experience than in younger companies. The more
years of experience an individual has, the better he or she is able to analyze how well an
innovation will perform or whether his or her customers, local inspection officials, or
subcontractors will reject it.
H9: Adoption of non-diffused innovations is related to the
geographic location of the company.
As shown in Table 1, the existing literature on home building innovation suggests that
local building codes and the permitting/inspection process influences the diffusion of
innovations. Since codes and inspection vary across geographic areas, it is likely that a
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builder's adoption behavior is significantly influenced by the location in which he
operates.
OVERVIEW OF METHODOLOGY
To test the nine hypotheses presented in this chapter, I performed a self-report,
observation studyl4 of 100 randomly selected 15 builders around the country. My
dependent variables-propensity to adopt high/low uncertainty innovations that are not
widely diffused-were measured by the number of innovations that a builder reported
using regularly from a list of twelve innovations. Since these twelve innovations were
thought to be between 2% and 40% diffused through the industry, if a builder reported
using them regularly, it was considered early adoption. Six innovations each were
classified as high uncertainty or low uncertainty using the framework shown in Appendix
1. The pilot stage of the survey occurred in October through December of 1993. The
remainder of the survey occurred in January 1994. After performing diagnostics to
confirm that regression analysis was appropriate, inferential statistical analysis was
performed through multiple regression analysis of each dependent variable and all
hypothesized independent variables. The multiple regression models were confirmed
using multinomial probit analysis.
SURVEY PROCESS
Table 3 summarizes the numbers of firms included in my sample and the contact
experience that led to a final sample of 100 companies building 180 homes per year or
less. Eleven of the firms contacted were identified through friendly sources. The
remaining firms were identified randomly from the Yellow Pages of 7 areas around the
country: Boston, MA; Boulder, CO; Chicago, IL; Nashville, TN; Princeton, NJ;
Rochester, NY; and Seattle, WA.
14 The term "self-report" indicates that I obtained data from each firm by asking participants rather than
through observation or archival study. The term "observation study" does not imply that I visually
observed 100 builders. The term is used in social science to connote any study that is not experimental or
quasi-experimental in nature. While the latter are clearly preferable because they allow possible
confounding effects to be controlled, they are extremely difficult to execute using home builders or any
other groups from industry.
15 11 (11%) of the builders in the sample were contacted as a result of a mutual acquaintance. Since data
analysis indicated that these firms were not atypical, there is little chance that including non-random firms
in the sample biased the findings.
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Table 3: Summary of sample contacts.
The interview process typically occurred as follows. When someone in the company
answered my call, I introduced myself as a doctoral student writing a thesis on how
builders decide to use new building products and asked to speak with the owner of the
company for "just a few minutes." Often the phone was answered by a secretary or
office administrator who asked for my name and number so the appropriate person could
return my call. (I believe that many of them suspected I was really a salesman.) I would
then ask if I could send a fax that provided information about my research, which was
always answered affirmatively. If no one called me back within 24 hours of receiving my
fax, I would call again at least one more time before recording them as a non-respondent.
Every phone call-successful or not-was dialed and documented using a contact
16 This figure does not include wrong or disconnected numbers or firms performing only remodeling
who were inadvertently contacted.
17 Six of these firms were surveyed and interviewed in-person during the pilot stage of my survey.
18 Four of these firms were discarded because they built between 275 and 2000 homes per year, while the
100 firms that were analyzed built between 1 and 180 homes per year, with a mean of 21. Since the
number of homes built per year is one of the variables included in the multiple regression models and
since regression analysis is highly sensitive to values significantly different from the bulk of a sample, it
was decided to delete the four larger companies from the sample before the data was analyzed. Another
firm was discarded because I discovered it was the sales office of a subdivision in which four home
building firms were active. The sixth firm was discarded because it was discovered that the company had
effectively ceased operations several years ago.
48
Number
of firms Description
191 Number of firms that build at least one new home per year that were contacted
by telephone and asked to participate in a telephone survey 16
31 Number of firms that never returned two messages left on answering machines
35 Number of firms that never returned at least two messages left with secretaries
or faxed to them
19 Number of firms that stated they would not help
106 Number of firms that agreed to participate 17
Number of firms whose data was discarded before analysisl8
100 Number of firms whose data were analyzed to test hypotheses
55% Response rate if builders that never returned messages are counted as non-
respondents as well as those that were contacted and stated they were not
_ willing to help.
85% Response rate if only builders that were contacted and stated they were not
willing to help are counted as non-respondents.
manager software program.
When I did manage to speak with an appropriate individual, I typically began by asking
how they hear about and decide to use innovative building products. Since most builders
were not sure what I meant by this term even after I gave a brief definition, I illustrated
my definition and jogged their memory about specific innovations by reading the list of
twelve innovations used to measure my dependent variables. I would proceed through a
written questionnaire 1 9 that served as the basis for my "script" and as the hardcopy on
which I recorded interviewees' answers. (A copy of the questionnaire is provided in
Appendix 2.) Builders frequently elaborated on their answers or provided opinions
related to my questions, which I scribbled in the margins of my questionnaire.
INDICATORS OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES
As I mentioned above, I measured propensity to adopt innovations that are not widely
diffused by reading builders a list of twelve innovations and asking which of them their
company used on a regular basis. All respondents seemed comfortable with my
clarification of "on a regular basis" as meaning they used them in at least 25% of the
occasions in which they had an opportunity to do so.
Appendix 1 provides detailed analysis on how the twelve innovations used to establish
the dependent variables were classified as high- or low-uncertainty innovations. High
uncertainty innovations are those for which potential adopters are at least initially missing
significant amounts of information necessary to answer the questions below.
* Will it perform as promised in all of my homes over a long period of time?
* How much will money will it actually save or cost me?
* How much will potential home buyers value or resist it?
* To what extent will it affect and/or be resisted by subcontractors?
* To what extent will it be resisted by the local regulatory system?
The six innovations listed below were used to measure propensity to adopt high
uncertainty, non-diffused innovations.
* composite floor joists or floor trusses
19 A written questionnaire was drafted because I initially intended to collect data using a written
instrument once I had completed a telephone pilot study. I decided to complete the study using telephone
surveys due to the advantages of high response rate and the ability to obtain rich data.
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* computer aided design/drafting (CADD)
* oriented strand board (OSB)
* steel studs
* plastic plumbing supply pipe
* vinyl siding
Low uncertainty innovations are those for which builders are at least initially missing less
information to answer the questions below. The six innovations listed below were used
to measure propensity to adopt low uncertainty, non-diffused innovations.
· estimating or scheduling software
· house wrap (often referred to by the brand name 'Tyvek")
· insulating concrete wall forms
· composite wood beams or headers
· non-wood trim
· vinyl-clad or all-vinyl windows
Each innovation reported to be used regularly was scored as one. The indicator for
adoption of high uncertainty, non-diffused innovations was calculated by summing the
scores for the six high uncertainty variables, thereby creating a discrete ratio variable
between 0 and 6. The indicator for adoption of low uncertainty, non-diffused
innovations was calculated by summing the scores for the six low uncertainty variables,
thereby creating a discrete ratio variable between 0 and 6.
INDICATORS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
HI: Adoption of non-diffused innovations is facilitated by tapping into
many sources of information about innovations.
The independent construct in this hypothesis was measured by asking interviewees,
"How do you hear about new building products, or, once you have heard about one,
what helps you decide whether to use it?" The sources they mentioned as a response to
this open-ended question were checked off on the third of the questionnaire. I then asked
them whether each of the potential sources of information shown below and on the third
page of my questionnaire that they had not mentioned were important to them.
· Architects / house designers
* Homeowners / customers
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· Local material suppliers
* Magazines, newspapers, and newsletters
* Manufacturers literature and service reps
* Other builders
* Results of your own testing (such as laboratory or field tests other than trying it in
one of your houses)
* Seminars and trade shows
* Subcontractors
I varied the order in which I mentioned the potential source such that architects and home
designers were not always the first one I mentioned, home owners not second, etc.
Each source of information that they stated was important to them received a score of 1.
Sources that were not affirmed as being important received a score of 0. If I sensed that
their reply to whether a source was important was rhetorical or normative, I would
respond with a statement that was negative about the source. For example, if when I
asked, "How about subs, are they an important source of information about new
products?" the builder responded with just a short "yeah," I would say, "Some builders
have told me that their subs are not very helpful on new products because they don't like
to try new things." I would then assign a score of 1 to subcontractors only if the
interviewee clearly affirmed their importance to his company. I then summed the scores
for the nine sources into a discrete ratio variable between 0 and 9 that represented the
number of sources that the builder reported were important.
H2: Adoption of non-diffused innovations is facilitated by higher
numbers of employees who participate in innovation-related activities
and/or higher percentages of employees who participate in innovation-
related activities.
The first independent construct in this hypothesis was measured by asking how many
people worked in each of the job categories shown below and on the bottom of the third
page of my questionnaire.
· Top Managers
* Office Staff
* Sales Staff
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· Design Staff
· Superintendents And Other Field Managers
· Tradesmen And Other Field Employees
I would then total these numbers up and confirm the total with the interviewee. I then
asked how many of the company's employees were "somehow involved in new
products, that is, suggesting new products or helping to decide whether to use a new
product." This variable was discrete and ranged between 1 and 10. The percent of
employees who are active in innovation-related activities was calculated by dividing the
number of active employees by the total employees, resulting in a continuous ordinal
variable between 5 and 100.
H3: Adoption of non-diffused innovations is facilitated by a greater
number of functions involved in innovation-related activities.
I chose to test this hypothesis using two indicators of the independent construct, neither
of which were not as simple as the previous indicators. One indicator pertained to the
number of functions involved in all innovation-related activities, that is, the number of job
categories active in suggesting specific innovations for the company to consider using,
gathering information on innovations, or deciding whether to use innovations. The other
indicator pertained expressly to the functions involved in deciding whether to use
innovations. It was straight forward to ask each respondent how many individuals from
each function were involved in each of these activities, however, it was not clear whether
and how to modify their answers to reflect individuals with multiple functions. Recall
that having multiple functional roles involved in decision making was hypothesized to
facilitate relatively early adoption because individuals in each function possessed valuable
information about the portion of the company's environment that they most interacted
with. It would not be appropriate to count multiple-function individuals in each of their
functions (for example, many top managers in small companies also perform the sales
function) because it is likely that their knowledge of specific portions of the environment
would be diluted by their multiple responsibilities. On the other hand, it would not seem
appropriate to count multiple-function decision makers only in one of their functions.
It was decided to split the difference. By referring back to the information on the number
of individuals in the company who worked in the job categories shown on the bottom of
the third page of my questionnaire, I could identify which, if any, employees reported to
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be active in innovation-related activities performed multiple roles within the company.
The number of functions involved in decision making was then taken as the average of 1)
the number of functions involved when each function of a multiple-role decision maker
was counted as one function and 2) the number of functions involved when multiple-role
decision maker were counted as only one function. For example, if a small builder
reported that he performed the top management, office administration, and sales functions
and that he and his superintendent jointly decided which new products to use, his firm
would be scored as 3, which is the average of 4 and 2. This indicator was a discrete
variable ranging from 1 to 5.
The number of functions considered active in all innovation related activities (i.e.,
gathering information as well as making decisions) was calculated the same way. This
indicator was a discrete variable ranging from 1 to 6 (which is one more than decision-
making variable because some firms had non-supervisory field employees who were
considered to be active in innovation-related activities).
H4: Adoption of non-diffused innovations is facilitated by having
multiple professional backgrounds active in innovation-related activities.
The independent construct in this hypothesis was measured by asking what were the
professional backgrounds of the individuals reported to be active in innovation-related
activities for H2. Most interviewees did not understand this open-ended (and vague)
question, so I then asked about each of the three backgrounds listed below and at the top
of the fourth page of my questionnaire:
* One or more has field experience in the building trades
· One or more has an architectural or engineering background
* One or more has a college degree in other than architecture or engineering.
Each of the backgrounds were scored as a 1 if any of the individuals active in adopting
innovations had such a background and a 0 if they did not. I then summed the scores
from the three variables to create a discrete ordinal variable between 0 and 3.
H5: Adoption of non-diffused innovations is facilitated by a positive
attitude about early adoption of technological innovations.
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The independent construct in this hypothesis was measured using three Likert scales that
capture three specific attitudes related to technological innovations: whether deviating
from standard industry behavior can be beneficial, whether technological innovations are
important to their company's success, and whether new building products represent
excessive risk. I introduced the scales by saying, "I would like to read three statements
and have you tell me whether you strongly or somewhat agree, you are neutral, or
strongly or somewhat disagree." I then read each statement and response question
exactly as shown below and on the second page of my questionnaire.
In general, there is little to be gained from being the first to do anything in
the home building business. Do you agree with this statement?
I strongly disagree
I somewhat disagree
I am neutral
I somewhat agree
I strongly agree
Using new building products does not make much of a difference in the
cost or performance of a house and does not improve profits or sales. Do
you agree with this statement?
I strongly disagree
I somewhat disagree
I am neutral
I somewhat agree
I strongly agree
In general, the benefits from using new building products right after they
are introduced are outweighed by the risks of using them. Do you agree
with this statement?
I strongly disagree
I somewhat disagree
I am neutral
I somewhat agree
I strongly agree
Each scale was scored -2 for "strongly agree," -1 for "somewhat agree," 0 for "I am
neutral," +1 for "somewhat disagree," and +2 for "strongly disagree." I then summed
the scores from the three scales to calculate a combined attitude score, which was a
discrete ordinal variable between -6 and +6.
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I should note that achieving stable and meaningful measures of attitudes is particularly
problematic in all areas of social science, which is why most questionnaires include
multiple measures of each construct or subconstruct. Multiple measures for each of the
three subconstructs listed above were created and used during the pilot stage of my
research; however, all but one scale each had to be dropped because interviewees got
impatient with the longer set of attitude scales.
H6: Adoption of non-diffused innovations is related to company size.
Company size is a difficult construct to operationalize in the home building industry. I
considered three measures that are commonly used to measure firm size in other
industries: total employees, annual revenues, and number of units (homes) produced per
year. Each of these have problems in home building. Revenues are troublesome for four
reasons. First, some firms have sister companies that perform subcontracting,
development, or design, and it is unclear whether to include these employees or not.
Second, companies with large revenues may actually build few homes because they
derive most of their revenues from commercial construction. Third, large revenues do
not imply either large net income or high number of employees because the firm may
subcontract all activities. Fourth, many companies consider this confidential information.
Total employees is problematic due to the problem of sister companies mentioned above.
The number of homes has the problem of low correlation with revenues and employees.
It was decided to gather data on total employees as well as number of homes.
H7: Adoption of high uncertainty, non-diffused innovations is negatively
related to average house price while adoption of low uncertainty, non-
diffused innovations is positively related to average house price.
The independent construct in this hypothesis was measured by asking interviewees what
percentages of their homes typically fall into the starter, average, and luxury categories.
Interviewees would occasionally respond with the price range of their homes, which
would require me to discuss with them where their houses stood in relation to median
prices in their areas. For example, a $150,000 home in Nashville is considered an
average home, while in nearly all other areas it would be considered a starter. The
indicator was calculated by multiplying the typical percentages of homes considered
starter, average, or luxury by 1, 2 and 3, respectively, resulting in a discrete ordinal
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variable between 100 and 300 that was referred to as SEGMENT.
As discussed in Chapter Four, the resulting variable was decidedly non-normal because
the majority of the sample built luxury homes. Some, but not all, statisticians believe that
non-normally distributed variables are not appropriate for parametric analysis (Bryman &
Cramer, 1990). It was decided to be conservative and transform the continuous variable
relating to market segment to a dichotomous variable. A company received a score of 1 if
its score for SEGMENT was above 220 and a 0 if its score was 220 or below. 220 was
chosen as the cutoff because it resulted in approximately one-third of the sample receiving
a score of 0.
H8: Adoption of non-diffused innovations is positively related to the age
of the company.
Company age was measured by asking interviewees how many years the company had
been in business, as shown the fifth page of Appendix 2. Because multiple regression is
sensitive to extreme values, this variable was capped at 60 years.
H9: Adoption of non-diffused innovations is related to the geographic
location of the company.
The location of the company was identified by the Yellow Pages that contained the
builder's name. Since the seven regions represented in the sample are hundreds of miles
apart, there is no chance of a company being listed in more than one set of Yellow Pages
used to identify the sample. Location indicators were included in the multiple regression
and probit models by including 0/1 dummy variables for all but one location (Colorado).
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CHAPTER FOUR: DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
This chapter provides detailed analysis of my hypotheses using data collected from a
telephone survey of 100 home builders. Using multiple regression analysis, confirmed
by probit analysis, five of the nine hypotheses presented in Chapter Three were found to
be statistically significant.
QUALITATIVE DATA
The data presented in this chapter provide systematic, objective evidence for my
hypotheses but are sterile and lacking in richness. Before turning to the data analysis, it
might be helpful to consider a few quotes by home builders that illustrate the broad
hypothesis underlying my research that many technological innovations in home building
are highly uncertain. These quotes were volunteered by home builders immediately after
I began my interviews by stating that I was researching how home builders decide to use
new building products.
The following remarks indicate that builders typically are missing information necessary
to determine how well innovations will perform in their houses, that is, how well
innovations will match with the home building task:
"I just like to see it perform first. I don't want to have to go back and replace
anything."
"Lab tests only go so far. We don't like to be guinea pigs."
"Some people like to take risks, but we like proven. Will people like it? Will it
work?
"We get lots of opportunity to try new things. You can take little risks, but how
dangerous can you let yourself be? We are mostly a proven product builder."
"There's no way of judging... [whether a new product will work. We]...don't
need to try anything that is not proven."
"You've got to remember that these new products are all prototypes. You don't
know. You don't know how long it will last. How're you going to feel if it
comes down and hurts somebody?"
"We like to see it used by somebody else. Nobody wants to be first. So many
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products have come and gone."
"You have to prove the product-takes 2-5 years. Lab tests don't cut it."
The next set of remarks indicate that builders typically are missing information necessary
to determine how well innovations will be received by portions of their organizational
environments, particularly by home owners.
"Buying a house is the biggest investment of their life, so they don't want to
take any risks."
"People see OSB [oriented strand board] and think, 'more like cardboard than
plywood."'
"Market perception is screwy, but key."
"People don't understand how and why many new products are better."
"If the marketplace is not educated enough, you are really taking a risk. Take
vinyl siding. It's a good product but customers drive by, see it going up, and
think, 'there's a cheap house."'
"What we are really talking about is trying to reach the buyer. There are times
when we don't want anything new. They want tradition, nothing different."
"We're market driven. We wait for a customer to ask for something new."
"It's hard to be the first to do something. ...bankers, sales-there's lots of
resistance."
"There's no question about it. Building codes limit the rate of innovation.
Inspectors are cover-their-ass bureaucrats, each with his own pet peeve and own
interpretations."
"Real estate agents can kill my ability to differentiate my homes, my ability to
sell our use of new products."
Appendix 5 provides additional quotes by builders during my interviews that help convey
the uncertainty builders typically perceive about innovations and how they reduce
uncertainty through gathering information.
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PRE-ANALYSIS PROCEDURES
The simplest way to furnish statistical evidence for my hypotheses would be to divide the
sample based on numbers of high and low uncertainty innovations adopted and compare
the means for each of the independent variables. Another simple analysis would be to
perform univariate regression between each dependent variable and each independent
variable. The problem with these approaches is that they provide evidence of association
but do not imply causality. That is, if Y is shown through univariate analysis to be
statistically related to both X1 and X2, we cannot be sure whether X1 and X2 each
influence Y directly, whether X2's influence on Y is a result of Xl's influence on X2, or
whether the relationship between Y and both Xs are the result of the influence between a
fourth variable and both X1 and X2. Multiple regression, on the other hand, inherently
controls for the influence of other independent variables included in the model. The
regression coefficients represent the slope of the line of Y on Xi after the effects of the
other Xs are "partialed out".
The theory underlying multiple regression makes several significant assumptions about
the distributions of the dependent variables and independent variables and the nature of
the relationships between them. Specifically, it is assumed that 1) dependent variables are
continuous and approximate a normal distribution, 2) independent variables approximate
a normal distribution or are categorical, and 3) the relationships between dependent and
independent variables are linear in nature. Multiple regression textbooks suggest the need
to perform various procedures before and after performing multiple regression analysis to
confirm that the underlying assumptions are not violated by the data or the model. In
addition, the independent variables should be analyzed to confirm that collinearity is not
excessive (Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch, 1980; Weisberg, 1982).
The raw data used to test my hypotheses apparently violated the first two assumptions
listed above. Specifically, although their distributions were bell shaped, my dependent
variables were clearly discrete (not continuous) and had a relatively narrow range. It was
decided the prudent course of action would be to confirm the results of the multiple
regression with an analysis technique that did not require dependent variables to be
continuous and normally distributed.
Many of the raw independent variables were also discrete. Furthermore, several were not
even bell-shaped and were therefore probably inappropriate to include in multiple
regression models in their raw forms. I corrected this problem through a combination of
transformations and deletions. Specifically, I transformed the variables associated with
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the percentage of employees considered active in innovation-related activities (H2) and the
number of homes typically built per year (H6) to a log form since this made them more
normally distributed. I dropped three variables because even after various
transformations their distributions were still fairly non-normal and because they were
found to have excessive collinearity.2 0 The three dropped variables were those relating to
total employees (H6), the number of individuals considered active in innovation-related
activities (H2), and the functions of individuals considered active in innovation-related
activities (H3). As mentioned in Chapter Three, I transfonned the variable relating to
market segment (H7) into a dichotomous variable since its distribution was highly non-
normal.
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES MULTIPLE REGRESSION PROCEDURE
I performed a full (i.e., not stepwise) ordinary least squares regression of each of my two
dependent variables against all of my (remaining) independent variables. The software
used was SYSTAT for the Macintosh. I then performed residual and other diagnostics to
verify that linear modeling was indeed appropriate, as discussed below.
1) Normal probability plots of the residuals indicated that the errors are normally
distributed.
2) Scatter plots of residuals versus estimates indicated that the model has approximately
constant variance.
3) Scatter plots of Cook distances and Student values versus estimates and the relatively
minor diagnostic warnings shown on the regression output indicated that all members of
sample were adequately described by the same linear model. I rechecked the raw data for
the cases indicated as either outliers or exerting large leverage. Although these cases are
slightly unusual in some respects (for example, the individual who decides whether to
adopt new products in case 89 has a Ph.D. in engineering), their data contained no
typographical errors and I did not feel it was appropriate to permanently remove them
from the analysis. To be sure that these cases were not exerting excessive helpful
influence on my data (i.e., increasing the significance of my findings), I removed the
cases and re-analyzed the data. The results were found to be even more significant. That
20 As suggested by Weisberg (1982), I tested for collinearity by regressing each of the independent
variables against all (i.e., multiple regression) of the other independent variables. The three independent
variables that were dropped had multiple R-squared values exceeding 0.80.
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is, the squared multiple R values were slightly higher and significant variables were
found to be even more significant. Thus, leaving the outlier and high leverage cases in
my sample actually has a conservative effect on my findings.
4) Scatter plots of residuals versus the interview sequence number indicated the errors
were independent, i.e., not serially correlated.
5) Scatter plots of residuals versus independent variables with Lowess line smoothing
confirmed the relationships between independent variables and dependent variables were
linear in nature.
The Findings section in this chapter presents which hypothesized independent variables
were found to be statistically related (p<0.05) to adoption of innovations that are not
widely diffused. It is important to note that statistical significance is not the same as
theoretical significance. A multiple regression model can have half of its independent
variables statistically significant, yet the results are trivial because the model only captures
a very small portion of the variance of the dependent variable. The amount of variance
captured by my two regression models-as measured by multiple R squared values-are
substantial for exploratory organizational research. The multiple R squared of the high
and low uncertainty models were 0.44 and 0.41, respectively.
PROBIT PROCEDURE
It was decided to confirm the results of the regression analysis with a technique that did
not assume continuous, normally distributed dependent variables. Probit and logit
analyses are both variations of the standard multiple regression procedure which allow for
dichotomous dependent variables, such as discrete choices. Judge et al. (1985) state that
the differences between the two are slight and that the choice of which to use is usually
based on convenience. Aldrich and Nelson (1984) state that the two techniques are
essentially identical unless there are many cases at extreme probability values. Gatignon
and Robertson (1986) performed both probit and logit analyses on adoption data and
found only slight variation between the two sets of results.
The independent variables for the probit model were the same as those for the multiple
regression model, but the dependent variables were slightly different. Instead of ranging
from 0 to 5, the dependent variables in the probit model were made dichotomous.
Builders who adopted 0 or 1 innovation in a set of high or low uncertainty innovations
were scored as 0 for that set. Builders who adopted 2 or more innovations in a set were
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scored as 1 for that set. This grouping scheme resulted in approximately one-half of the
sample considered to have a high propensity to adopt non-diffused innovations for each
set of innovations. Aggregating the entire sample into two groups for each dependent
variable in effect discards data because the analysis does not differentiate between cases
included within groups. Probit is therefore inherently more conservative than multiple
regression in estimating inferential statistical significance .
FINDINGS
The output from the multiple regression and probit analyses are shown on the following
four pages. 2 1 Descriptions of the variable codes shown are provided in Appendix 3.
Note that the p values shown on the regression output are for two-tailed t tests.
Therefore, independent variables that are in the hypothesized direction can be considered
significant if the value in the right column is p<O.10 or less.
Sources of information
Four of my hypotheses pertained to factors that influence the effectiveness of information
gathering and processing. My first hypothesis was that adoption of non-diffused
innovations was facilitated by tapping into higher numbers of external sources of
information about innovations. This hypothesis was probably the most important element
of uncertainty reduction and therefore the most important test of the themes underlying the
thesis. How many employees are active in gathering or processing information about
innovations (H2) and the functional responsibilities (H3) and analytical skills (H4) of
these employees are probably meaningless if a company does not gather information from
a number of different sources.
Table 4 indicates that the relationship between the number of information sources about
innovations that builders considered important and the number of non-diffused
innovations adopted is positive and significant for both high and low uncertainty
innovations. Builders more apt to adopt both high and low uncertainty, non-diffused
innovations tap into more sources of information about innovations than do non-adopters.
21 The results shown on these pages and again as each hypothesis is discussed include the three
individual professional backgrounds but not the variable for total professional backgrounds, as explained
in the discussion of H4.
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MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR HIGH UNCERTAINTY
ADOPTION
VAR: DVHIGH
N: 100
MULTIPLE R: 0.664
SQUARED MULTIPLE R: 0.440
ADJUSTED SQUARED MULTIPLE R: 0.333
STANDARD ERROR OF ESTIMATE: 0.77
VARIABLE
CONSTANT
TOTINFO
TRADEBAK
AEBAK
COLBAK
LPERCEMP
LHOMES
LYEARS
FUNDM2
ATITU
SEG220
MA
IL
NJ
NY
TN
WA
ANALYSIS (
SOURCE
REGRESSION
RESIDUAL
COEF- STD STD.
FICIENT ERROR COEF.
-0.41
0.28
0.70
-0.19
-0.19
-0.10
0.13
-0.09
0.19
-0.01
-0.02
-0.85
-0.52
0.03
-1.10
0.05
-0.39
0.87
0.08
0.28
0.19
0.19
0.13
0.08
0.11
0.12
0.03
0.19
0.34
0.33
0.37
0.37
0.35
0.34
0.00
0.37
0.23
-0.09
-0.10
-0.08
0.18
-0.08
0.16
-0.03
-0.01
-0.34
-0.22
0.01
-0.36
0.02
-0.15
)F VARIANCE
SUM-OF-
SQUARES DF
39.19 16
49.80 83
TOLER-
ANCE
0.64
0.78
0.84
0.73
0.56
0.56
0.81
0.61
0.78
0.76
0.36
0.34
0.41
0.44
0.36
0.40
MEAN-
SQUARE
2.45
0.60
P
T (2TAIL)
-0.47
3.65
2.52
-0.97
-1.01
-0.76
1.63
-0.83
1.51
-0.36
-0.12
-2.47
-1.58
0.07
-2.93
0.15
-1.13
0.64
0.00
0.01
0.33
0.32
0.45
0.11
0.41
0.13
0.72
0.91
0.02
0.12
0.94
0.00
0.88
0.26
F-RATIO P
4.08 0.00
WARNING: CASE
WARNING: CASE
89 IS AN OUTLIER (STUDENTIZED RESIDUAL =
92 HAS LARGE LEVERAGE (LEVERAGE =
DURBIN-WATSON D STATISTIC 2.129
FIRST ORDER AUTOCORRELATION -0.070
RESIDUALS HAVE BEEN SAVED
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4.677)
0.356)
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR LOW UNCERTAINTY
ADOPTION
DEP VAR: DVLOW
N: 100
MULTIPLE R: 0.643
SQUARED MULTIPLE R: 0.414
ADJUSTED SQUARED MULTIPLE R: 0.301
STANDARD ERROR OF ESTIMATE: 0.88
VARIABLE
CONSTANT
TOTINFO
TRADEBAK
AEBAK
COLBAK
LPERCEMP
LHOMES
LYEARS
FUNDM2
ATIllTU
SEG220
MA
IL
NJ
NY
TN
WA
COEF-
FICIENT
1.57
0.23
0.24
0.43
0.09
-0.04
-0.05
-0.02
-0.08
0.09
-0.01
-0.35
-0.50
0.30
-0.48
-0.86
-0.53
STD
ERROR
0.99
0.09
0.32
0.22
0.21
0.15
0.09
0.13
0.14
0.04
0.21
0.39
0.38
0.42
0.42
0.40
0.39
STD.
COEF.
0.00
0.28
0.07
0.18
0.04
-0.03
-0.06
-0.01
-0.06
0.24
-0.01
-0.13
-0.19
0.09
-0.14
-0.30
-0.18
TOLER-
ANCE
0.64
0.78
0.84
0.73
0.56
0.56
0.81
0.61
0.78
0.76
0.36
0.34
0.41
0.44
0.36
0.40
P
T (2TAIL)
1.59 0.12
2.65 0.01
0.75 0.46
1.99 0.05
0.44 0.66
-0.28 0.78
-0.53 0.60
-0.15 0.88
-0.58 0.56
2.49 0.01
-0.07 0.95
-0.91 0.36
-1.32 0.19
0.71 0.48
-1.13 0.26
-2.13 0.04
-1.37 0.18
ANALYSIS (
SOURCE
REGRESSION
RESIDUAL
)F VARIANCE
SUM-OF-
SQUARES
45.13
63.91
DF
16
83
MEAN-
SQUARE
2.82
0.77
F-RATIO P
3.66 0.00
WARNING: CASE
WARNING: CASE
33 IS AN OUTLIER (STUDENTIZED RESIDUAL =
92 HAS LARGE LEVERAGE (LEVERAGE =
DURBIN-WATSON D STATISTIC 2.097
FIRST ORDER AUTOCORRELATION -0.052
RESIDUALS HAVE BEEN SAVED
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3.125)
0.356)
PROBIT ANALYSIS FOR HIGH UNCERTAINTY ADOPTION
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: PDVHIGH
NUMBER OF INPUT CASES PROCESSED:
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE MEANS
VARIABLE MEAN FOR D=0
1 CONSTANT 1.00000
2 TOTINFO 4.25000
3 TRADEBAK .807692
4 AEBAK .307692
5 COLBAK .634615
6 LPERCEMP 3.74271
7 LHOMES 2.17140
8 LYEARS 2.71464
9 FUNDM2 2.02885
10 ATITU -.221154
11 SEG220 .692308
12 MA .230769
13 IL .230769
14 NJ 0.576923E-01
15 NY .192308
16 TN .134615
17 WA .153846
100
MEAN FOR D=1
1.00000
4.91667
.979167
.229167
.583333
3.52620
2.37079
2.59069
2.30208
1.01042
.645833
.104167
.166667
.187500
0.208333E-01
.187500
.145833
CONVERGENCE ACHIEVED AFTER 6 ITERATIONS.
TOL = 0.100000E-02 % CHANGE IN LIKELIHOOD IS
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS: 100
NUMBER WITH DUMMY = 0: 52
NUMBER WITH DUMMY = 1: 48
-2 TIMES LOG LIKELIHOOD RATIO (CHI SQUARED): 55.940
WITH 16. DEGREES OF FREEDOM
RESULTS OF ESTIMATION
LOG LIKELIHOOD: -41.2648
PARAMETER
1 CONSTANT
2 TOTINFO
3 TRADEBAK
4 AEBAK
5 COLBAK
6 LPERCEMP
7 LHOMES
8 LYEARS
9 FUNDM2
10 ATIITU
11 SEG220
12MA
13IL
14 NJ
15NY
16TN
17 WA
ESTIMATE
-3.94752
.440032
1.64722
-.548901
-.427669
-.310902
.322976
-.107068
.531783
0.738495E-01
.213881
-3.78726
3.33080
-2.74458
-4.81601
2.16341
-3.07758
STANDARD ERROR
2.14442
.179023
.677064
.411285
.383093
.279058
.198763
.253655
.271016
0.752880E-01
.425730
3.86491
3.86462
3.88064
3.90269
3.87199
3.86518
T-STATISTIC
-1.8408
2.4580
2.4329
-1.3346
-1.1164
-1.1141
1.6249
-.42210
1.9622
.98089
.50239
-.97991
.86187
-.70725
-1.2340
-. 55873
-.79623
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0.367352E-03
PROBIT ANALYSIS FOR LOW UNCERTAINTY ADOPTION
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: PDVLOW
NUMBER OF INPUT CASES PROCESSED: 100
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE MEANS
VARIABLE
1 CONSTANT
2 TOTINFO
3 TRADEBAK
4 AEBAK
5 COLBAK
6 LPERCEMP
7 LHOMES
8 LYEARS
9 FUNDM2
10 ATTITU
11 SEG220
12 MA
13 IL
14 NJ
15NY
16TN
17 WA
MEAN FOR D=0
1.00000
3.93617
.872340
.191489
.574468
3.68419
2.41127
2.63396
1.98936
-.521277
.680851
.148936
.276596
0.212766E-01
0.851064E-01
.255319
.170213
MEAN FOR D=l
1.00000
5.13208
.905660
.339623
.641509
3.59853
2.13927
2.67394
2.31132
1.16038
.660377
.188679
.132075
.207547
.132075
0.7547 17E-01
.132075
CONVERGENCE ACHIEVED AFTER 4 ITERATIONS.
TOL = 0.100000E-02 % CHANGE IN LIKELIHOOD IS
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS: 100
NUMBER WITH DUMMY = 0: 47
NUMBER WITH DUMMY = 1: 53
-2 TIMES LOG LIKELIHOOD RATIO (CHI SQUARED): 43.901
WITH 16. DEGREES OF FREEDOM
RESULTS OF ESTIMATION
LOG LIKELIHOOD: -47.1842
0.802304E-03
PARAMETER
1 CONSTANT
2 TOTINFO
3 TRADEBAK
4 AEBAK
5 COLBAK
6 LPERCEMP
7 LHOMES
8 LYEARS
9 FUNDM2
10 ATTITU
11 SEG220
12 MA
13IL
14 NJ
15 NY
16TN
17 WA
ESTIMATE
-.487560
.395874
-.477404
.572562
0.381609E-02
-.251326
-0.619401E-01
-.165878
0.309257E-01
.149698
.105444
-.189057
-.831840
.930883
-.392788
-1.03849
-.766535
STANDARD ERROR
1.71351
.154529
.498001
.380910
.366212
.265347
.166365
.252239
.258779
0.648095E-01
.359006
.689729
.668143
.908040
.734825
.695504
.656019
T-STATISTIC
-.28454
2.5618
-.95864
1.5031
0. 10420E-0 1
-.94716
-.37231
-.65762
.11951
2.3098
.29371
-.27410
-1.2450
1.0252
-.53453
-1.4932
-1.1685
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Table 4: Multivariate analysis of the relationship between the number of
information sources typically consulted and propensity to adopt non-
diffused innovations.
multiple standard.
regression coefficient
t statistic
probit estimate
t statistic
finding
adoption of high uncertainty
innovations
0.37
3.65
0.44
2.46
significant (p<0.005)
adoption of low uncertainty
innovations
0.28
2.65
0.40
2.56
significant (p<0.006)
An interesting question related to this hypothesis is, Which sources of information best
predict relatively early adoption? In other words, What sources of information do
builders who are more apt to adopt non-diffused innovations tend to consider important
that builders less apt to adopt early do not consider important? This question was
answered by substituting the individual indicators for the nine sources of information for
the indicator for total number of sources into the multiple regression models. The results
of these analyses were that adoption of high uncertainty, non-diffused innovations were
best predicted (p<0.05) by builders who considered other builders, in-house testing, and
subcontractors important sources of information on innovations (see Figure 4). Adoption
of low uncertainty, non-diffused innovations was best predicted by builders who
considered architects, home owners, manufacturers, and subcontractors important
sources of information (see Figure 5).
These findings are intuitively logical. Builders considering high uncertainty innovations
seek information that they can trust. Asking a source of information that may be biased
or wrong will not reduce uncertainty as well as will asking an unbiased source.
Conducting their own testing programs and talking with other builders provide unbiased
information. (It is not clear whether subcontractors provide unbiased information.)
Some readers may be surprised that builders would share unbiased, helpful information
with direct competitors. Schrader (1991), however, shows that employees in other
industries frequently trade information because it best serves the economic interests of
their firms.
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Figure 4: Sources of information about innovations that best predict
adoption of high uncertainty, non-diffused innovations.
architects and house designers
local suppliers
other
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trade
journals
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trade shows
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Figure 5: Sources of information about innovations that best predict
adoption of low uncertainty, non-diffused innovations.
architects and house designers
local suppliers
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laboratory testing
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owners
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With low uncertainty innovations, the accuracy of the information is not as critical, so
builders are comfortable seeking information from sources with whom they come into
contact on a regular basis, yet who may not have full or unbiased information: architects,
homeowners, manufacturers, and subcontractors. Of course, testing innovations and
asking other builders could also provide helpful information on low uncertainty
innovations, but both of these sources require more effort than necessary. Most of the
builders I spoke with reported that unless they were active in the local builders
association, they had little contact with other builders.
Numbers and percentages of employees gathering information
My second hypothesis suggested that adoption of non-diffused innovations is facilitated
by higher numbers of employees and/or higher percentages of employees who participate
in innovation-related activities. As each root and each leaf of a tree brings in certain
amounts of water or carbon dioxide, each employee considered active in innovation-
related activities was thought to bring in or process information that could be used to
reduce uncertainty.
It was mentioned earlier in this chapter that the relationship between the number of
employees active in innovation-related activities and relatively early adoption behavior
was not analyzed because the independent indicator was found to be not normally
distributed and to have excessive collinearity with the other independent variables. 22
As shown in Table 5, there appears to be no relationship between the percentage of
employees involved in innovation-related activities and adoption of either high or low
uncertainty, non-diffused innovations. Apparently, the ability of builders to gain
sufficient information in order to reduce the level of uncertainty to tolerable levels is not
influenced by the portion of the workforce who contribute information or help in adoption
decisions.
22 For the sake of completeness, I performed limited analysis on this indicator any way. The univariate
relationship between the number of individuals active in innovation-related activities and adoption of high
uncertainty innovations was positive and significant (t statistic = 2.09, p<.02). The univariate
relationship with adoption of low uncertainty innovations was positively and significant (t statistic =
2.01, p<.03). I also inserted this indicator into the multiple regression models. With both models
(corresponding to adoption of high and low uncertainty non-diffused innovations), the number of
individuals active in innovation-related activities was not even close to being statistically significant,
which implies that the significant univariate relationship were spurious or indirect.
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Table 5: Multivariate analysis of the relationship between the percentage
of employees active in innovation-related activities and propensity to
adopt non-diffused innovations.
multiple standard.
regression coefficient
t statistic
probit estimate
t statistic
finding
adoption of high uncertainty
innovations
-0.08
-0.76
-0.31
-1.11
not significant
adoption of low uncertainty
innovations
-0.03
-0.28
-0.25
-0.95
not significant
Number of functions involved in adoption decisions
In light of the underlying premise that uncertainty reduction requires information be
brought into the organization from the organization's environment, it was hypothesized
that the more functions active in innovation-related activities, the more information
gathering and processing are effective, which facilitates adoption. Multiple functions
were theorized to be important for information processing and uncertainty reduction
because individuals from each function are most closely connected with a specific portion
of the environment. For example, sales staff-not superintendents top management, or
other functions-should be most effective at providing information and analysis on how
potential home buyers would respond to an innovation.
It was mentioned earlier in this chapter that the variable measuring the number of
functions among the individuals considered active in any innovation-related activity was
dropped due to high collinearity and non-normal distribution. 23 The variable measuring
23 For the sake of completeness, I performed limited analysis on this indicator any way. The univariate
relationship between the number of functions among the individuals considered active in any innovation-
related activity and adoption of high uncertainty innovations was positively and significantly related (t
statistic = 1.65, p<.05). The univariate relationship early adoption of low uncertainty innovations was
not significantly related (t statistic = 1.02). I also inserted this indicator into the multiple regression
models. With the high uncertainty model, the number of functions active in any innovation-related
activities was highly significant (t statistic = 2.25, p<0.02) when the indicator relating to the number of
functions active in innovation adoption decisions was removed from the model. With the low uncertainty
model, the number of functions active in any innovation-related activities was not significant (t statistic =
-1.24, p<0.22).
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the number of functions among the individuals active in adoption decisions (which is a
subset of the individuals active in any innovation-related activity) was included in the
multivariate analysis.
Table 6: Multivariate analysis of the relationship between the number of
functions involved in adoption decisions and propensity to adopt non-
diffused innovations.
multiple standard.
regression coefficient
t statistic
probit estimate
t statistic
finding
adoption of high uncertainty
innovations
0.16
1.51
0.53
1.96
significant (p<.05)
adoption of low uncertainty
innovations
-0.06
-0.58
0.03
0.12
not significant
As shown in Table 6, the relationship between the number of functions involved in
making adoption decisions and adoption of high uncertainty, non-diffused innovations
was found to be positively and significantly related, while no significant relationship was
found with adoption of low uncertainty, non-diffused innovations. While the
independent variable was hypothesized to significantly influence low uncertainty adoption
as well as high, the lack of the relationship for low uncertainty innovations fits the
underlying theory. Effective information gathering and processing are not as critical for
adoption of low uncertainty innovations because potential adopters are not missing as
much information as they are about high uncertainty innovations. Consequently, it is not
essential that multiple functions are involved in low uncertainty adoption decisions.
The positive relationships between adoption and the number of functions involved and the
number of external information sources consulted are analogous to what Allen (1977)
found in his groundbreaking investigation of communication in R&D laboratories. The
amount of information gathered (which leads to higher problem-solving performance)
was found to be positively related to the number and diversity of external and internal
sources of information that were consulted.
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Professional backgrounds involved in innovation-related activities
Following the argument introduced for H3 that the characteristics of the individuals
gathering and processing information about innovations influences adoption behavior, it
was hypothesized in H4 that adoption of non-diffused innovations is facilitated by having
multiple professional backgrounds active in innovation-related activities. The initial
multiple regression models included one indicator that represented the number of
professional backgrounds from a pre-established list of three. As shown in Table 7, this
variable was not found to be statistically significant for either high or low uncertainty
innovations.
Table 7: Multivariate analysis of the relationship between the number of
professional backgrounds involved in innovation-related activities and
propensity to adopt non-diffused innovations.
multiple standard.
regression coefficient
t statistic
probit estimate
t statistic
finding
adoption of high uncertainty
innovations
-0.03
-0.26
-0.18
-0.74
not significant
adoption of low uncertainty
innovations
0.15
1.59
0.22
0.96
not significant
It was decided to further analyze the relationship between adoption behavior and
professional backgrounds. The regression model was re-analyzed with the individual
indicators for the three backgrounds substituted into the multivariate model for the
indicator for total backgrounds. (The revised hypothesis was that each professional
background was independently and positively related to adoption of non-diffused
innovations.) Tables 8, 9, and 10 indicate the findings from the multivariate analyses of
the revised hypothesis.
Table 8 indicates that having at least one individual with a building trades background
involved in innovation-related activities was found to be positively and significantly
related to adoption of high uncertainty, non-diffused innovations. Table 9 indicates that
having at least one individual with an architectural or engineering (AE) background
involved in innovation-related activities was found to be positively and significantly
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related to adoption of low uncertainty, non-diffused innovations.2 4 Table 10 indicates
that having at least one individual with a college degree other than architecture or
engineering involved in innovation-related activities was not found to be significantly
related to adoption of either high uncertainty or low uncertainty, non-diffused
innovations.
Table 8: Multivariate analysis of the relationship between having an
individual with a building trades background involved in innovation-
related activities and propensity to adopt non-diffused innovations.
multiple standard.
regression coefficient
t statistic
probit estimate
t statistic
finding
adoption of high uncertainty
innovations
0.23
2.52
1.65
2.43
significant (p<0.007)
adoption of low uncertainty
innovations
0.07
0.75
-0.48
-0.96
not sinificant
Table 9: Multivariate analysis of the relationship between having an
individual with an architecture or engineering background involved in
innovation-related activities and propensity to adopt non-diffused
innovations.
multiple standard.
regression coefficient
t statistic
probit estimate
t statistic
finding
adoption of high uncertainty
innovations
-0.09
-0.97
-0.55
-1.33
not significant
adoption of low uncertainty
innovations
0.18
1.99
0.57
1.50
significant (p<O.05)
24 The probit t-statistic was actually below the one-tail critical t value for the appropriate degrees of
freedom, however, this relationship will be accepted as statistically significant due to the high multiple
regression t-statistic.
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Table 10: Multivariate analysis of the relationship between having an
individual with a college degree other than architecture or engineering
involved in innovation-related activities and propensity to adopt non-
diffused innovations.
multiple standard.
regression coefficient
t statistic
probit estimate
t statistic
finding
adoption of high uncertainty
innovations
-0.10
-1.01
-0.43
-1.12
not significant
adoption of low uncertainty
innovations
0.04
0.44
0.04
0.10
not significant
These findings are interesting in that two of the three backgrounds were each significant
for adoption of innovations associated with one level of uncertainty but not the other.
The fact that having at least one individual with a building trades background involved in
innovation-related activities was significantly related to adoption of high uncertainty
innovations but not to adoption of low uncertainty innovations fits with the underlying
theme of the thesis: information processing characteristics facilitate adoption of all non-
diffused innovations, but they are particularly critical to adoption of high uncertainty
innovations. The data therefore support the idea mentioned in Chapter Three that
individuals with a building trades background possess a unique ability to reduce a portion
of the uncertainty associated with innovations. This ability is particularly important for
adoption of high uncertainty innovations. For adoption of low uncertainty innovations,
the uncertainty-reducing skills of individuals with a building trades background are not as
critical and the building trades indicator is apparently lost in the noise of other variables.
The finding related to AE background is not so easily explained. It was suggested in
Chapter Three that individuals with AE backgrounds possess unique skills that can help
reduce the uncertainty of innovations. For example, individuals with an AE background
might be more apt to adopt floor trusses or headers because they could understand the
engineering principles underlying these products. This is illustrated by the following
quote volunteered by a builder during an interview: "If you know enough about the
products, the engineering principles, you can reduce the risk." It was therefore
hypothesized that having at least one individual with an AE background involved in
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innovation-related activities facilitated adoption of non-diffused innovations. We would
thus expect to find that this relationship was significant for adoption of high uncertainty
innovations alone, or for both adoption of high uncertainty innovations and adoption of
low uncertainty innovations. Instead the data indicated a significant positive relationship
with adoption of low uncertainty innovations but a negative, not-significant relationship
with adoption of high uncertainty innovations.
A plausible explanation for these findings relates to the tolerance of uncertainty of
individuals with AE backgrounds and the uncertainty that they cannot reduce.
Architectural or engineering knowledge can be applied to reduce the uncertainty of
innovations associated with physical performance but not with market acceptance. If
much of the uncertainty of high uncertainty innovations stems from the latter, we would
expect to find a positive but weak relationship between AE background and adoption of
high uncertainty, non-diffused innovations. However, since the education and
professional norms of architects and engineers emphasize highly deterministic analysis
and decision making, we might expect to find individuals with AE backgrounds to be less
tolerant of uncertainty. Consequently, it is plausible that individuals with AE
backgrounds can help gather and processes information to facilitate adoption of low
uncertainty innovations, but actually hinder adoption of high uncertainty innovations due
to strong status quo bias.
Positive attitude about early adoption
It was suggested in Chapter Two that in situations of low uncertainty, decision makers
with a relatively high tolerance of uncertainty are more apt to decide to try a new building
product without gathering additional information. It was thus hypothesized that having a
positive attitude about early adoption of innovations-which implies a tolerance of
uncertainty-would be positively related to adoption of low uncertainty, non-diffused
innovations. It was also hypothesized that having a positive attitude would be positively
related to adoption of high uncertainty, non-diffused innovations because it is less likely
that high uncertainty innovations will be rejected due to status quo bias or regret bias.
Table 11 shows that the relationship between builders' attitudes and actual behavior
regarding adoption of high uncertainty innovations is not statistically significant. The
relationship between attitude and adoption of low uncertainty, non-diffused innovations,
however, is positive and highly significant.
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Table 11: Multivariate analysis of the relationship between positive
attitude and propensity to adopt non-diffused innovations.
multiple standard.
regression coefficient
t statistic
probit estimate
t statistic
finding
adoption of high uncertainty
innovations
-0.03
-0.36
0.07
0.98
not significant
adoption of low uncertainty
innovations
0.24
2.49
0.15
2.31
significant (p<0.01)
As was the case with H3, finding statistical significance with adoption of non-diffused
innovations with one level of uncertainty but not with the other does not contradict the
underlying theory. A positive attitude or tolerance of uncertainty can directly influence
adoption behavior of low uncertainty innovations because potential adopters are not
missing so much information that information gathering is essential. On the other hand,
with high uncertainty innovations, a positive attitude is not sufficient to lead to adoption,
and variables more directly relating to information gathering outweigh the importance of a
positive attitude.
It should be noted that if a hypothesized relationship in social science is not found to be
statistically significant, it is possible that the theorized relationship is present but that the
indicators are poor. As mentioned in Chapter Three, establishing attitude scales that are
stable across individuals is quite difficult. It is possible that the three Likert scales
adequately measured the attitudes of adopters of low uncertainty, non-diffused
innovations but not of adopters of high uncertainty innovations. It is also possible that
the attitude scales used inadequately captured tolerance of uncertainty.
Firm size
As stated in Chapter Three, the primary reason company size was included in the multiple
regression models was to prevent size from being a plausible alternative explanation for
significant findings related to other hypothesized variables. For example, it is plausible
that larger companies are more apt to tap into more sources of information about
innovations and to have formal decision making committees composed of multiple
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functions than are smaller firms. Without including an indicator of company size in the
models, the significant findings related to Hi, H3, H4, and H5 could have been
dismissed as indirect effects of company size. It was also stated in Chapter Three that
plausible theories pertaining to the relationship between company size and adoption
behavior can be in either a positive or negative direction. Consequently, the direction of
the relationship was not hypothesized.
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, data was collected on company size using two
indicators: number of homes typically built per year and total employees. The latter was
deleted from the analysis due to excessive collinearity.2 5
Table 12: Multivariate analysis of the relationship between (log) number
of homes built each year and propensity to adopt non-diffused
innovations.
multiple standard.
regression coefficient
t statistic
probit estimate
t statistic
finding
adoption of high uncertainty
innovations
0.01
0.10
-0.42
-0.31
not significant
adoption of low uncertainty
innovations
-0.02
-0.18
0.24
0.18
not significant
Table 12 indicates the data were inconclusive regarding whether company size-as
measured by the number of homes built per year-is related to adoption of either high or
low uncertainty, non-diffused innovations. It is important to remind the reader that only
companies building 180 homes per year or less were included in the sample. Thus, the
finding associated with this hypothesis should most accurately be stated as: "Among
small and medium-sized home builders, company size was not found to be significantly
related to early adoption." The data and analysis do not test whether the adoption
behavior of large companies (i.e., those building between 300 and 2000 homes per year)
25 For the sake of completeness, I performed limited analysis on this indicator any way. The univariate
relationship between the total number of employees and adoption of high uncertainty innovations was
positive and significant (t statistic = 2.15, p<0.02). The univariate relationship with adoption of low
uncertainty innovations was not significant (t statistic = 1.18, p<0.12). I also inserted this indicator into
the multiple regression models. The total number of employees was not significant in either the high
uncertainty or the low uncertainty models.
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is different from that of smaller companies.
Market segment
It was stated in Chapter Three that existing diffusion theory would suggest that builders
building higher priced homes would tend to adopt both high and low uncertainty
innovations earlier than would builders of affordable homes. It was hypothesized,
however, that the relationship between average house price and adoption was positive
only for low uncertainty adoption decisions. In light of the low tolerance of uncertainty
theorized to exist among builders of high-end homes, it was hypothesized that adoption
of high uncertainty, non-diffused innovations would be negatively related to average
house price.
Table 13 shows that the indicator pertaining to market segment (starter, average, or
luxury homes) was found to be not significant for either high or low uncertainty
innovations. It is possible but unlikely that a significant relationship exists but was
partially hidden when the raw variable pertaining to market segment was transformed into
a dichotomous variable due to non-normal distribution. A more likely explanation is that
the twelve innovations used to measure the dependent variables were equally balanced
between cost-saving and performance-enhancing. The former tends to be adopted by the
lower end of the market while the latter tends to be adopted by the high end of the market.
Table 13: Multivariate analysis of the relationship between average house
price and propensity to adopt non-diffused innovations.
multiple standard.
regression coefficient
t statistic
probit estimate
t statistic
finding
adoption of high uncertainty
innovations
-0.01
-0.12
0.21
0.50
not significant
adoption of low uncertainty
innovations
-0.01
-0.07
0.11
0.29
not significant
Number of years in business
It was stated in Chapter Three that the primary reason company age was included in the
multiple regression models was to prevent this variable from being a plausible alternative
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explanation for findings related to other hypothesized variables. Age was hypothesized to
be related to adoption behavior but a direction was not specified. Table 14 indicates that
company age was not found to be significantly related to adoption of either high
uncertainty or low uncertainty, non-diffused innovations.
Table 14: Multivariate analysis of the relationship between years in
business and propensity to adopt non-diffused innovations.
multiple standard.
regression coefficient
t statistic
probit estimate
t statistic
finding
adoption of high uncertainty
innovations
-0.08
-0.83
-0.11
-0.42
not significant
adoption of low uncertainty
innovations
-0.01
-0.15
-0.17
-0.66
not significant
Several builders I spoke with in the course of my investigation sincerely believe that
adoption of new building products that are not widely diffused is so risky that builders
who do so are mostly inexperienced fools who soon go out of business. While the
results of my study cannot be used to convincingly reject this proposition (this would
have required collecting data from builders who had indeed gone out of business), the
lack of a significant relationship between company age and adoption behavior suggests
that it is not accurate.
Geographic location
As stated in Chapter Three, indicators relating to the geographic location were included in
the multiple regression and probit analyses primarily to prevent location serving as a rival
explanation for findings associated with other hypotheses. The only theoretical link
between location and uncertainty reduction/information processing is that some of the
innovations included in the sample used to measure adoption behavior are more diffused
in some regions than in others. The more diffused the innovation, the less information
potential adopters are likely to be missing.
The output fiom the multiple regression and probit analyses provided at the beginning of
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this chapter indicates that geographic location is significantly related to adoption behavior
for several of the regions. The analyses were performed by including dummy variables
associated with all regions except Boulder, Colorado. Thus, the standardized coefficients
and t statistics pertaining to location shown in the analyses output are relative to the
Boulder area. (The coefficients and t statistics of the variables unrelated to location are
not influenced by which location is chosen as the reference location.) For example,
compared to Boulder, Rochester (NY) and Boston (MA) are negatively and significantly
related to adoption of high uncertainty, non-diffused innovations.
The squared multiple R values of the high uncertainty and low uncertainty multiple
regression models were 0.44 and 0.41, respectively, with the location dummy variables
included in the models and 0.34 and 0.29, respectively, without them. This implies that
location contributes approximately 25% of the explained variance in adoption behavior.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS
This chapter first summarizes the theory, hypotheses, measurement methods, data
collection techniques, analysis process, and findings that were discussed in Chapters One
through Four. Implications of these findings for various groups associated with the
home building industry and suggested research needs are then discussed.
SUMMARY
Research questions and background definitions
This thesis has presented theory and empirical data that contribute to answering two
related research questions. The first question is, how are home builders who are more
apt to adopt technological innovations that are not widely diffused different from home
builders who are less apt to do so? The second question is, how are adopters of high
uncertainty, non-diffused building innovations different from adopters of low
uncertainty, non-diffused building innovations?
Chapter One introduced these questions, discussed why they are important for a number
of groups and industries, and provided working definitions of key terms necessary to
answer the questions. Technological innovations were defined as significant,
technology-based improvements to the design, construction, or living space of homes.
Uncertainty was defined as the state when an individual or organization is missing
information necessary to make a decision. An organizational environment was defined as
the unique set of conditions surrounding an organization-its competitors, customers,
suppliers, technology, and regulatory sectors.
Existing and new theory
Chapter Two reviewed existing literature that helped answer the research questions of this
thesis. The home building innovation literature is helpful in that it documents the
environmental factors that influence generation and diffusion of technological innovations
within the home building industry, but it does not address what internal factors influence
adoption behavior of a given firm. Diffusion theory addresses what factors influence
individual adoption behavior, but offers limited insight into organizational contexts. It
was discussed how existing diffusion theory largely ignores the uncertainty permeating
adoption decisions that results when the underlying tasks and organizational
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environments of potential adopters are highly complex.
It was also suggested in Chapter Two that five distinct characteristics of the home
building task cause it to be highly complex and, thus, cause many adoption decisions to
be highly uncertain:
· End products vary considerably.
* End products consist of many interacting parts and/or dynamic subsystems.
· End products face wide ranges of conditions over a long time frame.
· Task requires high levels of tacit knowledge and skills.
· Task requires interaction with a large number of diverse entities.
In light of the significant amount of uncertainty associated with home building
innovations, it was surmised that response to uncertainty is a key behavior that
differentiates builders who are more apt to adopt innovations that are not widely diffused
from builders who are less apt to do so.
Descriptive decision theory that suggests how individuals and organizations respond to
uncertainty was briefly reviewed relative to the thesis topic. When an individual is
missing information necessary to make an optimal decision, she may take two paths:
postpone the decision and gather some of the missing information, or make the decision
based on existing information using heuristics. Which of these paths she takes depends
on the amount of information that is missing and her tolerance of uncertainty.
Consequently, we would expect adopters of non-diffused building innovations to have
either superior abilities to gather and process information about innovations to reduce
uncertainty, or to have higher tolerances of uncertainty.
Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), status quo bias (Samuelson &
Zeckhauser, 1988), and regret theory (Bell, 1988) provide similar theoretical explanations
for why people often are biased against choices that offer higher expected outcomes but
are more uncertain. These theories suggest that potential adopters of high uncertainty
innovations would rarely adopt without gathering additional information. The bias
against a high uncertainty innovation would be so excessive that the existing product or
method would always be judged to offer higher relative advantage. It follows that
information processing capabilities would be more important for adoption of high
uncertainty, non-diffused innovations than for low uncertainty, non-diffused innovations.
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Hypotheses and Methodology
The first half of Chapter Three presented nine hypotheses associated with the new
perspectives on home building adoption behavior presented in Chapter Two. Five of
these hypotheses pertain to structural, staffing, or cultural characteristics of home
building firns which influence their ability to effectively process information about
innovations in order to reduce uncertainty. Adopters of non-diffused innovations were
hypothesized to tap into a greater number of different sources of information about
innovations, to have greater numbers and percentages of employees active in innovation-
related activities, to have greater numbers of functions2 6 and professional backgrounds
active in innovation-related activities, and to have a more positive attitude about early
adoption of innovations.
Four of the hypotheses were not directly related to information processing but were
included to eliminate plausible rival explanations for findings associated with the first five
hypotheses. Company age was hypothesized to be positively related to propensity to
adopt non-diffused innovations. Company size was hypothesized to be related to
adoption behavior. The direction of the relationship was not specified due to conflicting
plausible explanations. The relationship between market segment served (that is, the
average house price of a firm) was hypothesized to depend on the level of uncertainty of
the innovation. Adoption of high uncertainty, non-diffused innovations was
hypothesized to be negatively related to average house price since builders serving high-
end customers would be less tolerant of the risk of something going wrong with a new
product. Conversely, adoption of low uncertainty innovations was hypothesized to be
positively related because high end builders seek products that offer superior performance
but with low perceived risk. Finally, company geographic location was hypothesized to
influence adoption behavior for many reasons.
The second part of Chapter Three discussed how each hypothesis was tested, that is, how
the dependent and independent constructs were measured, how data were collected from
over 100 builders through semi-structured in-person and telephone interviews2 7, and
how the data were analyzed using ordinary least squares multiple regression analysis and
26 Home building firms were conceptualized as having six functional areas: top management,
procurement and administration, sales, design, site supervision, and field labor.
27 The response rate was 55% if builders who never returned messages are counted as non-respondents,
and 85% if only builders who were contacted and stated they were not willing to help are counted as non-
respondents.
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confirmed through probit analysis.
Findings
The results of the multiple regression and probit analyses of the data collected from 100
home building companies provide strong evidence for the general hypothesis that builders
who are more apt to adopt non-diffused innovations are those who reduce uncertainty by
gathering and processing information about innovations. One set of evidence is provided
by the hypotheses that were found to be statistically significant. Four out of the five
hypotheses that related to uncertainty reduction/information processing were significant
for at least one of the two sets of innovations (high or low uncertainty) investigated. Out
of the four hypotheses that did not relate directly to information processing, only one
(geographic location) was found to be significantly related to adoption of either set of
innovations. The beliefs held by many home builders that a firm's use of new building
products reflects the firm's size, number of years in business, and market segment (price)
were not borne out by the data.
A second and cruder set of evidence is provided by the multiple squared R values of the
multiple regression models, which indicate how much of the variances in the dependent
variable are explained by the independent variables included in the models. The multiple
squared R values were 0.44 and 0.41 for adoption of high and low uncertainty non-
diffused innovations, respectively. Approximately 75% of the explained variance was
attributable to information processing characteristics while the remaining 25% of
explained variance was attributable to geographic location. If uncertainty was not a key
attribute of most building innovations, we should not have found that variables relating to
information processing or tolerance of uncertainty would be so significantly related to
adoption behavior.
The data therefore provides an answer to the first research question of this thesis: How
are home builders who are more apt to adopt technological innovations that are not widely
diffused different from home builders who are less apt to do so? Builders who are more
apt to adopt non-diffused innovations are those who gather and process more information
about innovations. Specifically, both adopters of high uncertainty, non-diffused
innovations and adopters of low uncertainty, non-diffused innovations consult more
sources of information about innovations found outside of their companies and consider
this information in their adoption decisions.
The previous paragraph stated how adopters of high uncertainty non-diffused innovations
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and adopters of low uncertainty non-diffused innovations are alike. The second research
question of this thesis was, how are these two groups different? Let me first review the
findings associated with each set of innovations, then compare the two sets of findings.
Three of the nine hypotheses were found to be statistically significant (p<0.05) for high
uncertainty innovations. The most statistically significant (p<0.005) and most
theoretically important finding was already mentioned: Adoption of high uncertainty non-
diffused innovations is strongly predicted by the number of information sources that a
home builder consults in order to reduce uncertainty about specific innovations. Two
other variables were also found to be statistically related to propensity to adopt high
uncertainty non-diffused innovations. The number of functions (e.g., top management,
sales, etc.) active in making adoption decisions was found to be positively related to
adoption of non-diffused innovations as hypothesized. This finding, together with the
finding regarding the number of information sources consulted, suggest that adoption of
high uncertainty non-diffused innovations requires perspective and information associated
with multiple sectors of the organization's environment. Each source of information that
builders reported was important for gathering information about innovations is associated
with a different portion of the environment.2 8 Likewise, each of the functions in a home
building company is most knowledgeable about one or more sectors of the organization's
environment.
While the total number of professional backgrounds active in innovation-related activities
was not found to be significant, having at least one individual with a building trades
background active in gathering information or making adoption decisions was found to be
positively related to propensity for relatively early adoption. Apparently, such individuals
have tacit knowledge that allows them to process information related to how well the
innovation will fit with the construction process.
Neither the percentage of employees considered active in innovation-related activities,
whether a positive attitude about early adoption exists in the company, company size,
market segment, nor the number of years a company has been in business were found to
be significantly related to adoption of high uncertainty, non-diffused innovations.
Three of the six hypotheses concerning adoption of low uncertainty, non-diffused
28 The nine important sources of information about innovations reported by builders were architects or
house designers, homeowners, local material suppliers, trade magazines, manufacturers literature and
service representatives, other builders, trade shows, and subcontractors.
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innovations were found to be statistically significant. Propensity to adopt low
uncertainty, non-diffused innovations was found to be most strongly predicted (p<0.006)
by the number of information sources about innovations that a home builder taps into in
order to reduce uncertainty. Having a positive attitude about home building technological
innovations in general-that is, believing that innovations are important to competitive
success, that early adoption does not always present excessive risk, and that doing
something first in the business can be beneficial-was also found to positively influence
adoption behavior. In addition, having at least one individual with an architectural or
engineering background active in innovation-related activities was found to be positively
and significantly related to adoption of low uncertainty non-diffused building
innovations. Apparently, such individuals apply their knowledge of materials and
structural principles to reduce the uncertainty related to how well innovations may
perform.
The percentage of employees considered active in innovation-related activities, the
number of functions involved in adoption decisions, company size, market segment, and
company age were found not to be significantly related to adoption of low uncertainty
non-diffused innovations.
How are adopters of high uncertainty, non-diffused building innovations different from
adopters of low uncertainty, non-diffused building innovations? While adopters of both
high and low uncertainty non-diffused innovations obtain information about innovations
from more sources of information than do builders less apt to adopt non-diffused
innovations, the amount and quality of the information needed to facilitate adoption of
high uncertainty innovations is higher than is needed for adoption of low uncertainty
innovations. Consequently, having a positive attitude about innovations and/or a higher
tolerance of uncertainty play a significant role in adoption of low uncertainty innovations,
but not in adoption of high uncertainty innovations because it is overwhelmed by the need
for effective gathering and processing of information about innovations.
Builders more apt to adopt high uncertainty innovations that are not widely diffused also
differ from adopters of low uncertainty innovations in terms of the important
characteristics of the individuals involved in innovation-related activities. While having at
least one individual with an architectural or engineering background involved in
innovation-related activities facilitates adoption of low uncertainty innovations, it does not
facilitate adoption of high uncertainty innovations, apparently because such individuals
are less tolerant of and cannot reduce high uncertainty related to market acceptance.
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Adoption of high uncertainty non-diffused innovations is, however, facilitated by having
someone with a building trades background to help evaluate how the innovation would fit
with the company's house designs and subcontracting procedures.
Adoption of high uncertainty, non-diffused innovations also requires intimate knowledge
of multiple sectors of the environment, which is provided by having multiple functions
involved in adoption decisions. The functional duties of the individuals involved in
innovation related activities characteristics are apparently not as important for adoption of
low uncertainty innovations because the amount and nature of information is not so
critical that knowledge about specific sectors of the environment is needed.
Figure 6 illustrates how adopters of high uncertainty, non-diffused innovations and
adopters of low uncertainty, non-diffused innovations are alike and how they are
different.
INFERENCES AND RESEARCH NEEDS
Although it was stated in Chapter One that this thesis was intended to be purely
descriptive, most readers would be frustrated if the findings of any research did not have
prescriptive implications-that is, point to what builders and other industry groups
should do. This section extends the findings of my empirical research to infer what
things builders and other industry groups should do differently.
Home builders
For the purpose of discussing the implications of this thesis, home builders can be
divided into two groups: builders who believe that starting to use some new building
products before they are widely diffused can pay off (that is, provide competitive
advantage) and builders who believe that early adoption of building innovations can never
pay off. For the first group, this thesis suggests they should establish appropriate staff,
procedures, and norms within their organizations to more effectively gather and process
information about innovations. Suggesting that information processing could be made
more effective does not imply that builders should adopt more frequently adopt
innovations before they are widely diffused. Rather, I am suggesting that builders
improve the information processing within their companies to ensure the innovations that
are adopted early are appropriate, that is, are more apt to be accepted by home owners,
subcontractors, and local building departments and less apt to fail.
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Figure 6: Comparison of adopters of high uncertainty, non-diffused
innovations and adopters of low uncertainty, non-diffused innovations.
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The findings suggest that vaguely assigning any one employee or all employees to be on
the look out for new products probably will not be effective. An effective staffing plan
should consider the number, professional backgrounds, and functional responsibilities of
those assigned to gather information or make adoption decisions. Procedures should be
established for collecting meaningful input about individual innovations from home
buyers, subcontractors, retailers, and manufacturers, and for incorporating such input
into timely adoption decisions.
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Many of the builders I spoke with believe that early adoption of some innovations could
be beneficial, yet had a company policy never to do it because identifying these
innovations is too difficult and costly. This thesis suggests such builders should re-
evaluate their policy in conjunction with improving the information processing within
their organizations as summarized in the previous paragraphs.
For the second group of builders-those who believe that early adoption can never pay
off-this thesis suggests that they too should reconsider their position. The empirical
research presented in this thesis did not include a direct investigation of whether builders
who are more apt to adopt non-diffused innovations are more successful than builders
who are less apt. However, indirect evidence for the idea that relatively early adoption
can pay off is provided by the finding in this thesis that adopters of non-diffused
innovations are apparently more knowledgeable about innovations than are builders who
do not adopt until an innovation is widely diffused. If decisions to adopt innovations
relatively early were bad decisions, we would expect to find that early adopters made the
decisions out of ignorance, i.e., that they did "not know what they were getting into."
Instead, this thesis showed the opposite to be true. Builders who adopt relatively early
know more about innovations because they seek information about them from more
sources of information outside their companies and get more functional areas of their
companies involved in the adoption decision.
Further evidence that early adoption may prove effective is provided by the relationship
found between adoption behavior and the number of years firms have been in business.
If relatively early adoption is always too costly or too risky, we would expect that
builders more apt to adopt non-diffused innovations are young finns who have not yet
"learned their lesson." We should have thus found the relationship between early
adoption and firm age to be strongly negative. The data analysis indicated that this was
not the case.
National Association of Home Builders
Detailed recommendations about what builders should do to improve their processing of
information about innovations cannot be made without further research, which suggests
that issues related to adopting building innovations should be added to the agenda of the
research subsidiary of the industry's trade association, the National Association of Home
Builders Research Center (NAHBRC). To better serve their constituency, NAHBRC
should perform research to determine: what factors facilitate efficient information
processing/uncertainty reduction among builders; what are the circumstances in which
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adoption of non-diffused innovations can pay off for a builder; and how builders can
influence the acceptance of building innovations by home buyers, real estate agents,
subcontractors, and local inspection officials.
This thesis did not attempt to empirically investigate the benefits in home building of
adoption of technological innovations theorized in Toole (1990) and elsewhere, but there
is clearly a need for such research. Unfortunately, the reluctance of home builders and
other small businesses to reveal profits and the confounding effects of cyclical demand
makes even a simple correlation study between adoption behavior and firm performance
difficult.
The NAHBRC should consider establishing a clearinghouse to provide builders with
information on specific innovations, either within NAHBRC or in conjunction with an
independent organization. A database containing detailed information on projects in
which specific innovations were used could reduce builder uncertainty about whether the
innovation will perform well in the context of similar designs, site conditions, and other
project factors.
Building material manufacturers
The findings of this thesis strongly suggest that material manufacturers should re-evaluate
their marketing programs in light of the overwhelming influence of uncertainty on the
adoption decisions of builders. In particular, manufacturers need to work closer with
each of the industries and groups that contribute to builder uncertainty about new
products.
Demand-pull marketing is risky and expensive in many industries, but it would seem to
be warranted in home building since many custom builders will continue to look to
customers to suggest new products. Marketing directly to home buyers will be more
effective if market research is able to clarify confusing trends among homeowners. On
one hand, home buyers are more educated about new products and more demanding
about what is in their houses than they were in years past. On the other hand, most
homeowners continue to be conservative about new products and very cost conscious. If
material manufacturers already know, through market research, in which home elements
mainstream home buyers still seek traditional design and materials and in which they are
open to innovation, this information should be communicated to small builders.
Manufacturers need to work with retailers to ensure retail employees are as
knowledgeable about new products as they are about existing products. Retailers will not
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sufficiently train their employees on new products without incentives from
manufacturers. Sweaney, Meeks and Swagler (1992) show that builders' responses to
an innovation based on text and pictures are considerably different than responses to
viewing and touching it. Manufacturers should therefore also work with retailers to
create shelf displays, in-store demonstrations, and take-home literature or samples that
reduce uncertainty through visual and tactile exposure to the product and how it works.
Sales calls on builders by manufacturers representatives and demonstration house
programs would also seem to be effective marketing tools for reducing uncertainty about
performance. These methods also provide a valuable means for manufacturers to obtain
direct feedback from builders. Trade shows provide hands-on exposure and opportunity
for direct dialogue with builders, but many builders I spoke with told me that they avoid
trade shows because they are too crowded and have excessive hype.
Manufacturers need to consider whether product design or product packaging can be
improved to reduce the chances that contractors will store or install innovations
improperly. Manufacturers also need to consider actual subcontractor installation costs
(which may be highly localized) when pricing products and need to communicate this
information to builders. Builders will then be more confident that promised cost savings
will actually be achieved. To that end, manufacturers should perhaps even consider
guaranteeing installation costs.
A final implication of my findings for manufacturers is that effective warranties should be
part of the marketing mix of all innovative building products. Many of the warranties that
come with new building products do not sufficiently alleviate the uncertainty of builders,
installers, home owners, and local regulatory officials.
Academic theory
The empirical findings presented in this thesis indicate that the suggestions for improving
diffusion theory discussed in Chapter Two deserve serious consideration. Although the
empirical research reported here was not intended to adequately test whether variables
directly related to uncertainty predict adoption behavior better than variables found in
existing theory, the significant multiple squared R values of the multiple regression
models indicate that the construct and effects of uncertainty may deserve more
prominence in diffusion theory than they currently hold. The static research design used
in this research was satisfactory for exploratory research, but future empirical studies
must include direct measures of uncertainty and longitudinal and process research (Van de
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Ven & Rogers, 1988) that more directly capture uncertainty reduction processes.
This thesis also suggests that diffusion theory needs to be expanded for organizational
adoption, in particular to reflect task and environmental context. Unfortunately, although
Conrath (1967), Duncan (1972), Miles and Snow (1978), Dess and Beard (1984), and
others are helpful, no satisfactory, generalizable theoretical frameworks exist for
categorizing task or environmental characteristics. Indeed, fundamental issues
concerning the nature, measurement, and effects of organizational environments remain
unresolved (Dess & Rasheed, 1991).
Closing Thoughts
It was suggested very early in this thesis that a significant portion of the public believe
that home builders are either apathetic or excessively conservative about new building
technologies. It is hoped that the theoretical perspectives on home builders' adoption of
technological innovations presented in Chapter Two, the responses to the Likert scale
items in my survey that measured builders' attitudes summarized in Chapter Four, and the
quotes by builders included in Appendix 5 demonstrate that this belief is wrong. Most
builders believe innovative building products are important for their competitive success
and for best serving their customers. However, due to the many physical failures of new
products in the past and the frequent resistance to new products by home owners and
building regulatory officials, the vast majority of builders are highly suspect of using new
products before they are widely diffused. Builders' behavior concerning new building
products can therefore be viewed as a "rational" response to the challenging task and
environmental characteristics of their industry.
This thesis began by pointing out the widespread belief that the American home building
industry is not as innovative as it should be. This thesis has shown that if this belief is
accurate, the problem does not lie solely with home builders or any other single group
associated with the industry. If the rate of technical change in home building is to be
increased, builders' uncertainty about new building products must be reduced. Individual
home building firms can make a significant contribution toward this end by improving
their abilities to gather and process information about innovations, but they cannot do it
alone. The industries and groups that play key roles in the home building task and
comprise home builders' organizational environments must also help builders process
information and reduce the uncertainty of non-diffused building innovations.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1: CLASSIFICATION OF INNOVATIONS USED IN
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
This appendix provides information on how the twelve innovations that were used to
establish the dependent variables were classified as high or low uncertainty innovations.
NAHBRC (1989b, 1991), Slaughter (1991), and articles from various trade magazines
served as sources of data for this appendix. High uncertainty innovations are those for
which builders are typically missing significant amounts of information necessary to
answer the questions below. Low uncertainty innovations are those for which builders
are typically missing less information to answer the questions below.
* Will it perform as promised in all of my homes over a long period of time?
* How much will potential home buyers value or resist it?
* To what extent will it affect and/or be resisted by subcontractors?
* To what extent will it be resisted by the local regulatory system?
* How much will money will it actually save or cost me?
HIGH UNCERTAINTY INNOVATIONS
Composite floor joists or trusses
Description: This term refers to two different products, wood I beams and trusses
composed of laminated veneer lumber (LVL) or sawn lumber. Both replace sawn
lumber, such as 2x10s or 2x12s, as the structural members holding up the subflooring
and flooring.
Advantages: They are more dimensionally consistent and stable, giving the floor a more
solid feeling and reducing the chance of squeaks developing. They can span longer
distances while still meeting deflection criteria, thereby allowing larger open spaces.
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Composite floor joists or trusses, continued
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Criteria question Amount of uncertainty and comments
Will it perform as HIGH: Squeaky and sagging floors are common and salient
promised in all of my problems so builders are attuned to floor systems. Builders
homes over a long period may be skeptical of performance because they do not trust or
of time? understand glue-based flaked engineered lumber and do not
understand the principles underlying truss or I-beam design.
How much will potential MEDIUM-HIGH: On one hand, home owners are attuned to
home buyers value or potential causes of squeaky or sagging floors and are not apt
resist it? to understand or trust the materials or design principles
underlying these products. They may also think that these
products cost less than sawn lumber and suspect a builder is
just trying to save money. On the other hand, floor framing
systems are not visible once framing is completed, so some
home owners will not pay any attention to them.
To what extent will it MEDIUM: Some framing subcontractors have never installed
affect and/or be resisted these products. Some electrical, plumbing, and HVAC
by subcontractors? subcontractors do not know how to work around these
products.
To what extent will it be MEDIUM: Some building inspectors are not familiar with the
resisted by the local products and have concerns about their long-term
regulatory system? performance and proper connection details.
How much will money HIGH: Builders are often concerned about changes in local
will it actually save/cost pricing and availability and whether subcontractors will
me? charge more because they are not familiar with the products.
Computer-aided design/drafting (CADD)
Description: Computer software programs which produce printer/plotter-generated
drawings ("blueprints").
Advantage: A set of plans can be stored in a computer file, allowing modifications to be
made quickly and easily and a new set of plans to be printed. Also, drawings are more
legible, cleaner and more uniform than hand-drawn plans.
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Criteria question Amount of uncertainty and comments
Will I achieve the HIGH: CADD systems have gotten mixed reviews in the
expected performance construction industry, with frequent reports of equipment and
benefits? training costs outweighing productivity or marketing gains.
Builders who typically hire out design and view CADD as a
tool for including this service as part of their company's work
scope have particularly high uncertainty about whether they
will be able to effectively adopt this tool.
How much will potential MEDIUM-HIGH: It is difficult to gauge whether home
home buyers value or owners will appreciate the performance advantages. While
resist it? CADD drawings look more professional, they lack the
personality of hand-rendered drawings. Custom home
owners may lose the sense that their home design is unique.
To what extent will it LOW: Subcontractors are rarely affected.
affect and/or be resisted
by subcontractors?
To what extent will it be LOW: The building permitting and inspection processes are
resisted by the local rarely affected.
regulatory system?
How much will money HIGH: The investment in hardware and software required to
will it actually save/cost perform CADD is substantial. Even builders who already
me? own and use personal computers typically must upgrade their
systems in order to run CADD programs. The time and costs
required to make CADD operators productive are difficult to
estimate but substantial.
Oriented strand board (OSB)
Description: Structural sheathing product made out of oriented strands of wood (similar
to wafer board) that replaces plywood in walls, roofs, and perhaps floors.
Advantages: Less expensive than plywood.
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Criteria question Amount of uncertainty and comments
Will it perform as HIGH: Many builders associate OSB with earlier generations
promised in all of my of waferboard or particleboard, which deteriorated when wet.
homes over a long period Even some of the builders who are not concerned about
of time? wetness failure claim OSB is not dimensionally stable under
moisture (i.e., it swells) or that it does not hold nails as well
as plywood.
How much will potential HIGH: Most home owners perceive OSB to be a cheap
home buyers value or substitute for plywood and also associate OSB with earlier
resist it? generations of waferboard.
To what extent will it MEDIUM-LOW: Only the framing and siding subcontractors
affect and/or be resisted are affected.
by subcontractors?
To what extent will it be MEDIUM: Many local inspectors share builders' concerns
resisted by the local over long-term performance.
regulatory system?
How much will money HIGH: The price difference between OSB and plywood has
will it actually save/cost fluctuated, as has OSB availability. Many builders fear that
me? the $400 or so that they would save on a house by using OSB
would be more than offset by the need to lower the price of
the house due to home owner resistance.
Steel studs
Description: Steel studs (which are lightweight steel channel) most directly replace 2X
wood studs and are part of an overall steel framing system (with metal top plates,
headers, etc.).
Advantage: The price per linear foot of steel studs has dropped to below that of wood
studs. Also, steel studs are more dimensionally uniform and stable than wood studs.
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Criteria question Amount of uncertainty and comments
Will it perform as LOW: Steel studs have a proven track record in commercial
promised in all of my construction.
homes over a long period
of time?
How much will potential HIGH: Steel framing in houses is a totally foreign concept to
home buyers value or most home owners. Home owners seem content with the
resist it? idea of steel studs in commercial walls, but view an
underlying wood frame as the essence of a home.
To what extent will it HIGH: Steel framing would require most builders to start
affect and/or be resisted working with entirely new sets of fiaming subcontractors.
by subcontractors?
To what extent will it be MEDIUM: Some building inspectors are not familiar with
resisted by the local steel framing.
regulatory system?
How much will money HIGH: Although the price per linear foot of steel studs is
will it actually save/cost currently less than that of wood studs, builders fear that the
me? total material and labor costs of the framing system will not be
lower. Also, builders fear that steel manufacturers will raise
the price of steel studs.
Plastic freshwater piping
Description: Freshwater plumbing (i.e., supply rather than waste) pipe made out of
polybutylene or polyvinyl chloride instead of copper.
Source and type of advantage: The price is both less expensive and less volatile than the
price of copper pipe.
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Criteria question Amount of uncertainty and comments
Will it perform as MEDIUM-HIGH: Earlier versions of plastic pipe cracked
promised in all of my over time and current plastic pipe is still more apt to crack if
homes over a long period frozen.
of time?
How much will potential MEDIUM-HIGH: Plastic pipe is still viewed as a cheap
home buyers value or substitute for copper pipe. Plastic pipe is noisier than copper.
resist it?
To what extent will it MEDIUM: Some plumbing subcontractors do not install
affect and/or be resisted plastic freshwater pipe.
by subcontractors?
To what extent will it be MEDIUM: Many building codes do not allow plastic
resisted by the local freshwater pipe within the house. Even in areas that allow it,
regulatory system? local inspectors are often leery of its long-term performance.
How much will money LOW
will it actually save/cost
me?
Vinyl siding
Description: Exterior finish material for walls that is made out of vinyl instead of wood.
Advantages: More durable and requires less maintenance than wood.
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Criteria question Amount of uncertainty and comments
Will it perform as MEDIUM-HIGH: Earlier generations of vinyl siding cracked
promised in all of my and warped over time. Builders in some regions of the
homes over a long period country fear deterioration due to ultraviolet exposure.
of time?
How much will potential HIGH: Most home owners still view vinyl siding as a cheap
home buyers value or and less desirable alternative to wood, probably because early
resist it? versions did not provide satisfactory performance and
exhibited a distinctive sterile appearance.
To what extent will it MEDIUM: Some builders would be required to start working
affect and/or be resisted with installers who currently perform mostly remodeling.
by subcontractors?
To what extent will it be MEDIUM: Some local inspection officials share builders'
resisted by the local concerns about performance.
regulatory system?
How much will money LOW: Material and installation costs are relatively
will it actually save/cost predictable.
me?
LOW UNCERTAINTY INNOVATIONS
Computer-aided estimating or scheduling
Description: Computer software programs that facilitate scheduling or cost-estimating of
future homes.
Advantage: Scheduling programs allow rapid and easy calculation of expected
completion dates, activity float, resource utilization, and other sets of information that
help builders manage subcontractors and keep future home owners appraised of progress.
Estimating programs allow rapid calculation of costs to improve cash management and the
transfer of information gained from one project to another.
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Criteria question Amount of uncertainty and comments
Will I achieve the MEDIUM: Many builders have set up spreadsheets or word
expected performance processing templates to help them document and track
benefits? construction costs as they occur; however, dedicated
estimating and scheduling programs are decidedly less
flexible and less intuitive but more powerful. Some builders
perceive that costing information from one home cannot be
effectively applied to other homes due to various aspects of
the design, size, or site layout that make each home unique.
How much will potential LOW
home buyers value or
resist it?
To what extent will it LOW
affect and/or be resisted
by subcontractors?
To what extent will it be LOW
resisted by the local
regulatory system?
How much will money MEDIUM: Some builders fear the time necessary to enter
will it actually save/cost information about each home into the programs may outweigh
me? the tangible benefits.
House wrap
Description: A layer of synthetic material that is stapled into the sheathing over the entire
building envelope much like building paper. This product is often referred to by the
brand name 'Tyvek."
Advantages: The material is formulated to repel wind and water but allow water vapor to
migrate from inside the house to the outside. As a result, a house is "tighter" (i.e., less
drafts and more energy efficient) without causing moisture buildup on or inside walls.
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Criteria question Amount of uncertainty and comments
Will it perform as MEDIUM-LOW: Some builders question whether the
promised in all of my product really works better than traditional building papers.
homes over a long period The benefits of a "tight" houe are lost if design and
of time? construction near the sill and around windows are not
effective.
How much will potential MEDIUM-LOW: Most builders apparently perceive that
home buyers value or home owners like the idea of the product but may not be
resist it? willing to pay extra for it.
To what extent will it LOW
affect and/or be resisted
by subcontractors?
To what extent will it be LOW
resisted by the local
regulatory system?
How much will money LOW
will it actually save/cost
me?
Composite wood beams or headers
Description: Structural beams made out of LVL flanges and an oriented strand board
(OSB) web that replace sawn 2x lumber.
Advantages: Due to the I-beam design and use of engineered materials, they can span
longer distances and are more dimensionally stable.
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Criteria question Amount of uncertainty and comments
Will it perform as MEDIUM: Some builders are skeptical of these products'
promised in all of my performance because they do not understand the underlying I-
homes over a long period beam principle.
of time?
How much will potential MEDIUM-LOW: Home owners are less apt to understand or
home buyers value or trust the materials or design principles underlying these
resist it? product than are builders; however, many homeowners have
seen them used before. Also, many homeowners pay little
attention to headers.
To what extent will it MEDIUM-LOW: Many framing subcontractors have used
affect and/or be resisted these products. Using them usually does not affect the work
by subcontractors? of other subcontractors.
To what extent will it be LOW: Most building inspectors are familiar with these
resisted by the local products.
regulatory system?
How much will money MEDUM: Builders are often concerned about changes in
will it actually save/cost local pricing and availability.
me?
Insulating concrete wall forms
Description: Blocks or panels made out of expanded polystyrene or similar polymeric
material that serve both as a forming material for concrete and thermal barrier. Most often
used in foundations, but can be used in walls also.
Advantage: Provide superior thermal insulation, may increase the speed of construction,
and may allow concrete be placed on days that would otherwise be too cold.
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Criteria question Amount of uncertainty and comments
Will it perform as MEDIUM-LOW: Many builders already install rigid
promised in all of my insulation sheeting over their concrete walls.
homes over a long period
of time?
How much will potential MEDIUM: Most home owners do not think about thermal
home buyers value or performance of foundation walls as much as they do about
resist it? above-grade walls.
To what extent will it MEDIUM-HIGH: Most foundation contractors are not
affect and/or be resisted familiar with the product and would incur training costs.
by subcontractors? Also, they have invested substantially in conventional
forming systems.
To what extent will it be MEDIUM: Local building inspectors may not be familiar
resisted by the local with the product.
regulatory system?
How much will money LOW
will it actually save/cost
me?
Non-wood trim
Description: Outside trim or molding for baseboard or ceiling that is made out of either
vinyl or a plastic-wood composite.
Advantage: Either less expensive and more uniform than comparable wood or allows
more ornate patterns.
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Criteria question Amount of uncertainty and comments
Will it perform as MEDIUM-LOW: Some builders fear that outside vinyl trim
promised in all of my will crack or warp and that the veneer-over-plastic-wood
homes over a long period composites may de-laminate.
of time?
How much will potential MEDIUM: Some home owners may reject materials other
home buyers value or than real wood as cheap substitutes.
resist it?
To what extent will it LOW
affect and/or be resisted
by subcontractors?
To what extent will it be LOW
resisted by the local
regulatory system?
How much will money LOW
will it actually save/cost
me?
Vinyl windows (clad or all-vinyl)
Description: Windows with frames that are made nearly entirely out of vinyl or are made
of vinyl-clad wood.
Advantages: More attractive than aluminum-clad windows. Less expensive than all-
wood windows and do not require painting.
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Criteria question Amount of uncertainty and comments
Will it perform as MEDIUM: Some builders fear the vinyl will crack or warp,
promised in all of my particularly in regions of high ultraviolet exposure.
homes over a long period
of time?
How much will potential MEDIUM: Some home owners view the products as a cheap
home buyers value or substitute for all-wood windows and/or have concerns about
resist it? the vinyl deteriorating.
To what extent will it LOW
affect and/or be resisted
by subcontractors?
To what extent will it be LOW
resisted by the local
regulatory system?
How much will money LOW
will it actually save/cost
me?
APPENDIX 2: QUESTIONNAIRE USED AS SCRIPT IN TELEPHONE
SURVEY
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Construction Research and Education
77 Massachusetts Ave, Room 1-041, Cambridge, MA 02139. 617-648-4466. Fax 617-641-2980.
QUESTIONNAIRE ON NEW BUILDING TECHNOLOGIES
Company: Date:
Name of individual completing the questionnaire:
Which of the innovative building products listed below does your company use on a
regular basis? Let's say that "on a regular basis" means using it in 1/4 of the cases in
which you have an opportunity to do so. Please circle the answer that best describes your
company for each product. Feelfree to comment on any or all of the products you don't
use.
Composite floor joists or trusses
Composite wood beams or
headers
Computer-aided design/drafting
(CADD)
Computer-aided estimating or
scheduling
House wrap (e.g., Tyvek)
Insulating concrete wall forms
Non-wood trim
Oriented strand board (OSB)
Polybutylene or CPVC
freshwater pipe
Steel studs
Vinyl siding
Vinyl windows (clad or all vinyl)
USE IT REGULARLY
USE IT REGULARLY
USE 1T REGULARLY
USE IT REGULARLY
USE IT REGULARLY
USE IT REGULARLY
USE IT REGULARLY
USE IT REGULARLY
USE T REGULARLY
USE IT REGULARLY
USE 1T REGULARLY
USE IT REGULARLY
TRIED 1T BUT DON'T
USE IT REGULARLY
TRIED IT BUT DON'T
USE IT REGULARLY
TRIED IT BUT DON'T
USE IT REGULARLY
TRIED IT BUT DON'T
USE IT REGULARLY
TRIED IT BUT DON'T
USE IT REGULARLY
TRIED IT BUT DON'T
USE IT REGULARLY
TRIED IT BUT DON'T
USE 1T REGULARLY
TRIED IT BUT DON'T
USE IT REGULARLY
TRIED IT BUT DON'T
USE IT REGULARLY
TRIED IT BUT DON'T
USE IT REGULARLY
TRIED IT BUT DON'T
USE IT REGULARLY
TRIED IT BUT DON'T
USE IT REGULARLY
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NEVERUSED1T
NEVER USED IT
NEVER USED IT
NEVER USED IT
NEVER USED IT
NEVER USED IT
NEVER USED IT
NEVERUSED1T
NEVER USED IT
NEVER USED IT
NEVER USED IT
NEVER USED IT
We are interested in your attitudes relating to new building products and technologies.
Please place a check next to the answer which best describes your company or how you
feel.
In general, when do you start to use a new building product relative to other builders in
your area?
We are generally one of the first
We generally start shortly after the first
We generally start about the same time as most other builders
we generally start after most other builders
we are generally one of the last
Are there exceptions to what you typically do? Have there been one or more new
building products in which you started to use it right after it came out? If you check
"yes", please list the products.
No
Yes PLEASE LIST THEM
In general, there is little to be gained from being the first to do anything in the home
building business. Do you agree with this statement?
I strongly disagree
I somewhat disagree
I am neutral
I somewhat agree
I strongly agree
Using new building products does not make much of a difference in the cost or
performance of a house and does not improve profits or sales. Do you agree with this
statement?
I strongly disagree
I somewhat disagree
I am neutral
I somewhat agree
I strongly agree
In general, the benefits from using new building products right after they are introduced
are outweighed by the risks of using them. Do you agree with this statement?
I strongly disagree
I somewhat disagree
I am neutral
I somewhat agree
I strongly agree
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Which of the following groups frequently suggest a new product or provide you with
information that helps you decide whether to try a new product?
Please check all important
Potential source of information sources of information
1. Architects / house designers
2. Homeowners / customers
3. Local material suppliers
4. Magazines, newspapers, and newsletters
5. Manufacturers literature and service reps
6. Other builders
7. Results of your own testing (such as laboratory or
field tests other than trying it in one of your houses)
8. Seminars and trade shows
9. Subcontractors
Please indicate below the total number of people who work in the following job
categories in your company.
JOB CATEGORY Number of people in this job
category in the company
TOP MANAGERS
OFFICE STAFF
SALES STAFF
DESIGN STAFF
SUPERINTENDENTS AND OTHER FIELD MANAGERS
TRADESMEN AND OTHER FIELD EMPLOYEES
Please indicate below the number of people in each job category who at least occasionally
suggest new building products or gather information about them.
JOB CATEGORY Number of people somehow
involved in considering new products
TOP MANAGERS
OFFICE STAFF
SALES STAFF
DESIGN STAFF
SUPERINTENDENTS AND OTHER FIELD MANAGERS
TRADESMEN AND OTHER FIELD EMPLOYEES
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What are the backgrounds of the people of who are active in suggesting new building
products or gathering information about them? Please check all that apply
One or more has field experience in the building trades.
One or more has an architectural or engineering background.
One or more has a college degree in other than architecture or engineering.
Of the individuals who suggest or help evaluate new building products, how many spend
more than 25% of their workday on these activities?
NONE
1-2
3-5
6 OR MORE
What is the position(s) of the individual(s) who decides whether to try a new building
product? Please check all that apply
TOP MANAGERS
OFFICE STAFF
DESIGN STAFF
SALES STAFF
SUPERINTENDENTS AND OTHER FIELD MANAGERS
Does your company perform non-residential construction?
Yes
No
Please check the portions of your houses that you typically perform with in-house crews
rather than subcontracting out the activities.
Excavation
Paving
Foundation
Framing
Doors/windows
Drywall
Painting
Finish carpentry
Flooring
Insulation
Plumbing
Electrical
HVAC
Other (PLEASE SPECIFY)
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It is important that we know a few more things about your company. Please don't skip
this section. The information requested below is as critical to our research as the
questions you have already answered!
How many homes do you typically build a year?
homes per year
Of the total number of homes that you build each year, approximately what percentage are
built speculatively, that is, construction is started before the owner is known?
built speculatively %
Of the total number of homes that you build each year, approximately what percentage are
built on your own land, that is, on land not owned by some one else at the time of
construction?
built on own land %
Of the total number of homes that you build each year, approximately what percentages
are typically single family detached versus multi-family?
single-family detached (SFD) %
multi-family %
Of the total number of homes that you build each year, approximately what percentages
are typically in the following market segments:
Starter %
Average %
Luxury %
How many years has your company been in business?
years in businesses
Have I missed anything? Are there factors influencing builders' use of new building
products that I haven't asked?
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Thank you very much for taking the time to complete this survey. If you would like to talk about new
building technologies and products or about any of the questions in this survey, please feel free to call
Mike Toole at 617-648-4466 or write your name and number below. I will call you shortly.
APPENDIX 3: RAW DATA
This appendix includes the raw data used to empirically investigate my hypotheses. It is
provided to allow other researchers to perform meta-analysis. Home building companies
(n=100) are grouped by rows, with the dependent and independent variables grouped by
columns. This appendix also includes data on several variables that were collected during
the telephone interviews but not included in the hypotheses or data analysis.
Key to the variable codes used in my analysis
CODE DESCRLPTION DATA CHARACTERISTIC
num Case number assigned to each builder. integer variable ranging from 1
to 100.
floors Composite floor joists or trusses; used dummy variable scored as 1 if
to measure adoption of high the innovation was reported to
uncertainty, non-diffused innovations be used on a regular basis, 0 if
(dependent variable for Hl-H9). not used on a regular basis.
cadd Computer-aided design/drafting same as floors
(CADD); see estsched
osb Oriented strand board (OSB); see floors same as floors
pipe Polybutylene or CPVC freshwater pipe; same as floors
see floors
studs Steel studs; see floors same as floors
siding Vinyl siding; see floors same as floors
estsched Computer-aided estimating or same as floors
scheduling; used to measure adoption of
low uncertainty, non-diffused
innovations (dependent variable for
H1-H9).
wrap House wrap; see estsched same as floors
forms Insulating concrete wall forms; see same as floors
estsched
headers Composite wood beams or headers; see same as floors
estsched
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trim Non-wood trim; see estsched same as floors
windows Vinyl windows (clad or all vinyl); see same as floors
estsched
arch Architects and house designers; used to dummy variable scored as 1 if
measure the number of sources of the source was considered an
information about innovations that a important source of information
builder taps into (independent variable on new building products, 0 if
for Hi) not.
buyer Home owners; see arch same as arch
suppl Local material suppliers; see arch same as arch
mags Trade journals and newsletters; see arch same as arch
mfrs Manufacturers literature and service same as arch
representatives; see arch
bldrs Other builders; see arch same as arch
test Laboratory testing; see arch same as arch
show Trade shows and seminars; see arch same as arch
subs Subcontractors; see arch same as arch
totinfo Number of information sources that discrete variable with maximum
company regularly taps into concerning range of 0 to oo and actual range
new products; calculated by summing between 3 and 7
the scores assigned to the nine variables
listed above (independent variable for
H1)
totempl Total number of employees in the discrete variable ranging from 1
company. (not used) upward
numind Number of individuals considered discrete variable ranging from 1
active in gathering information about or and up
deciding to use new building products.
(not used)
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state Region in which the builder's name was nominal variable using standard
found in the Yellow Pages (used to state abbreviations, transformed
create dummy variables for each region; into 0/1 dummy variables for
which were independent variables for each region
H9)
first Used to measure attitude about early 5-point Likert scale ranging
adoption; Likert scale response to: "In from -2 to +2.
general, there is little to be gained from
being the first to do anything in the
home building business." (independent
variable in H5)
import Used to measure attitude about early 5-point Likert scale ranging
adoption; Likert scale response to: from -2 to +2.
"Using new building products does not
make much of a difference in the cost or
performance of a house and does not
improve profits or sales." (independent
variable in H5)
risks Used to measure attitude about early 5-point Likert scale ranging
adoption; Likert scale response to: "In from -2 to +2.
general, the benefits from using new
building products right after they are
introduced are outweighed by the risks
of using them." (independent variable in
H5)
attitu Attitude about early adoption of discrete variable ranging from -6
innovations; calculated by summing the to +6
scores from the three above attitude
scales. (independent variable in H5)
percemp The percentage of employees continuous variable with
considered to be active in innovation- maximum range of 0-100 and
related activities (independent variable actual range of 7-100 (before
in H2) log transformation)
numfunm Number of functions considered active discrete variable ranging from 1
in gathering information about or to 6
deciding to use new building products,
counting multi-functional individuals in
all of their roles. (not used)
numfuns Number of functions considered active discrete variable ranging from 1
in gathering information about or to 6
deciding to use new building products,
counting multi-functional individuals in
only one of their roles. (not used)
,, , , , ,, ,, ,, , ,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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fundmm Number of functions considered active discrete variable ranging from 1
in deciding to use new building to 6
products, counting multi-functional
individuals in all of their roles. (used to
calculate fundm2)
fundms Number of functions considered active discrete variable ranging from 1
in deciding to use new building to 6
products, counting multi-functional
individuals in only one of their roles.
(used to calculate fundm2)
tradebak Whether at least one individual involved dummy variable scored as 1 if at
in making adoption decisions has least one individual having this
building trades experience. background was reported to be
(independent variable in H4) active in adoption decisions, 0 if
not.
aebak Whether at least one individual involved same as TRADEBAK
in making adoption decisions has an
architectural or engineering
background. (independent variable in
H4)
colbak Whether at least one individual involved same as TRADEBAK
in making adoption decisions has a
college degree other than architectural or
engineering. (independent variable in
H4)
totbak Number of different professional discrete variable between 0 and
backgrounds involved in making 3
adoption decisions; calculated by adding
scores for TRADEBAK, AEBAK, and
COLBAK. (independent variable in H4)
inhouse Number of portions of the house that discrete variable between 0 and
company performs with company 12
crews. (not used)
comm Whether the company performs dummy variable scored as 1 if it
commercial construction as well as was reported that the company
residential construction. (not used) at least occasionally performed
commercial construction, 0 if
not
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lhomes The (log of) the number of homes continuous variable with
typically built per year. (independent maximum range of 0-200 and
variable in H6) actual range of 1.5-180 (before
log transformation)
spec The percentage of homes that the continuous variable between 0
company typically builds speculatively. and 100
(not used)
mf The percentage of multi-family homes continuous variable between 0
that the company typically builds. (not and 100
used)
years Number of years the company has been continuous variable between 1
in business. (independent variable in and 60 (capped)
H8)
start The percentage of homes that the continuous variable between 0
company typically builds considered in and 100
the Starter market segment.
(independent variable in H7)
aver The percentage of homes that the continuous variable between 0
company typically builds considered in and 100
the Average market segment.
(independent variable in H7)
luxur The percentage of homes that the continuous variable between 0
company typically builds considered in and 100
the Luxury market segment.
(independent variable in H7)
seg220 Whether the builder typically builds dichotomous (dummy) variable
home in the upper half or the lower half scored as 1 if the calculated
of the market; calculated by multiplying segment score >220, 0 if not
the percentages of homes built in the
Starter, Average, and Luxury segments
by 1, 2, and 3, respectively, then
splitting the sample at the 220 level.
(independent variable in H7)
numfun2 Number of functions involved in any discrete variable with maximum
innovation-related activity, calculated by range of 1-6
averaging numfunm and numfuns (not
used)
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fundm2 Number of functions involved in discrete variable with maximum
making adoption decisions, calculated range of 1-6
by averaging fundmm and fundms
(independent variable in H3)
dvhigh Number of high uncertainty, non- discrete variable with maximum
diffused innovations that the builder has range of 0-6 and actual range
adopted (dependent variable) from 0-5.
dvlow Number of low uncertainty, non- discrete variable with maximum
diffused innovations that the builder has range of 0-6 and actual range
adopted (dependent variable) from 0-5
pdvhigh High uncertainty adopter or non-adopter dichotomous variable scored as
classification used in Probit analysis 2 if DVHIGH>2, otherwise 0
(dependent variable)
pdvlow How uncertainty adopter or non-adopter dichotomous variable scored as
classification used in Probit analysis 2 if DVLOW>2, otherwise 0
(dependent variable)
l , , 
num floors headers cadd estsched wrap forms trim osb pipe
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
4 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
6 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
7 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
8 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
9 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
11 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
13 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
15 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
16 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
17 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
18 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
19 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
20 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
21 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
22 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
23 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
25 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
26 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
27 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
28 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
29 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
30 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
32 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
33 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
34 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
35 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
36 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
37 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
38 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
39 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
40 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0
41 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
43 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
44 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
45 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
46 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
47 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
48 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
49 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
50 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
51 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
52 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
53 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
54 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
55 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
56 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
57 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
58 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
59 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
60 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
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studs siding
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 1
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 1
1 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
O O
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
O O
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 1
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 1
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 1
0 1
0 0
0 1
0 0
0 0
windows
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
I
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
headers cadd estsched wrap forms trim osb pipe
0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0
O 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
O 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
o o 1 0 0 0 0 0
o 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
o 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
o o 0 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
o 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
o 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
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num floors
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
74
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
5
12
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
O
studs siding
0 1
O 0
0 1
O 0
O 0
0 1
1 0
O 0
0 1
0 1
O 0
O O
0 1
1 1
0 1
O O
0 1
1 0
0 1
0 1
O o
O O
O O
O O
0 1
O 0
O 0
O O
O O
O 0
0 1
0 1
O O
0 1
0 1
o 0
0 1
0 1
0 1
0 1
O O
O 0
0 1
0 1
0 1
0 1
0 1
O 0
windows
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
num
1
4
6
7
8
9
10
11
13
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
25
26
27
28
29
30
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
arch
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
O
suppl
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
mags
1
1
1
I
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
mfrs
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
bldrs
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
I
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
test show
O 0
O O
0 1
O O
0 1
O O
0 1
0 1
O O
0 1
O 0
0 1
0 1
0 1
0 1
0 1
0 1
0 1
0 1
O O
O 0
O 0
0 1
o 0
O 0
O 0
0 1
0 1
0 1
O 0
O 0
O O
O O
O 0
O O
0 1
O O
0 1
0 1
0 1
O O
O O
0 1
O O
O O
0 1
O 0
0 1
O O
O O
o O
0 1
subs
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
0O
totinfo
5
4
6
3
7
4
4
6
3
6
5
5
4
3
6
7
5
4
5
4
5
4
7
3
5
3
5
4
6
5
3
3
4
5
5
5
5
3
5
5
4
3
7
5
6
4
4
3
4
5
5
2
totemp
20
15
4
1
3
3
2
5
12
60
4
3
11
18
7
16
12
50
2
8
6
2
18
2
4
5
1
1
3
3
5
5
13
1
7
20
44
14
4
6
4
2
1
11
5
15
6
18
16
6
3
7
numind
4
6
4
1
2
2
1
3
4
6
3
1
4
2
3
3
2
2
1
1
3
2
5
2
3
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
2
1
2
3
9
3
3
1
2
2
1
2
1
5
3
1
3
3
1
1
119
ho
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
num
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
74
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
5
12
arch
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
suppl
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
mags
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
mfrs
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
bldrs
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
test show
1 1
0 1
0 1
0 1
0 1
0 1
o 0
0 1
0 1
o 1
0 0
0 1
0 0
0 1
0 1
0 0
0 1
o 0
0 1
0 0
0 0
0 1
0 1
0 1
0 1
0 1
o 0
0 1
o 0
0 1
0 0
0 1
0 1
0 1
0 0
0 0
1 1
0 1
0 1
0 1
o 0
0 1
0 0
0 1
0 0
0 1
0 1
0 1
subs
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
totinfo
7
2
2
5
5
5
5
5
3
4
4
3
5
5
5
3
4
5
5
6
3
4
4
4
5
6
4
5
4
1
6
6
2
7
5
4
6
4
4
5
5
4
6
4
6
7
6
4
totemp
49
2
9
10
13
8
7
4
7
60
2
3
9
12
1
1
3
6
1
5
7
3
2
1
2
6
2
1
6
2
5
6
8
4
2
1
7
7
4
5
8
2
3
2
5
8
20
10
numind
9
1
1
4
6
5
3
2
1
3
1
1
1
3
1
1
1
4
1
1
4
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
5
3
3
2
2
1
2
3
2
2
3
1
1
2
3
7
2
1
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ho
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
i
0
1
num state first import risks attitu percemp numfumn numfuns fundmm fundms
1 MA -2 1 0 -1 20 3 3 2 2
4 MA -2 -1 -2 -5 40 5 3 3 3
6 MA -1 0 0 -1 100 5 3 5 3
7 MA -1 1 1 1 100 4 1 4 1
8 MA 2 0 2 4 67 4 1 4 1
9 MA 0 0 0 0 67 4 2 4 2
10 MA 1 1 -2 0 50 3 1 3 1
11 MA 1 1 0 2 60 4 1 4 1
13 CO -2 0 -1 -3 33 3 3 3 2
15 OH 0 2 0 2 8 4 4 4 4
16 MA 1 1 1 3 75 4 3 4 3
17 CO 2 2 1 5 33 3 1 3 1
18 MA 0 1 -1 0 64 5 5 1 1
19 NY 0 -1 -1 -2 11 2 2 1 1
20 NY -1 -1 -1 -3 43 2 2 1 1
21 NY 1 1 1 3 19 2 2 1 1
22 NY 2 1 0 3 17 3 3 3 3
23 NY 0 1 -1 0 4 2 2 1 1
25 NY 1 0 1 2 50 3 1 3 1
26 CO 2 0 2 4 13 1 1 1 1
27 IL 2 1 0 3 50 3 2 3 2
28 IL 1 0 0 1 100 4 2 4 2
29 IL 1 1.50 1 4 28 3 3 3 3
30 IL -1 1 0 0 100 4 2 4 1
32 IL 1 1.50 1 4 75 4 1 4 1
33 IL 1 -2 -1 -2 40 3 1 3 1
34 IL -2 0 2 0 100 3 1 3 1
35 IL -1 1 -1 -1 100 1 1 1 1
36 CO 2 1 0 3 33 2 1 2 1
37 CO 2 -1 2 3 67 3 2 3 2
38 IL -2 1 -2 -3 20 1 1 1 1
39 IL -1 -1 0 -2 20 1 1 1 1
40 IL 1 1 -1 1 15 1 1 1 1
41 WA -1 1 -1 -1 100 4 1 4 1
43 CO -1 2 2 3 29 3 1 3 2
44 IL 1 -1 -1 -1 15 3 3 2 2
45 MA 2 2 1 5 20 4 3 2 1
46 MA -2 -2 -2 -6 21 1 1 2 1
47 IL -1 2 -1 0 75 3 2 3 2
48 CO 2 1 -1 2 17 1 1 1 1
49 TN 0 1 -2 -1 50 3 1 3 1
50 TN -1 0 -1 -2 100 4 2 1 1
51 TN 1 -1 -1 -1 100 4 1 4 1
52 WA 0 0 0 0 18 2 2 2 1
53 WA -1 1 -1 -1 20 3 1 3 1
54 IL 2 -1 1 2 33 2 2 1 1
55 TN 1 1 2 4 50 2 1 2 1
56 TN -1 -1 -2 4 6 2 1 2 1
57 TN 0 1 1 2 19 2 1 1 1
58 TN 1 1 -1 1 50 3 2 2 2
59 WA -1 1 -1 -1 33 2 1 2 1
60 IL -2 0 -1 -3 14 3 1 3 1
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import risks
O O
1 1
-1 1
1 2
1 1
1 -1
O O
1 -2
-2 -2
1 1
O 0
O 0
1 -1
-1 0
1 0
-2 -2
O O
-1 -1
1 1
-1 -1
2 0
1 0
O -1
1 0
0 -2
O 0
2 0
-1 -1
2 -2
2 0
O O
1 1
O 0
2 1
2 0
O -1
2 0
1 0
1 0
1 0
2 0
1 0
-2 -1
2 -2
2 -1
2 2
2 0
-1 -2
attitu
0
1
0
5
3
1
0
0
-6
3
-1
-1
1
1
-1
-6
-1
-3
3
4
4
0
-3
1
-4
2
1
-3
-2
3
2
3
0
4
4
-2
3
3
2
1
2
-1
4
-2
2
5
2
-3
percemp numfunm
18
50
11
40
46
63
43
50
14
5
50
33
11
25
100
100
33
67
100
20
100
33
50
100
50
33
50
100
17
100
100
50
38
50
100
100
28
43
50
40
38
50
33
100
60
88
10
10
4
2
2
2
3
3
4
1
3
1
3
4
3
3
5
5
4
4
4
3
4
2
4
4
3
3
3
4
3
4
4
4
3
4
4
3
3
3
3
4
4
3
3
4
3
4
4
1
numfuns fundmm fundms
4 3 3
1 2 1
1 2 1
2 2 2
2 3 2
2 2 1
2 4 2
1 1 1
1 3 1
1 1 1
1 3 1
1 4 1
1 3 1
1 3 1
1 5 1
1 5 1
1 4 1
3 4 3
1 4 1
1 3 1
4 5 3
1 2 1
1 4 1
1 4 1
1 3 1
1 3 1
1 3 1
1 4 1
1 3 1
1 4 1
4 4 4
2 4 3
2 3 2
2 4 2
1 4 1
1 3 1
2 2 1
2 2 1
2 2 1
2 4 2
3 4 3
1 3 1
1 3 1
1 4 1
2 3 2
4 4 4
2 4 2
1 1 1
122
num
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
74
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
5
12
state
IL
WA
TN
WA
NJ
TN
NJ
NJ
NJ
WA
MA
MA
NJ
TN
NY
TX
NJ
WA
CT
NJ
IL
IL
TN
WA
WA
WA
WA
IL
WA
IL
NJ
NJ
TX
NJ
TN
TN
NY
NY
NY
NJ
WA
WA
CO
TN
NY
NJ
MA
MA
first
0
-1
0
2
1
1
0
1
-2
1
-1
-1
1
2
-2
-2
-1
-1
1
-2
2
-1
-2
0
-2
2
-1
-1
-2
1
2
1
0
1
2
-1
1
2
1
0
0
-2
-1
-2
1
1
0
0
num tradebak aebak colbak totbak inhouse comm homes spec mf years
1 1 0 1 2 1 0 12 50 60 19
4 1 1 1 3 1 0 6 75 0 46
6 1 0 1 2 5 1 3 85 0 15
7 1 0 0 1 1 0 2 0 0 8
8 1 1 1 3 3 1 6 50 0 8
9 0 1 1 2 2 0 2 0 0 60
10 1 0 0 1 4 0 4 0 0 23
11 1 0 0 1 4 1 2 0 0 30
13 1 0 1 2 0 0 50 95 0 12
15 1 1 1 3 12 0 75 10 25 43
16 1 1 1 3 4 1 2 0 0 14
17 1 0 1 2 6 1 8 25 0 12
18 1 0 0 1 1 0 40 0 0 19
19 1 0 0 1 0 0 25 45 0 20
20 1 1 1 3 0 0 50 50 0 48
21 1 1 1 3 0 0 17 50 0 18
22 1 1 1 3 0 1 40 50 0 44
23 1 0 1 2 4 1 150 50 0 29
25 1 1 0 2 0 1 6 40 0 20
26 1 0 0 2 2 0 12 13 0 19
27 1 1 1 3 0 0 10 50 0 20
28 1 0 1 2 0 0 2 25 0 10
29 1 0 1 2 0 0 100 45 0 14
30 1 0 1 2 0 0 20 45 0 21
32 1 0 1 2 0 0 5 50 0 7
33 1 0 1 2 0 0 17 38 0 15
34 1 0 1 2 0 0 10 0 0 10
35 1 0 0 1 0 0 45 45 0 25
36 1 0 1 2 0 1 3 50 0 13
37 1 0 1 3 2 1 10 10 0 21
38 1 0 0 1 1 0 20 50 0 28
39 1 0 1 2 0 0 6 45 0 12
40 1 0 1 2 3 0 12 5 0 6
41 1 0 1 2 0 0 4 43 0 5
43 1 0 1 2 1 0 35 10 0 2
44 1 1 1 3 0 0 65 8 0 6
45 1 1 1 3 6 1 35 0 0 22
46 1 1 0 2 1 0 12 50 0 9
47 1 1 1 3 0 0 4 100 0 2
48 1 0 0 1 0 0 35 70 0 22
49 1 0 1 2 6 0 3 0 0 30
50 1 0 1 2 0 0 4 0 0 9
51 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 0 0 8
52 1 0 1 2 0 0 8 25 0 17
53 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 70 0 6
54 1 0 1 3 0 0 50 10 20 25
55 1 0 0 1 0 1 17 50 0 24
56 1 0 0 2 3 1 3 0 5 9
57 1 0 1 2 6 1 3 0 0 21
58 1 1 1 3 3 1 4 0 0 7
59 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 80 20 15
60 1 0 0 1 0 0 35 10 0 14
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61 1 1 1 3 8 1 120 10 20 60
62 0 1 0 1 0 0 4 75 0 28
63 1 0 0 1 0 0 65 0 30 20
64 1 0 1 2 0 0 37 95 0 12
65 1 0 1 3 4 1 1 25 0 25
66 1 0 1 2 0 0 55 50 0 12
67 1 0 0 1 4 0 1 0 0 11
68 1 0 0 1 3 1 2 50 0 40
69 1 0 0 1 3 1 17 0 10 56
70 1 0 0 1 2 0 180 75 50 22
71 1 0 1 2 7 0 1 50 0 10
72 1 0 0 1 0 0 12 0 0 8
74 1 0 1 2 0 0 12 20 0 8
76 1 1 0 2 6 1 5 60 0 12
77 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 60 0 13
78 0 0 1 1 0 0 10 66 0 15
79 1 0 0 1 7 1 1 0 0 5
80 1 1 1 3 0 0 6 0 0 15
81 1 0 1 2 0 1 10 15 0 15
82 1 0 0 1 4 1 4 0 0 33
83 1 0 0 1 3 1 11 0 0 4
84 0 0 1 1 0 0 11 10 20 14
85 0 0 1 1 0 0 5 0 0 12
86 0 0 1 1 0 0 7 25 0 11
87 1 0 0 1 0 1 10 100 100 20
88 1 0 1 2 2 1 30 90 0 13
89 1 0 1 2 0 0 10 100 70 9
90 1 0 1 2 0 0 4 25 0 3
91 1 1 0 2 4 0 8 88 0 14
92 1 0 1 2 0 0 10 10 0 10
93 1 0 1 2 0 1 2 100 20 38
94 1 1 0 2 0 1 3 33 0 18
95 1 1 0 2 0 0 50 50 0 21
96 1 0 0 1 4 0 3 25 40 21
97 1 0 0 1 0 0 10 25 0 2
98 1 0 0 1 0 1 3 25 0 14
99 1 1 0 2 0 0 12 70 0 60
100 1 0 1 2 0 1 27 10 0 20
101 1 0 1 2 0 1 17 10 0 10
102 1 1 1 3 0 0 10 20 0 1
103 1 1 0 2 6 0 3 0 0 12
104 1 1 0 2 0 1 11 33 0 9
105 1 0 0 1 4 0 2 0 0 4
106 0 1 1 2 0 1 60 100 0 12
107 1 0 1 2 0 1 30 5 10 13
108 1 0 1 2 0 0 50 5 70 35
5 1 0 1 2 2 1 17 99 0 23
12 1 0 0 1 1 0 13 0 0 18
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colbak totbak inhouse comm homes specnum traddbak aebak mf years
num start aver luxer
1 0 0
4 0 0
6 0 80
7 0 90
8 0 100
9 0 0
10 0 0
11 0 0
13 0 50
15 0 25
16 0 50
17 0 0
18 0 100
19 0 0
20 0 100
21 0 0
22 0 0
23 40 60
25 0 100
26 0 100
27 0 0
28 0 0
29 0 100
30 0 0
32 0 50
33 0 50
34 0 0
35 50 50
36 0 0
37 0 0
38 0 0
39 0 0
40 0 20
41 0 0
43 0 30
44 0 70
45 0 0
46 0 0
47 0 0
48 0 30
49 30 50
50 0 0
51 0 0
52 0 0
53 0 0
54 0 0
55 0 30
56 0 30
57 0 10
58 0 35
59 60 40
60 0 20
100
100
20
10
0
100
100
100
50
75
50
100
0
100
0
100
100
0
0
0
100
100
0
100
50
50
100
0
100
100
100
100
80
100
70
30
100
100
100
70
20
100
100
100
100
100
70
70
90
65
0
80
seg220 numfun2 fundm2 dvhigh
1 3 2 3
1 4 3 2
0 4 4 2
0 3 3 1
0 3 3 3
1 3 3 1
1 2 2 0
1 3 3 2
1 3 3 4
1 4 4 2
1 4 4 3
1 2 2 3
0 5 1 2
1 2 1 0
0 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
1 3 3 1
0 2 1 1
0 2 2 1
0 1 1 2
1 3 3 1
1 3 3 3
0 3 3 3
1 3 3 2
1 3 3 2
1 2 2 3
1 2 2 3
0 1 1 2
1 2 2 3
1 3 3 3
1 1 1
1 1 1 0
1 1 1 3
1 3 3 3
1 2 3 3
1 3 2 2
1 4 2 2
1 1 2 1
1 3 3 2
1 1 1 3
0 2 2 3
1 3 1 1
1 3 3 2
1 2 2 1
1 2 2 2
1 2 1 2
1 2 2 3
1 2 2 3
1 2 1 2
1 3 2 3
0 2 2 2
1 2 2 1
dvlow
1
1
1
2
3
2
1
2
1
3
2
3
1
2
3
3
2
3
2
4
3
1
3
1
1
1
2
1
3
2
1
2
4
2
3
2
3
2
2
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
1
0
1
3
2
1
pdvhigh pdvlow
2 0
0 0
O 0
o 0
2 2
0 0
0 0
0 0
2 0
0 2
2 0
2 2
O O
0 0
0 2
0 2
0 0
0 2
O 0
0 2
0 2
2 0
2 2
0 0
0 0
2 0
2 0
0 0
2 2
2 0
0 0
0 O
2 2
2 0
2 2
O 0
0 2
0 0
0 0
2 0
2 0
0 0
0 0
o 0
0 0
0 0
2 0
2 0
O 0
2 2
0 0
O 0
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luxer seg220 numfun2 fundmi2 dvhigh dvlow
40 0 4 3 3 4
100 1 2 2 0 2
0 0 2 2 3 3
80 1 2 2 3 2
100 1 3 3 2 2
0 0 3 2 2 3
100 1 3 3 4 3
100 1 1 1 2 2
40 1 2 2 2 3
0 0 1 1 2 1
0 0 2 2 2 3
70 1 3 3 1 3
100 1 2 2 4 3
0 0 2 2 2 2
80 1 3 3 1 1
100 1 3 3 1 0
50 1 3 3 2 2
50 1 4 4 2 1
20 0 3 3 2 2
0 0 2 2 3 1
100 1 4 4 2 2
50 1 2 2 0 1
100 1 3 3 2 2
100 1 3 3 3 1
50 1 2 2 4 3
0 0 2 2 2 1
0 0 2 2 0 3
0 0 3 3 2 1
50 1 2 2 2 1
100 1 3 3 1 2
20 0 4 4 3 3
70 1 3 4 4 3
0 0 3 3 1 1
20 0 3 3 4 3
0 0 3 3 3 1
100 1 2 2 3 1
0 0 3 2 5 3
50 1 3 2 1 1
0 0 3 2 1 2
30 0 3 3 4 2
80 1 4 4 3 3
80 1 2 2 2 2
0 0 2 2 4 2
0 0 3 3 1 1
0 0 3 3 2 2
50 1 4 4 4 4
100 1 3 3 3 2
100 1 1 1 1 2
pdvhigh pdvlow
2 2
0 0
2 2
2 0
0 0
0 2
2 2
0 0
0 2
0 0
0 2
0 2
2 2
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
2 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
2 0
2 2
0 0
0 2
0 0
0 0
0 0
2 2
2 2
0 0
2 2
2 0
2 0
2 2
0 0
0 0
2 0
2 2
0 0
2 0
0 0
0 0
2 2
2 0
0 0
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num
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
74
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
5
12
start
30
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
30
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
40
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
100
0
0
0
20
0
0
30
0
0
60
0
0
20
0
0
0
0
70
0
0
0
aver
30
0
100
20
0
100
0
0
60
70
100
30
0
100
20
0
50
50
40
100
0
50
0
0
50
100
0
100
50
0
60
30
100
50
100
0
40
50
100
50
20
20
100
100
30
50
0
0
APPENDIX 4: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
This appendix provides descriptive statistics on the variables included Appendix 3. The
names in parentheses after the variable descriptions are the codes used in the computer
analyses and in Appendix 3.
Percentages of sample who reported to
regularly:
composite floor joists or floor trusses (floors)
composite wood beams or headers (headers)
CADD (cadd)
estimating or scheduling software (estsched)
house wrap (wrap)
insulating concrete wall forms (forms)
non-wood trim (trim)
oriented strand board (osb)
plastic plumbing supply pipe (pipe)
steel studs (studs)
vinyl siding (siding)
vinyl-clad or all-vinyl windows (windows)
use the following innovations
39
74
19
50
61
2
15
49
8
4
32
62
Percentages of sample who reported that the following are important
sources of information about new building products:
Architects / house designers (arch) 29
Homeowners / customers (buyer) 30
Local material suppliers (suppl) 70
Magazines, newspapers, and newsletters (mags) 83
Manufacturers literature and service reps (mfrs) 64
Other builders (bldrs) 63
Results of your own testing (test) 2
Seminars and trade shows (show) 58
Subcontractors (subs) 58
Percentages of sample who reported that the following professional
backgrounds are involved in suggesting, gathering information on, or
deciding whether to use new building products:
Building Trades (tradebak) 89
Architecture or Engineering (aebak) 27
College other than AE (colbak) 61
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Other independent variables
number of sources of information about innovations
considered important (totinfo)
number of individuals active in innovation-related
activities (numind)
percentage of employees active in innovation-related
activities (percemp)
number of functions active in making decisions
about new products (fundm2)
% of houses in the starter market segment (start)
% of houses in the average market segment (aver)
% of houses in the luxury market segment (luxur)
overall market segment (segment)
attitude concerning being benefits of being one of
the first in the industry to do something (first)
attitude concerning the importance of new building
products to their success (import)
attitude concerning the risks of new building
products (risks)
overall attitude score (attitu)
number of homes typically built per year (homes)
total number of employees
Dependent Variables, by region
region mean number of high
uncertainty innovations
adopted
CO 2.22
IL
MA
NJ
NY
TN
WA
total sample
1.35
1.06
2.25
0.91
1.69
1.47
1.51
mean number of low
uncertainty innovations
adopted
3.22
2.40
2.71
3.50
2.82
1.94
2.47
2.64
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Minimum
1
1
4
1
Maximum
7
9
100
4
0
0
0
100
-2
100
100
100
300
2
Mean
4.57
2.38
48.91
2.16
5.80
35.90
58.30
252.50
0.06
0.51
-0.16
0.41
20.81
8.65
-2 2
-2 2
-6
1
1
5
180
60
Univariate relationship between hypothesized variables
The table below indicates the t statistics from univariate regression of the independent
variables listed below against the two dependent variables. T statistics above 1.67 are
considered significant (p<0.05) for one tailed tests (that is, if in the hypothesized
direction), and 2.00 for two tailed tests.
univariate relationship with
adoption of:
high uncertainty low uncertainty
independent variable innovations innovations
number of sources of information about +5.28 +4.05
innovations considered important (totinfo)
number of individuals active in innovation- +1.72 +2.48
related activities (numind)
percentage of employees active in innovation- -0.32 -1.92
related activities (percemp)
number of functions active in any innovation- +1.98 +0.57
related activities (numfun2)
number of functions active in making +2.72 +0.79
decisions about new products (fundm2)
total number of professional backgrounds +1.02 +2.61
active in innovation-related activities (totbak)
some one with building trades background +2.72 +2.06
active in innovation-related activities
(tradebak)
some one with architectural or engineering -0.33 +1.89
background active in innovation-related
activities (aebak)
some one with a college degree other than -0.07 +0.72
architecture or engineering active in
innovation-related activities (colbak)
overall attitude score (attitu) +2.04 3.94
log number of homes typically built per year -0.79 +0.99
(Ihomes)
log total number of employees (ltotemp) +0.87 +2.61
market segment (average house price) -0.67 -1.09
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Pearson correlation matrices
(A key to the variable codes shown below is in Appendix 3.)
totinfo
tradebak
aebak
colbak
totbak
Ipercem
Ihomes
fundm2
attitu
seg220
dvhigh
dvlow
totinfo
1.00
0.06
0.15
0.23
0.27
0.06
-0.06
0.29
0.35
-0.21
0.47
0.38
The following variables were used in H1-H7.
tradebk aebak colbak totbak Iperce Ihomes fundm2 attitu seg220 dvhigh
1.00
-0.00
-0.08
0.36
-0.21
0.11
-0.07
0.21
-0.11
0.27
0.20
1.00
0.02
0.58
-0.05
0.07
0.20
0.03
-0.00
-0.03
0.19
1.00
0.64
0.21
0.11
0.22
0.18
0.09
-0.01
0.07
1.00
-0.03
0.15
0.20
0.26
0.04
0.10
0.25
1.00
-0.40
0.41
0.09
-0.06
0.03
-0.19
1.00
-0.23
0.11
-0.19
-0.08
0.10
1.00
0.15
0.05
0.26
0.08
1.00
-0.08
0.20
0.37
1.00
-0.07
-0.11
1.00
0.25
The following variables were not used in any hypotheses but are included
for meta-analyis or other analysis by other researchers.
totempl numind numfunm numfuns inhouse comm spec mf lyears dvhigh
totempl 1.00
numind
numfunm
numfuns
inhouse
comm
spec
mf
lyears
dvhigh
dvlow
0.56
-0.15
0.40
0.46
0.07
0.00
0.20
0.30
0.00
0.20
1.00
0.24
0.76
0.29
0.12
-0.01
0.15
0.28
0.17
0.24
1.00
0.37
0.12
0.08
-0.12
-0.04
-0.15
0.16
-0.08
1.00
0.17
0.05
-0.05
0.13
0.24
0.17
0.20
1.00
0.29
-0.24
-0.00
0.17
0.12
0.21
1.00
-0.01
-0.04
0.19
0.10
0.06
1.00
0.19
0.09
-0.03
-0.11
1.00
0.18
0.16
0.23
1.00
-0.11
0.08
1.00
0.25
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APPENDIX 5: QUOTES BY BUILDERS
This appendix features quotes by builders volunteered during in-person interviews or
telephone surveys. They are grouped by the themes presented in Chapter Two.
'You just don't know if it will work'
The quotes in this section illustrate the uncertainty builders perceive about new building
products that is related to the complexity of the task in which innovations are introduced.
Because building products are subjected to a wider range of conditions than is possible in
pre-release testing and because there have been so many failures of new building products
in the past, builders understandably are extremely cautious about adoption of innovations
that are not widely diffused.
"They have to be proven before I will use it."
"If it's working, I don't want to change. If you have to go back and repair it..."
"I've been burned many times. Why do I keep trying new things? I'm dumb, I guess. I
mean, I want to be smart and keep up, but I keep getting burned."
"You are definitely taking a risk."
"I used to be on the forefront, but I've had a lot of bad experiences. Now we like to see a
product tested for a while."
"Manufacturers are biased. They will tell you how wonderful it is, but it is not always so
great."
"A lot of new products don't come with installation or protection literature. They get
stored in the mud then installed improperly."
"Half the time new products end up failing, so we have to go back and fix it. But the
other half, they work well and we end up setting the pace for other builders."
"Many new products compromise durability ...."
New products are an "inherent risk."
"We don't like to stick our necks out."
"We're ahead of most builders.... We continue to do it but we get burned."
"If you are interested in new products, you are crazy."
"Warranty is your problem. Is the manufacturer going to be around for a long time?"
"It's got to prove itself."
"We are slow to switch. Let someone else take the risk first."
"I want to be up near the front of the pack, but not necessarily first. Litigation is so
common. You can get sued for anything. We don't do anything that could lead to a
problem."
"You've got to know the down side of each new product, how to use it properly."
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"I don't trust a product that depends entirely on glue."
'You just don't know if buyers will go for it'
The quotes in this section illustrate the uncertainty builders perceive about technological
innovations that is related to the most critical area of the home builder environment: home
buyer acceptance.
"If we don't have the information to educate the buyer, we don't use it."
(vinyl siding) "Excellent product but you can't get it accepted except in low end."
"Buying a house is the biggest investment of their life, so they don't want to take any
risks."
"People see OSB and think, 'more like cardboard than plywood."'
"If you know enough about the products, the engineering principles, you can reduce the
risk. But you still got sellability risks."
"We let someone else do the testing, so the public comes to accept it."
"You have to worry about buyer's perception if it is visible."
"It has to be accepted by the public first before we'll try it."
"I wait for a customer to ask for something. Hey, 'if it ain't broke...', right?"
"You've really got to do a lot of marketing to get something new accepted. There is
usually a margin of safety with existing products, so there isn't a lot of incentive."
"Selling a steel house is totally different. There's a lot of learning, education involved.
Using steel studs when everyone else is using wood is like committing suicide."
"We are not really innovators. We've been in business since 1965 and we sell that we
will be around for a long time. A lot of guys are willing to try anything for price. We are
not."
"My goal is to differentiate my product from the standing inventory. The more I
differentiate my product, the better I do, which may require new products or new
designs."
"I'm willing to try a new product when a customer asks for it, but not until then."
(Homeowners) "are helping us to become more educated. They ask about things we
don't even know about."
"First movers don't get appreciated" in this business. We are here to serve the niche that
exists, not to create a new one."
Uncertainty related to other environmental sectors
The quotes in this section illustrate that builders adoption behavior reflects other areas of
their environment, particularly building codes.
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"Codes are screwy."
"It's also an educational process with inspectors."
"Unions and codes very restrictive. As a result of that mentality, we are not going to
pioneer through" (every municipality the company builds in).
"A lot of this stuff is governed by codes."
"Local interpretation of building codes is really bad-fire blocking, etc. Also, the
inspector asks for things not in the codes.... Codes are builders' worst enemy."
"You carry subs kicking and screaming."
"Real estate agents need to be educated about new products."
Information reduces uncertainty
The key assumption underlying many of my hypotheses was that builders who are more
apt to adopt innovations that are not widely diffused reduced the uncertainty of
innovations through gathering information. This point is illustrated in the following
quotes.
"We use it only if we are absolutely sure it will work."
"We wait for acceptance, avoid using something right away. And we definitely get buyer
input."
"If I use something first, I have made damn sure it is going to work."
"It has got to be proven" before we use it."
"You've got to do a little research first. We might try it on a spec home or model first."
'The kind of information you need" about new products "depends on the product."
"I'm not worried about new products needing to be fixed more often, not as long as they
are installed properly and you've talked with the manufacturer about it."
Do new products typically cost more or less?
It is the author's opinion that some product innovations are high cost, high performance
while others are lower cost, equal or higher performance. The quotes included in this
section illustrate that many builders have strong perceptions on this issue that go one way
or the other.
'That's the problems with new products. Every time they come out with something new,
it costs more."
"Sometimes they help sell, but they never save money."
"Most new products are cost-saving, which are most important in lower-end homes.
They look like real products at first, but eventually you get what you pay for."
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"New products drive up costs, but they provide better sales."
"Your subs usually want more money for something new, so it really doesn't pay."
"Some new products make sense, but you can't get the customer to pay for it."
"All customers are cost conscious. New products let us offer more features for the same
money."
"In the $250-300 range, we are very reluctant to try anything new. In the $100-125
range, we will try anything to keep the price down."
"Manufacturers say, 'this costs more but there are labor savings.' But subs say they
want more to install it."
"We've considered steel studs. They are supposed to cost less, but our carpenter subs
haven't had a raise in a few years, so they'd use it as an excuse to get more money."
Miscellaneous
The quotes in this section pertain to various issues associated with adoption of home
building technological innovations that are not widely diffused.
'There is a bottom line that you can measure and one you can't. You can't know the cost
of not keeping current."
"It is only risk if you can't identify a fault, a problem to solve, a void to fill."
"I see a product in a magazine that fills a hole in the market. I think, 'If we had this
product, we could have done a better job with Mr ..... "
"Who uses a lot of new products? The guys who aren't around anymore, or they're just
barely hanging on."
"Manufacturers don't support their new products like they should. Anderson came out
with these new types of windows. I went whole-hog on them in a development, then
Anderson just discontinued them. Made me look bad. Owens-Corning introduced this
new type of insulation, kind of like thermaply. I fought the city to use it, then Owens-
Corning just pulled it, probably because sales were going fast enough for them. You
have enough of these experiences, and it blunts your pioneering spirit."
"I'm a risk-taker, a gambler. I have to fight myself to keep from being the first one. The
rewards just aren't there, takes too much time and energy to be first."
"Pioneers get shot, arrows in their necks, and stuff like that."
"Financial strength is important. Innovation takes time, which I wouldn't have if I was
always worried about cash flow."
"It's an educational process. It's cheaper to copy than to pioneer."
"The small builder is consumed with running his business. He's a lawyer, accountant,
backhoe operator. He's too busy to learn about new products. During the weekdays
you're building. On weekends you're selling. At nights you're planning meetings,
running through your numbers..."
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